scholarly journals Operation Lam Son 719 amid “Vietnamization” Strategy during Vietnam War

Author(s):  
Assoc. Prof. Nguyen Ngọc Dung ◽  
◽  

Fifty years ago, Operation Lam Son 719 was organized by the US Army and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to realize their scheme to cut off the Indochina battlefield separating the Vietnam revolutionary forces from the revolutionary movement of Laos and Cambodia. Based on historical evidence from previous Vietnamese and USA documents, this article aims to prove that Operation Lam Son 719 made many strategic mistakes in assessing the military power of ARVN and the revolutionary alliance of Vietnam - Laos – Cambodia during the Vietnam War, as well as the tactical mistakes on the battlefield of ARVN. The failure of Operation Lam Son 719 dealt a heavy blow to the Vietnamization strategy, showing the passive strategic approach in the Doctrine of Vietnamization. Operation Lam Son 719 played a big role in forcing the U S to agree to negotiate with Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Paris.

Author(s):  
James W. Pardew

The Dayton proximity talks are a vast diplomatic undertaking. Holbrooke is the ringmaster of this unwieldy operation with no guarantee of success. Attendees perceive a dinner at an Air Force museum as a show of US military power. Talks happen on many levels in the first two weeks, but key issues remain unsolved. Neoconservative Richard Perle arrives to assist the Bosnian Muslim delegation. The military annex becomes a major point of negotiations between Washington and the US negotiators at Dayton. Milosevic assures Pardew’s spouse that their son, an officer in the US Army, will be safe in Bosnia.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-149
Author(s):  
Juraj Šimko

Abstract The article focuses on the basic characteristic of military development in the second half of the 20th century. On pursuance of William Lind´s concept or theory of Four Generations of War, the article describes the culmination of the Third Generation of War, based on manoeuver and mobility, coupled with air superiority. The first part deals with issues of US technical dominance in the military, the development of new ways of fighting, especially the airmobile tactics used in South Vietnam. The second part of the article focuses on the specific conditions of the Vietnam War that the US Army, for the first time, had to face while applying elements of the Fourth Generation of War. The final part focuses on the issues of implementing the theory of Four Generations of War into the Armed Forces Academy education to better understand the development of military in modern times.


2021 ◽  
pp. 151-161
Author(s):  
V. V. Ivanov

The article devoted to the analysis of the actions of special forces of US and South Vietnam during 1961–1967. One of the main tasks of these units during Vietnam war – destruction main objects of «Ho Chi Minh Trail» in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The work is built with the assistance of a memoir – translations memories combatants in South Vietnam and Laos, soldiers and commanders of Army of US, South Vietnam and Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The materials housed in the monographs of American and Vietnam researchers of the Indochina conflict, 1960–1970-s.In the early 1960s, in the setting of active infiltration teams of PAVN from DRV administration of USA adopted decision to send to Indochina units of special forces (Green Berets). Many of the military personnel who served in Vietnam belonged to 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups. Some Green Berets were assigned to the U.S. Military Assistance Command’s Studies and Observation Group (SOG) for making top secret intelligence operations and helped train the South Vietnamese special forces (LLDB). The most Green Berets defended South Vietnam’s border from infiltration from DRV. Apart from Green Berets, special units of the US NAVY were also active in South Vietnam. The main task of the special forces of the NAVY was the blockade of all waterways supplying partisans from North Vietnam and Cambodia by means of ambushes, sabotage, laying of mines and raids on bases of PAVN. In 1965-1967s mixed teams of Green Berets and LLDB conducted long-range reconnaissance missions into Laos and directed air strikes against the «Ho Chi Minh Trail». The U.S. aircraft bombed the «Ho Chi Minh Trail» daily, targeting areas based on electronic detection devices and intelligence gained by covert teams that infiltrated the area. However, these efforts could not slow down the movement of troops of PAVN, supplies southward along the «Ho Chi Minh Trail». The author paid attention to the creation units of special forces as part of army units of US Army situated in South Vietnam during 1965–1967. Special attention is paid by the author to the analysis secret operations of Green Berets against «Ho Chi Minh Trail». The author concluded that the special forces of USA and South Vietnam failed to achieve the set goals.


Head Strong ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 78-98
Author(s):  
Michael D. Matthews

Budgetary constraints and emerging advances in weapons technology have resulted in a substantial reduction in the sizes of contemporary military forces. The US Army, at less than 500,000 soldiers, is a fraction of its size of a generation ago, yet the demands for it to deploy in a variety of missions around the globe have only increased. This chapter reviews current and emerging strategies that may aid in optimizing soldier performance. Developments in human physiology, genetics, nutrition, neurotechnology, sleep, noncognitive amplifiers, and leader development are described. Currently available strategies are identified, as are approaches to human performance optimization that are likely to emerge in the near future. Extrapolations of human performance optimization protocols to other contexts beyond the military are considered.


Author(s):  
Michael E. Lynch

This biography examines the long career of Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, who was born to a family of modest means in rural Virginia. His early education at the Virginia Military Institute, steeped him in Confederate lore and nurtured his “can do” attitude, natural aggressiveness, demanding personality and sometimes self-serving nature. These qualities later earned him the sobriquet “Sic’em, Ned,” which stuck with him for the remainder of his career. Almond commanded the African-American 92nd Infantry Division during World War II. The division failed in combat and was re-organized, after which it contained one white, one black, and the Army’s only Japanese-American (Nisei) regiment. The years since that war have seen the glorification of the “Greatest Generation,” with all racist notions and ideas “whitewashed” with a veneer of honor. When war came to Korea, Almond commanded X Corps in the Inchon invasion, liberation of Seoul, race to the Yalu. When the Chinese entered the war and sent the US Army into retreat, Almond mounted one of the largest evacuations in history at Hungnam -- but not before the disaster at Chosin claimed the lives of hundreds of soldiers and marines. This book reveals Almond as a man who stubbornly held onto bigoted attitudes about race, but also exhibited an unfaltering commitment to the military profession. Often viewed as the “Army’s racist,” Almond reflected the attitudes of the Army and society. This book places Almond in a broader context and presents a more complete picture of this flawed man yet gifted officer.


2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Hadden

A special collection of German, Polish, and Russian language books, maps and reports in the US Geological Survey Library has an interesting and unusual history. The so-called ‘Heringen Collection’ came from Nazi Germany. Many of these items were captured from libraries, offices and even private homes as the German Army advanced into neighboring countries. In the last days of the war, these maps, reports, photos and other records were sent from the Military Geology offices in Berlin to the safety of a deep potash mineshaft in Heringen (Werra), in Hessen, Germany. A group of US Army soldiers found these lost records of the Third Reich. When removed from the Heringen mine, those records that dealt with the earth sciences, terrain analysis, military geology and other geological matters were sent to the USGS, and eventually came to reside at the USGS Library. The printed papers and books were mostly incorporated into the main collection, but a portion of the materials have never been cataloged, calendared or indexed. These materials have many current uses, including projects of value to citizens in their nations of origin.


2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (893) ◽  
pp. 13-27

Brigadier General Richard C. “Rich” Gross is the US Army Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He attended the Military Academy at West Point and was commissioned in the US Army as a second lieutenant in the Infantry. He also attended the University of Virginia School of Law and the US Army Judge Advocate General's Corps. He holds a Master's degree in strategic studies from the US Army War College. Prior to his current position, he served as the Chief Legal Adviser for the Joint Special Operations Command, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and at US Central Command.The scope of application of international humanitarian law (IHL) is a deceptively simple concept; broadly speaking, it is where, when and to whom the IHL rules apply. Although this has always been a precondition for discussing IHL issues, the outer limits of the law's applicability remain unsettled. To open this issue on the nuances of the scope of the law's application, Brigadier General Gross gave the following interview providing the US perspective on the circumstances in which IHL applies, and the challenges that lie ahead in light of the ongoing evolution of the way war is waged.


Organization ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 491-515 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo McCann

Managerialism versus professionalism is a central axis of conflict across many occupations. ‘The profession of arms’ is no exception. This article explores the contested yet symbiotic relationship of management and the military via a discussion of the Vietnam conflict and contemporary debates over restructuring the US military to fight so-called ‘New Wars’. It portrays a complex picture of the organization and measurement of destruction, arguing that managerialism has long been an important ideological element of civilian and military practice. While management systems such as the infamous ‘measurements of progress’ in the Vietnam War were practically dysfunctional, they were effective up to a point in their managerialist goal of portraying civilian and military organizations as effective, evidence-based, progressive and ethical. This logic also pertains to contemporary debates over ‘progress’, and its measurement in the Iraq and Afghanistan counterinsurgencies and the campaign against Isil. Despite its practical limitations, managerialism is highly prevalent as ideology in warfare, fixating on tactical and operational levels, thereby excluding broader strategic, political or ethical discussions. ‘Progress’ and its mismeasurement in Vietnam and the New Wars are therefore best understood not simply as reasons for military and civilian failures in prolonged and inconclusive conflicts but as evidence of the success of managerialism in restricting public scrutiny and accountability of the business of war.


Author(s):  
Ivan Desiatnikov ◽  

The article focuses on the analysis of US-Vietnam relations during the period from 1945 to 1975. The aim of the article is to trace the changes that took place in the US-Vietnam relationship over that period, to identify the factors that influenced them, as well as the approaches used by the heads of the countries to tackle their foreign policy objectives in the region. The author traces the evolution of US policy in Vietnam pursued by Presidents H. Truman, D. Eisenhower, J. Kennedy, L. Johnson and R. Nixon. The United States had diametrically opposed position on relations with the Vietnamese governments, namely, confrontation and military conflict with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and cooperation, military and economic aid to the Republic of Vietnam. The author concludes that the US attitude towards Vietnam was determined by the international situation at that time, including the beginning of the Cold War. The policies of Presidents D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy were to restrain the expansion of the Communist bloc's sphere of influence. The direct involvement of the US military in the Vietnam conflict, initiated by L. Johnson, pursued the goal of enhancing the prestige of the United States in the global confrontation with the USSR. The split between the Soviet Union and China was used by the US to get out of the Vietnam War and mend relations with China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. Instead, the Republic of Vietnam, which had been the "junior partner" of the United States, was left to its fate.


Author(s):  
Le Thi Nhuong

President M. Richard Nixon took office in the context that the United States was being crisis and deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Ending the war became the new administration's top priority. The top priority of the new government was to get the American out of the war. But if the American got out of the war and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) fell, the honor and and prestige of the U.S will be effected. Nixon government wanted to conclude American involvement honorably. It means that the U.S forces could be returned to the U.S, but still maintaining the RVN government in South Vietnam. To accomplish this goal, Nixon government implemented linkage diplomacy, negotiated with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Paris and implemented "Vietnamization" strategy. The aim of the Vietnamization was to train and provide equipments for the RVN's military forces that gradually replace the U.S. troops, take responsibility in self-guarantee for their own security. By analyzing the military cooperation between the United States and the RVN in the implementation of "Vietnamization", the paper aims to clarify the nature of the "allied relationship" between the U.S and the RVN. It also proves that the goal of Nixon's Vietnamization was not to help the RVN "reach to a strong government with a wealthy economy, a powerful internal security and military forces", served the policy of withdrawing American troops from the war that the U.S could not win militarily, solving internal problems but still preserving the honor of the United States.


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