Enacting rules is an obvious way for authorities to guide behaviour and set standards for large numbers of people. Imposing sanctions, in turn, is an obvious way to help ensure compliance with rules. The role of judicial orders (remedies) is less obvious. What is the point of ordering defendants to do things when the law has, or could have, rules that tell individuals to do the same things and sanctions that it can impose when rules fail to motivate? Chapter 5 explores this question. It argues that judicial orders provide distinctive reasons to perform the actions they stipulate, reasons that differ in kind from those provided by either rules or sanctions. Like duty-imposing rules—but unlike sanctions—orders purport to give rise to duties to perform the actions they describe. However, the explanation of how such duties arise differs as between rules and orders. Duty-imposing rules are propositions about, and constitutive of, the existence of duties. When courts assert such rules, they presume ‘declarative authority’—the authority to declare that, by virtue of the assertion (or ‘declaration’), something is the case, here that a certain duty exists. In contrast, orders are imperative statements: they command the performance of particular actions. Insofar as orders give rise to duties to perform the actions they stipulate, they do so indirectly, by virtue of a presumed general duty to obey orders. In presuming this general duty, the law invokes ‘directive authority’—the authority to command obedience. Because these forms of authority are different, orders can provide new reasons to do things that rules already require and, as well, reasons to do things that are not a proper subject matter for rules.