DRŽAVNA POMOĆ ZA ISTRAŽIVANjE I RAZVOJ I INOVACIJE KOJA SE MORA PRIJAVITI

2021 ◽  
pp. 397-409
Author(s):  
Stefan Šokinjov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Member States ◽  
Incentive Effect ◽  
Council Regulation

According to Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 of 13 th July 2015 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of horizontal State aid the Commission may declare state aid for research&development and innovation compatible with the internal market and are not subject to the notification requirement of Article 108(3) TFEU. Authorized by mentioned Regulation, Commission adopted Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty and stipulated conditions under which state aid for research&development and innovation is exempted from the notification requirement. It does not mean that state aid which does not fulfill prescribed conditions is forbidden. State aid which does not fulfill envisaged conditions can be considered compatible with the internal market if after notification to the Commission it assessing it separately establishes that it satisfies each of the following criteria: contribution to a well-defined objective of common interest; need for State intervention; appropriateness of the aid measure; incentive effect; proportionality of the aid (aid limited to the minimum); avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade between Member States and transparency of aid

scholarly journals EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION OF STATE AIDS AND PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL (PART 1)

2020 ◽  
pp. 72-82
Author(s):  
Ramón Terol Gómez
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Professional Sports ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Professional Football ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Commission Regulation ◽  
Council Regulation ◽  
State Aids

1. Introducción: la problemática compatibilidad de la financiación pública del deporte (fútbol) profesional con el régimen de ayudas de Estado de la Unión Europea. 2. Referencia a las previsiones del Derecho de la Unión Europea sobre ayudas de Estado. 2.1. La regulación de los artículos 107 a 109 TFUE. 2.2. La referencia al deporte del Reglamento (UE) 2015/1588, del Consejo, de 13 de julio de 2015, sobre la aplicación de los artículos 107 y 108 del TFUE a determinadas categorías de ayudas estatales horizontales. 2.3. La financiación de infraestructuras deportivas en el Reglamento (UE) № 651/2014, de la Comisin, de 17 de junio de 2014, por el que se declaran determinadas categorías de ayudas compatibles con el mercado interior en aplicación de los artículos 107 y 108 TFUE.  1. Introduction: the problematic compatibility of public financing of professional sports (football) withthe State aid scheme of the European Union. 2. Reference to the provisions of European Union Law on State aid. 2.1. The regulation of articles 107 to 109 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). 2.2. The reference to the sport of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 of 13 July 2015 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU to certain categories of horizontal state aid. 2.3. The financing of sports infrastructures in Commission Regulation (EU) № 651/2014 of 17 June 2014, declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.

Enhanced Cooperation and European Tax Law

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Heber
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Member States ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
The Law

The enhanced cooperation mechanism allows at least nine Member States to introduce secondary EU law which is only binding among these Member States. From an internal market perspective, enhanced cooperation laws are unique as they lie somewhere between unilateral Member State laws and uniform EU law. The law creates harmonisation and coordination between the participating Member States, but it may introduce trade obstacles in relation to non-participating Member States. This book reveals that the enhanced cooperation mechanism allows Member States to protect their harmonised values and coordination endeavours against market efficiency. Values which may not be able to justify single Member State’s trade obstacles may outweigh pure internal market needs if an entire group of Member States finds these value worthy of protection. However, protection of the harmonised values can never go as far as shielding participating Member States from the negative effects of enhanced cooperation laws. The hybrid nature of enhanced cooperation laws—their nexus between the law of a single Member State and secondary EU law—also demands that these laws comply with state aid law. This book shows how the European state aid law provisions should be applied to enhanced cooperation laws. Furthermore, the book also develops a sophisticated approach to the limits non-participating Member States face in ensuring that their actions do not impede the implementation of enhanced cooperation between the participating Member States.

scholarly journals Competition Law and State Aid for Failing Banks in the EU and its Specific Implications for CEE Member States

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Virág Blazsek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Common Market ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Bank Bailouts ◽  
The Eu

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the longrun however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.

Part V Judicial Review before the Court of Justice of the European Union, 3 Decentralized Judicial Review and Enforcement of EU State Aid Rules

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Common Market ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Common

This chapter assesses the enforcement of EU State aid rules. The Commission is not the only authority involved in the monitoring of State aid. As regards the supervision of Member States' compliance with their obligations under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, the national courts also have an important role to play. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for national courts to ensure the safeguarding, until the final decision of the Commission, of the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU.

5. Article 102

2021 ◽  
pp. 180-223
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

This chapter discusses the main features of Article 102 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is concerned with the abusive conduct of dominant firms. It begins by discussing the meaning of ‘undertaking’ and ‘effect on trade between Member States’ in the context of Article 102. It then considers what is meant by a dominant position and looks at the requirement that any dominant position must be held in a substantial part of the internal market. Thereafter it discusses some general considerations relevant to the concept of abuse of dominance, followed by an explanation of what is meant by ‘exploitative’, ‘exclusionary’ and ‘single market’ abuses. It then discusses possible defences to allegations of abuse, and concludes by considering the consequences of infringing Article 102.

Differentiation through Derogations—Contesting Internal Market Discipline

2019 ◽  
pp. 143-179
Author(s):  
Maria Weimer
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Market Discipline ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Practical Application ◽  
Member States ◽  
Strict Interpretation ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Decentralized Governance ◽  
Legal Frameworks

This chapter examines attempts to accommodate diversity and disagreement on issues of agricultural biotechnology in the European Union through derogation mechanisms, such as those contained in Article 114 TFEU. More specifically, it considers whether derogations can lead to differentiation in EU harmonization to regulate risk in the internal market. The chapter begins with a discussion of pathways of differentiation available under EU harmonized legal frameworks, with particular emphasis on opt-out clauses under Article 114(4) and (5) TFEU and safeguard clauses in EU secondary legislation. It then explores the practical application of these clauses in the field of GMOs, showing that their strict interpretation by both the Commission and the CJEU leaves little room for differentiation and decentralized governance after GMO authorization. Finally, the chapter analyses the contestation by Member States of such strict interpretation. By continuously invoking opt-outs and safeguards, Member States have achieved de facto differentiation through disobedience.

5. Article 102

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Controversial Issue ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter discusses the main features of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is concerned with the abusive conduct of dominant firms. It begins by introducing the European Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article [102 TFEU] to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. It then discusses the concept of undertaking, the requirement of an effect on trade between Member States, the concept of a dominant position and the requirement that any dominant position must be held in a substantial part of the internal market. The chapter also considers the meaning of abuse of a dominant position, which is a complex and controversial issue. A discussion of the defences to allegations of abuse is followed by a brief look at the consequences of infringing Article 102.

EU Institutions Representing Member States’ Governments

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugenia Dumitriu Segnana ◽  
Alberto de Gregorio Merino
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Central Place ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Policies ◽  
Greek Crisis

The Council of the European Union (EU) occupies a central place in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), even more so than in any other Union policies. It exercises in this area a variety of roles going from a forum for coordination of national policies to legislative functions and executive powers. The different crises that affected the Union and in particular the euro area in the last ten years have strengthened its prominent position, in no small part due to the Council’s ownership by the Member States. Alongside the Council, the Euro Group, which is presided by a fixed-term president, has developed itself as the informal forum where Ministers from the Member States whose currency is the euro discuss matters of common interest. Its role has been decisive, in particular in the Cypriot and Greek crisis, which could have put into question the very existence of the euro area as a whole.

scholarly journals Zagadnienie pomocy publicznej udzielanej na ochronę środowiska – teoria zawodności rynku a polityka konkurencji Unii Europejskiej

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-172
Author(s):  
Piotr Podsiadło
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Eu

The aim of this article is to present the conditions of admissibility of state aidin the European Union, with particular emphasis on horizontal aid for environmentalprotection. State aid measures can correct market failures and therebycontribute towards achieving common objectives. It should be targeted towardssituations where aid can bring a material improvement that the market cannotdeliver alone. The EU Member States intending to grant environmental or energyaid have to define precisely the objective pursued and explain what is the expectedcontribution of the measure towards this objective.

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