Drie is meer dan twee:

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilja van Beest
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Power Distribution ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Short Version ◽  
Dyadic Interactions ◽  
Inaugural Address ◽  
Distribution Rules ◽  
As If

Three is more than two: why coalition formation is not easy Three is more than two: why coalition formation is not easy In this short version of my inaugural address I describe how people form coalitions. I argue that people behave as if they are already a member of a coalition without realizing that they could also be excluded from the winning coalition. As a consequence people use specific tactics that have proven their success in dyadic interactions. Using examples of research on resources, power, distribution rules, emotions and deception, I show that the implementation of such tactics yield unexpected and potentially disastrous outcomes in triadic settings.

Coalition Formation and Selectorate Theory: An Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-275
Author(s):  
Andrew W. Bausch
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Target Individual ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Over Time

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine how different rules for re-selecting the leader of a group affects how that leader builds a winning coalition. Leaders play an inter-group game and then distribute winnings from that game within their group before standing for re-selection. The results of the experiment show that leaders of groups with large winning coalition systems rely heavily on distributing winnings through public goods, while leaders of groups with small winning coalition systems are more likely to target specific citizens with private goods. Furthermore, the experiment shows that supporters of small coalition leaders benefit from that support in future rounds by receiving more private goods than citizens that did not support the leader. Meanwhile, citizens that support a large coalition leader do not benefit from this support in future rounds. Therefore, small coalition leaders target individual citizens to maintain a coalition over time in a way not possible in a group with a large winning coalition. Finally, in the experiment, small coalition leaders increased their payoffs over time, suggesting that once power has been consolidated, small coalition leaders narrow their coalition.

Slovakia

2019 ◽  
pp. 435-474
Author(s):  
Soňa Szomolányi ◽  
Alexander Karvai
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Power Distribution ◽  
Driving Force ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
Internal Conflicts ◽  
Large Party ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Policy Agreement ◽  
Coalition Bargaining

In Slovakia, the main lines of conflict that determine coalition formation have changed over time. Iinitially the conflicts were based on national-ethnic issues, later this was followed by disagreement over the direction of reforms and the European integration process. Eventually they have settled around socioeconomic policies with alternating right and left governments in power. Only three coalition cabinets have served the full parliamentary terms, and all of them have both enjoyed a majority support in Parliament and included a dominant large party. In contrast, coalitions without a major leading party, and where the power structure has been more evenly distributed, have been more likely to terminate due to inter-party conflicts before the end of the full constitutionally mandated term. The coalitions of the second type coalitions have also been pursuing more of consensual style of politics. They have been based on social-economic policy agreement between the parties but differed considerably in terms of the GAL-TAN dimension. While socioeconomic policies appear is a strong driving force in coalition bargaining, the second (GAL-TAN) dimension tends to matters more when it comes to the survival of the coalition. In terms of coalition governance, six out twelve cabinets represented the Prime Minister Dominated model. The cabinets with a leading party (HZDS, SDKÚ-DS, and SMER-DS) did not have as many internal conflicts as the cabinets with a relatively even power distribution. The latter type of cabinets relied instead on their ability to negotiate and compromise in the name of consensus and so they represent a Coalition Compromise Model.

Modeling Dyadic Interactions and Networks in Marketing

1992 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawn Iacobucci ◽  
Nigel Hopkins
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Word Of Mouth ◽  
Network Models ◽  
Opinion Leaders ◽  
Dyadic Interaction ◽  
Service Encounters ◽  
Dyadic Interactions

Many substantive areas in marketing share a basic concern with relationships. Social network and dyadic interaction methods are techniques that can enrich a researcher's understanding of the structure of relationships, whether a few actors or many are involved and whether the relationships are at the consumer or business level. Network models are discussed in a variety of substantive areas, including coalition formation in buying centers, identification of opinion leaders in word-of-mouth networks, power and cooperation in channel dyads, conflict resolution in family purchasing, and the management of expectations in service encounters. In addition, important modeling advances are described, including techniques that enable researchers to make comparisons between networks and adaptations of reciprocity parameters to allow for identification of stochastic cliques.

Universalism in Experimental Committees

1982 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary J. Miller ◽  
Joe A. Oppenheimer
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Experimental Design ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Real World ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Committee Decision Making ◽  
Expected Benefits ◽  
High Level ◽  
Rational Choice Theories

Most rational choice theories of committee decision making predict a process of competitive coalition formation leading to a minimum winning coalition. Committee experiments reported to date tend to support these theories. However, both theories and committee experiments are contradicted by the evidence of real-world legislatures making distributive decisions; these decisions are characterized by coalitions of the whole providing virtually all members with a share of distributive benefits. The results in this article help to resolve this contradiction by showing that if the committee experimental design includes a universalistic alternative which provides a high level of expected benefits for committee members, it will be selected. Competitive coalition formation occurs in experimental settings which do not include such an alternative. The results call into question the generality of ordinalist theories of competitive coalition formation.

scholarly journals The Science of History, Inaugural Address

1881 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Gustavus George Zerffi
Keyword(s):  
Inaugural Address ◽  
Historical Society ◽  
Universal History ◽  
Science Of History ◽  
Scientific Treatment ◽  
Better Than ◽  
As If

Six years ago I had the pleasure of reading a paper “On the Possibility of a strictly Scientific Treatment of Universal History,” and that which was at that time a mere aiggestion, has since become a firm conviction, based on indefatigable study, and the collection of innumerable facts.When called upon at the first meeting of the Council of the Royal Historical Society this session, to read an inaugural paper before the Fellows, I thought I could not do better than bring this conviction before you, so as, if possible, to make it your own.

Decision Costs in Coalition Formation

1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 556-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Adrian ◽  
Charles Press
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Competent Authority ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
Information Costs ◽  
Zero Sum

Choices made in coalition formation are costly to participants, complex, and difficult to measure with precision because observable coalitions are multi-person, non-zero-sum games. At least eight decision costs are included in the process. The purpose of this paper is to identify them and to examine their usefulness in explaining coalition formation. Decisions include: (1) information costs, (2) responsibility costs, (3) intergame costs, (4) costs of division of payoffs, (5) dissonance costs (6) inertia costs, (7) time costs, and (8) persuasion costs.Coalition building is an essential aspect of decision making within any political system. Whether one is studying the behavior of a municipal planning commission, a committee or sub-committee of a legislative body, the United Nations Security Council, or any other decision-making institution in which more than one person is involved in reaching a decision, the essential problem is often one of establishing a winning coalition within the entire group membership. A winning coalition is any portion of the group that can decide to do or not to do something that is on the agenda of the group and over which it has competent authority. The requirements of what constitutes a winning coalition are determined by the formal and informal rules of the game. Most commonly, one of the rules is that a winning coalition must consist of one-half the members of the group plus one and this assumption is made for purposes of this paper. The size of the coalition needed is important for individual and coalition strategies, but it is not important conceptually. That is, the problems involved in securing a winning coalition on the United States Supreme Court when only four votes are needed in order to agree to hear a case affects the strategy of the members of the court, but is of no theoretical importance to coalition formation.

Ordinal Preference Games: An Analysis of Legislative Coalition Formation Without Transferable Utility

1983 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 750-763 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Koehler
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Cardinal Utility ◽  
Size Principle ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Ordinal Preferences ◽  
Ordinal Preference ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Voting Strategy

Two important findings from n-person game theory are that coalition formation is superadditive if and only if a game possesses an empty core, and Riker's size principle. Up to the present, both theorems have been proved and critiqued under the assumption of transferable cardinal utility.This analysis eliminates the cardinal utility assumption on the grounds that it is generally inconsistent with the conditions that characterize collective choice on political issues. Instead, a model of collective decision making is set forth in terms of ordinal preferences, and the two theorems are reconsidered. The superadditivity theorem survives intact, whereas the size principle is weakened. Circumstances are identified in which there is no incentive to reduce an oversized winning coalition; however, under no condition is there an incentive to increase the size of a winning coalition. A number of coalition-size hypotheses are tested using roll-call data from the U.S. Senate. The results raise new questions about the role of coalition formation in legislative voting strategy.

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