scholarly journals Development and Transformation of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashfaq Ahmed ◽  
Muhammad Jawad Hashmi ◽  
Saima Kausar
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Qualitative Method ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Indian Government ◽  
Nuclear Signaling ◽  
Force Structure ◽  
Defence Spending ◽  
Nuclear Exchange ◽  
Preemptive Strike

Indian rationale for developing nuclear weapons is embedded in Article 51 of United Nations (UN) Charter. After analyzing the changes in Indian defence procurements, a huge defence spending and public statements issued by the former and incumbent Indian government official authors presume India is changing its nuclear posture. New Delhi is discarding earlier publicly stated No-First Use (NFU) posture with ready or super ready status. It is replacing Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD) posture with overkill capacity. India revived earlier announced Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The objective of this paper is to review changes in Indian nuclear doctrine and capabilities and implications for Pakistan security. However a qualitative method is used for the completion of this research. Paramount aim of nuclear signaling is to avoid outbreak of violence. The findings of this paper include dividing Indian strategic community into leftists/rightists. Further, abovementioned changes can result in Indian preemptive strike against Pakistan or inadvertent or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The region is ripe for nuclear exchange. South Asia is nuclear flashpoint. In conclusion, Pakistan needs to expedite its diplomatic efforts to highlight changes introduced by India. Islamabad should follow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy to solidify its conventional and nuclear armed force structure to deter militarily powerful enemy

scholarly journals Perceptions and purpose of the bomb: Explaining India's nuclear restraint against China

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-42
Author(s):  
Yogesh Joshi
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Indian Government ◽  
Nuclear Threat ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Nuclear Behaviour ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Cold War

Abstract Much of the literature on India's nuclear programme assumes that China's nuclear capability drove New Delhi, the strategically weaker actor, to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. China's nuclear tests not only rendered New Delhi militarily insecure and dented its claim for the leadership of the Third World but they also polarized the domestic debate over the utility of the bomb. In the global scheme of nuclear proliferation, therefore, India was just another fallen nuclear domino. Marshalling recently declassified documents, this article revisits India's nuclear behaviour during the crucial decade between 1964 and 1974. By focusing on threat assessments made at the highest levels and internal deliberations of the Indian Government, this article shows how, contrary to the claims made in the literature, Indian decision-makers did not make much of the Chinese nuclear threat. This conviction emanated out of their distinct reading of the purpose of nuclear weapons in China's foreign and military policy; their perceptions of how India could achieve nuclear deterrence against China by using the bipolar international politics of the Cold War; and, finally, their understanding of the political costs of developing an indigenous nuclear response to China's nuclear threat. New Delhi's nuclear restraint resulted from its perceptions of Chinese nuclear intentions and its beliefs about the purpose of the bomb in Sino-Indian relations. India's perceptions of China as a nuclear adversary and its decision-makers’ views on the purpose of nuclear weapons in this rivalry were fundamentally different from the expectations set out by the domino theory of nuclear proliferation.

Problems of the modern society and ethnic separatism in North-Eastern India (NER)

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 315-328
Author(s):  
Sergey Aleksandrovich Mikhailov
Keyword(s):  
Modern Society ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Eastern India ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Indian Government ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Resource Search ◽  
North Eastern ◽  
North Eastern India

This article deals with the issue of North-Eastern India, its current social and economic problems in the context of long-term demonstrations of the ethnic separatism. The main aim of the research implies systematic analysis and identification of key factors and reasons perpetuating separatism in NER as well as resource search which determines Indian strategy in solving this problem. The first part of the article is devoted to separatism peculiarities in the region which remains withdrawn and underexplored in many respects. Apart from this, the author provides a quite detailed analysis of negative mentality of the certain part of NER population which justifiably reproaches New Delhi for “discrimination” and inability to solve many problems of the region. Then the author paid the detailed attention to these problems of NER modern society (ethnic, demographic, economic, transport, social etc.) as well as measures undertaken by the Indian government for its settlement.

Perpetual Crisis

Worldview ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 10-11
Author(s):  
Edmund Stillman
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Mediterranean ◽  
Nuclear Exchange

The British Minister of Defense, Denis Healy, has informed us that within minutes of the outbreak of hostilities every Soviet fleet unit in the Mediterranean would be sunk. Let us hope that he has supplied us with a long-overdue corrective to the near-hysteria evident in the press about the Soviet naval presence in the area.Presumably by citing the destruction of the Soviet fleet “within minutes” Mr. Healy is making reference to nuclear weapons—a most implausible scenario. But even in a limited encounter, held short of a nuclear exchange, it is hard to believe that the Soviet fleet would fare well in combat.

Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance

1957 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Speier
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Future War ◽  
The Cold War

The uncertainty about whether atomic weapons will be used in future war, whether local or general, lends itself to political exploitation in the cold war. The efficiency of nuclear weapons in wartime, and their resulting threat-value in either war- or peacetime, constitute their political-military worth. In peacetime, the threat-value of weapons can be exploited in many ways: by an ultimatum, by authoritative or inspired statements on capabilities or intentions, by studied disclosures of new weapons at ceremonial occasions, by means of maneuvers, redeployments of forces, or by so-called demonstrations.

scholarly journals The Role of Nuclear Weapons in NATO’s Early Cold War Strategies (1949–1957)

2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Petra Kiss
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Thinking ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The North ◽  
Significant Factors

Since August 1945 atomic weapons have become significant factors in international relations, every state with great ambitions has aspired to get atomic secrets. The primary goal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created in 1949 was – possessing the United States’, a nuclear power’s, security guarantee – to deter the Soviet agression. The first strategic documents of the Alliance were written with this very purpose. However, in the 1950s there was a shift in the allied nations’ policies, which influenced NATO’s strategic thinking as well, so in 1957 a real different strategic concept was adopted. Gaining technological superiority became the most important goal, which led to development and intense production of nuclear weapons. This article examines the emerging role of nuclear weapons and the changing strategy of the Alliance between 1949 and 1957.

Challenges for India’s Agriculture: Towards a New Green Revolution?

2021 ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Ellina P. Shavlay
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Green Revolution ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Indian Government ◽  
Primary Sector ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Gradual Introduction

Agriculture continues to be one of the most significant sectors of India's economy today. The country is successfully performing in a wide range of primary sector fields, gradually increasing its export potential. However, the first green revolution caused significant damage to the country's resources, as a result of which, in the post-bipolar period, the state began to take actions aimed at changing the established practices of the last century. However, the second revolution, which began in the 1990s, did not solve all the difficulties. In this regard, the author's goal is to analyze the existing key problems of the primary sector and consider possible answers to them in the field of innovative technologies. The author comes to the conclusion that it is the digitalization of agricultural activities that could qualitatively increase the level of income of the population and the efficiency of the primary sector both in the domestic and foreign markets. At the same time, the introduction of new technologies is impossible without changing the institutional environment and work on socio-cultural factors that have a substantial negative impact not only on India's agriculture, but on all socio-economic processes in general, and therefore New Delhi will need to take comprehensive measures on a large scale rather than limit oneself to the primary economic sector. The Indian government has to carry out a comprehensive reform of its economy, otherwise there is a great threat of undermining social stability. The gradual introduction of innovative solutions and digitalization of agriculture will have a relatively quick, visible, but at the same time sustainable effect.

British Thinking about Tactical Nuclear Weapons

2019 ◽  
pp. 22-53
Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
British Government ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
British Policy ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
Strategic Theories ◽  
Nuclear Exchange ◽  
Massive Retaliation

Chapter 1 examines how British policy-makers viewed the arrival of tactical nuclear weapons, employing as a vehicle in the 1950s debate on the relative merits of the opposing strategic theories of ‘graduated deterrence’ and ‘massive retaliation’. It shows how the British government rejected any suggestion to draw distinctions in peacetime between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons because of a strong belief that such an announcement would undermine the overall deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Gripped by a ‘deterrence habit of mind’, civilian leaders viewed tactical nuclear weapons not as meaningful military tools, but as weapons of escalation whose use would trigger a strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers. The rejection of any kind of graduated deterrence through the use of tactical nuclear weapons set a precedent in how British policy-makers conceived the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, which would have important consequences in the following debates about NATO strategy.

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