Defining Water in Natural Philosophical Texts

Author(s):  
Lindsay J. Starkey

This chapter explores some of the most frequently printed and widely circulated natural philosophical texts of the sixteenth century along with their medieval predecessors. It focuses on each author’s conception of water and his classification for why water did not flood the earth. This chapter argues that most of these authors did ultimately classify the dry land’s existence as a natural occurrence. However, it also shows that their arguments for this naturalness were longer and more convoluted than previous discussions, incorporating redefinitions of the proper subject matter of natural philosophy to do so. These longer, more complex discussions suggest that water was of more particular interest to sixteenthcentury authors of natural philosophical texts than to previous ones.

On Purpose ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 42-60
Author(s):  
Michael Ruse

This chapter discusses the Scientific Revolution that is dated from the publication of Nicolaus Copernicus's On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres in 1543, the work that put the sun rather than the earth at the center of the universe to Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy in 1687, the work that gave the causal underpinnings of the whole system as developed over the previous one hundred and fifty years. Historian Rupert Hall put his finger precisely on the real change that occurred in the revolution. It was not so much the physical theories, although these were massive and important. It was rather a change of metaphors or models—from that of an organism to that of a machine. By the sixteenth century, machines were becoming ever more common and ever more sophisticated. It was natural therefore for people to start thinking of the world—the universe—as a machine, especially since some of the most elaborate of the new machines were astronomical clocks that had the planets and the sun and moon moving through the heavens, not by human force but by predestined contraptions. In a word, by clockwork!


1998 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-310
Author(s):  
Jim Kanaris

Recent interest in the growing field of pragmatics has inspired philosophers and theologians to rethink the problematic issue of method in connection with their own proper subject matter. Inasmuch as pragmatics deals with the relationship between language and its users, this level of reflection, particularly in its philosophical guise, evokes something more than the mere implementation or destruction of method. Indeed, I argue that one of its primary concerns is the function of method, raising questions like "How does method relate to its users?" or "To what end is method employed?" In this article I attempt to show what the benefits of such pragmatic questioning are in a climate that is not favorably disposed, by and large, toward the methodological. Moreover, I do so in connection with the thought of Canadian philosopher-theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-84), whose emphasis on method and methodical rationality seems to disqualify him as a thinker concerned with the pragmatics of meaning.


Author(s):  
Stephen A. Smith

Enacting rules is an obvious way for authorities to guide behaviour and set standards for large numbers of people. Imposing sanctions, in turn, is an obvious way to help ensure compliance with rules. The role of judicial orders (remedies) is less obvious. What is the point of ordering defendants to do things when the law has, or could have, rules that tell individuals to do the same things and sanctions that it can impose when rules fail to motivate? Chapter 5 explores this question. It argues that judicial orders provide distinctive reasons to perform the actions they stipulate, reasons that differ in kind from those provided by either rules or sanctions. Like duty-imposing rules—but unlike sanctions—orders purport to give rise to duties to perform the actions they describe. However, the explanation of how such duties arise differs as between rules and orders. Duty-imposing rules are propositions about, and constitutive of, the existence of duties. When courts assert such rules, they presume ‘declarative authority’—the authority to declare that, by virtue of the assertion (or ‘declaration’), something is the case, here that a certain duty exists. In contrast, orders are imperative statements: they command the performance of particular actions. Insofar as orders give rise to duties to perform the actions they stipulate, they do so indirectly, by virtue of a presumed general duty to obey orders. In presuming this general duty, the law invokes ‘directive authority’—the authority to command obedience. Because these forms of authority are different, orders can provide new reasons to do things that rules already require and, as well, reasons to do things that are not a proper subject matter for rules.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 311-339
Author(s):  
Craig Martin

Abstract From the time of Albertus Magnus, medieval commentators on Aristotle regularly used a passage from Meteorology 1.2 as evidence that the stars and planets influence and even govern terrestrial events. Many of these commentators integrated their readings of this work with the view that planetary conjunctions were causes of significant changes in human affairs. By the end of the sixteenth century, Italian Aristotelian commentators and astrologers alike deemed this passage as authoritative for the integration of astrology with natural philosophy. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, however, criticized this reading, contending that Aristotle never used the science of the stars to explain meteorological phenomena. While some Italian commentators, such as Pietro Pomponazzi dismissed Pico’s contentions, by the middle of the sixteenth century many reevaluated the medieval integration. This reevaluation culminated in Cesare Cremonini, who put forth an extensive critique of astrology in which he argued against the idea of occult causation and celestial influence, as he tried to rid Aristotelianism of its medieval legacy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Roberts

The notion that the Earth has entered a new epoch characterized by the ubiquity of anthropogenic change presents the social sciences with something of a paradox, namely, that the point at which we recognize our species to be a geologic force is also the moment where our assumed metaphysical privilege becomes untenable. Cultural geography continues to navigate this paradox in conceptually innovative ways through its engagements with materialist philosophies, more-than-human thinking and experimental modes of ontological enquiry. Drawing upon the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon, this article contributes to these timely debates by articulating the paradox of the Anthropocene in relation to technological processes. Simondon’s philosophy precedes the identification of the Anthropocene epoch by a number of decades, yet his insistence upon situating technology within an immanent field of material processes resonates with contemporary geographical concerns in a number of important ways. More specifically, Simondon’s conceptual vocabulary provides a means of framing our entanglements with technological processes without assuming a metaphysical distinction between human beings and the forces of nature. In this article, I show how Simondon’s concepts of individuation and transduction intersect with this technological problematic through his far-reaching critique of the ‘hylomorphic’ distinction between matter and form. Inspired by Simondon’s original account of the genesis of a clay brick, the article unfolds these conceptual challenges through two contrasting empirical encounters with 3D printing technologies. In doing so, my intention is to lend an affective consistency to Simondon’s problematic, and to do so in a way that captures the kinds of material mutations expressive of a particular technological moment.


2008 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
A.C. Neele

This article suggests that the topic “children” received considerable attention in the post-Reformation era – the period of CA 1565-1725. In particular, the author argues that the post-Reformation Reformed sources attest of a significant interest in the education and parenting of children. This interest not only continued, but intensified during the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation when much thought was given to the subject matter. This article attempts to appraise the aim of post-Reformation Reformed sources on the topic “children.”


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 290-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Shank
Keyword(s):  

AbstractIn 1499, while Copernicus studies in Bologna, the commentary on Sacrobosco's Sphere by the Padua master Francesco Capuano da Manfredonia first appears in print. It will be revised and reprinted several times thereafter. Like Copernicus, Capuano has a high view of astronomy and mingles astronomical and physical considerations (flies moving on wheels, men on ships, impetus, comets, raptus). Also, Capuano offers a flawed argument against a two-fold (diurnal and zodiacal) motion of the Earth. Multiple thematic resonances between Capuano's commentary and De revolutionibus, I, 5-11, suggest the hypothesis that Copernicus is answering Capuano, whose work was owned by Joachim Rheticus, if not Copernicus himself.


Author(s):  
Manuel Mertens

The present article presents the art of memory of the sixteenth-century philosopherGiordano Bruno by taking into consideration the mythological figure of Proteus.Bruno’s comparison of the metaphysical Monad – aim of his philosophical quest – withProteus sheds a light on the mnemonic practice. Although Bruno is often presented as aherald of modern science, the description of the Monad as Protheus, always subject tonew metamorphoses, and the importance of Ovidius’ Metamorphoses show him ratheras a representative of the Pythagorean tradition. An echo of Ovidius is also indicated inBruno’s Cena de le ceneri showing that the Pythagorean influence is also present in hiscosmological view on the motion of the earth.


2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-331
Author(s):  
GIAN BATTISTA VAI

Anniversaries for the two founding fathers of geology occurring in the same year prompted a comparative evaluation of how the two contributed to establishing the basic principles of the discipline. To do so, passages from their publications, codices and manuscripts have been quoted directly. The Stenonian principles (‘original horizontality’, ‘original continuity’, and ‘superposition of individual strata’) are present in Leonardo’s notebooks amazingly formulated, using similar wording when studying the same area more than 150 years earlier. Also, Stenonian priority in naming and explaining geological concepts and processes (e.g., faulting, folding, angular unconformity, relative chronology) are mirrored in Leonardo’s writings and pictorial works. While Steno enjoys priority in stepwise restoration of the geological history of a given region, Leonardo was the first to construct a 3D geological profile representation and geomorphologic maps. Lastly, the paper focuses on diverging stances of the two savants about the Noachian Deluge and the age of the Earth. Already 500 years ago, Leonardo had solved the question of marine fossil remains of organic origin found in the mountains implying the possibility of deep geologic time in a statement of ‘eternalism’. 350 years ago, Steno solved the same question in a different way in which he retained a basic role for the Deluge and assumed a short age for the Earth by focusing mainly on short-lived sedimentary and geomorphologic processes.


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