scholarly journals VIABLE HEALTH FUNDING IN TIME OF DEMOGRAPHIC AGEING

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marija Trpkova-Nestorovska ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Health Expenditure ◽  
National Health System ◽  
Social Spending ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Older Population ◽  
Demographic Ageing ◽  
Dummy Variable ◽  
Global Recession ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure

In the past several decades a new challenge has arisen, and it refers to the rapid demographic ageing of the population in developed and developing countries, quite opposite to the previous understanding of overpopulated planet. Increase in the older population brings its implications to different segments of the society, and the national health system and its funding is one of them. This paper tends to analyze if there is a relationship between the government health expenditure and the increase in the older population in fourteen countries from the European Union that are experiencing most intense process of demographic ageing. Also, other possible determinants of the health expenditures are included, such as government social spending, gross domestic product per capita and dummy variable to estimate the effect of the global recession onto the health expenditure.

scholarly journals Does intense electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong Woo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Health Issues ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure ◽  
High Level

<p></p><p>Does intense electoral competition in electoral autocracies (EAs) increase the government health expenditure? Previous studies on EAs and public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in EAs as a significant determinant on the expenditure. Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators; hence. multiparty elections <i>per se</i> do not capture well-known impact of elections, such as the electoral competition increasing health expenditure. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competition is high. This paper analyzes the effect of electoral competition on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competition affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competition indicates a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health expenditure to voters when the level of electoral competition is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competition in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competition does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competition in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.</p><br><p></p>

scholarly journals The belated implementation of a long-awaited health system in Cyprus and the role of interest groups

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise Alexandrou ◽  
Marios Kantaris ◽  
Mamas Theodorou
Keyword(s):  
Health System ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
National Health System ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Health Coverage ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Media ◽  
Path Dependent ◽  
The Government ◽  
Political Economic

It is really a paradox that 60 years were required to establish a modern health system in Cyprus, despite the expressed positive attitude οf all political parties and most governments. This article investigates the planning and implementation of the National Health System (NHS) and its delay determinants, by employing qualitative research of published sources, audio material and 33 interviews with elite key informants. A major anti-reform alliance, consisting of private doctors, private hospitals and health insurance companies was identified, further supported by doctors of the “old” public system, whose benefits were threatened. Delay contributions additionally arose from media and patient groups, whilst the pharmaceutical sector imposed insignificant influence. Τhe prevailing political, economic and social environment, along with aspects of the proposed reform, fueled this anti-reform movement. However, climate in favour of the NHS implementation gradually developed, attributed to the power balance shift supportingthe Minister of Health and the government, mobilization of important actors/stakeholders, including the Federation of Patients' Organizations of Cyprus and the Media, and significant decrease in the influence of reform-resistant groups. The new dynamics created a supportive environment leading to the NHS launch on June 1st, 2019; thus Cyprus has ceased to be the last state of the European Union (EU) without a universal health coverage system. The process of introducing this new system in Cyprus is a prime example of resource and power redistribution amongst different interest groups and of the catalysts required to exit the orbit of an extremely “path-dependent” system, potentially inspiring future reformers.

Analysis of novel FAGM(1,1,tα) model to forecast health expenditure of China

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 232-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenqing Wu ◽  
Xin Ma ◽  
Yuanyuan Zhang ◽  
Yong Wang ◽  
Xinxing Wu
Keyword(s):  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Grey Model ◽  
Approximation Formula ◽  
Content Type ◽  
National Health Expenditure ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure ◽  
Particle Swarm Optimisation Algorithm ◽  
Practical Implications

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to study a fractional grey model FAGM(1,1,tα) based on the GM(1,1,tα) model and the fractional accumulated generating operation, and then predict the national health expenditure, the government health expenditure and the out-of-pocket health expenditure of China.Design/methodology/approachThe presented univariate grey model is systematically studied by using the grey modelling technique, the fractional accumulated generating operation and the trapezoid approximation formula of definite integral. The optimal system parametersrandαare evaluated by the particle swarm optimisation algorithm.FindingsThe expressions of the time response function and the restored values of this model are derived. The GM(1,1), NGM(1,1,k,c) and GM(1,1,tα) models are particular cases of the FAGM(1,1,tα) model with deterministicrandα. Compared with other forecasting models, the results of the FAGM(1,1,tα) model have higher precision.Practical implicationsThe superiority of the new model has high potential to be used in the medicine and health fields and others. Results can provide a guideline for government decision making.Originality/valueThe univariate fractional grey model FAGM (1,1,tα) successfully studies the China’s health expenditure.

Health Status, Government Health Expenditure and Economic Growth Nexus in India: A Toda–Yamamoto Causality Approach

2020 ◽  
pp. 097674792096340
Author(s):  
Avinash Kaur
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Health Status ◽  
Mortality Rate ◽  
Infant Mortality ◽  
Life Expectancy ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Infant Mortality Rate ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure

This article attempts to examine the causal linkage among government health expenditure, health status and economic growth in India for the period from 1981–1982 to 2015–2016. The results of Johansen co-integration test indicate that government health expenditure, health status and economic growth have long-run relationship in India. The results of Toda–Yamamoto causality test showed that there existed unidirectional causal relationship running from government health expenditure to gross domestic product—GDP (economic growth); GDP (economic growth) to life expectancy; government health expenditure to infant mortality rate and infant mortality rate to life expectancy. On the other hand, there is no evidence showing causality in any direction between infant mortality rate to GDP (economic growth) and government health expenditure to life expectancy. The study strongly confirmed that the government health expenditure has an effect on GDP (economic growth) and infant mortality rate (which depicts health status) in India. The health outcomes, namely life expectancy and infant mortality rare, reveal unidirectional causality between them. Therefore, the study concludes that policymakers and the government should pay proper attention to the health sector in order to ultimately achieve economic growth in the country.

scholarly journals Does electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong Woo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Health Issues ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

<p>Previous studies on the electoral autocracies (EAs) and public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in EAs. Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators. Multiparty elections <i>per se</i> do not capture the impact of characteristics during elections such as the electoral competition in EAs. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competition is high. I analyze the effect of electoral competition on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competition affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competition stands for a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health policy to voters when the level of electoral competition is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competition in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competition does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competition in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.</p>

scholarly journals Does electoral competitiveness increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong Woo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Electoral Competitiveness

<p>Previous studies on the public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in electoral autocracies (EAs). Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators. Multiparty elections <i>per se</i> do not capture the impact of characteristics during elections such as the electoral competitiveness in EAs. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competitiveness is high. I analyze the effect of electoral competitiveness on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competitiveness affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competitiveness stands for a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health policy to voters when the level of electoral competitiveness is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competitiveness in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competitiveness does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competitiveness in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.</p>

scholarly journals Does intense electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong Woo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Health Issues ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure ◽  
High Level

<p></p><p>Does intense electoral competition in electoral autocracies (EAs) increase the government health expenditure? Previous studies on EAs and public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in EAs as a significant determinant on the expenditure. Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators; hence. multiparty elections <i>per se</i> do not capture well-known impact of elections, such as the electoral competition increasing health expenditure. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competition is high. This paper analyzes the effect of electoral competition on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competition affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competition indicates a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health expenditure to voters when the level of electoral competition is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competition in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competition does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competition in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.</p><br><p></p>

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