scholarly journals A Critique of The Laffer Curve

2021 ◽  
pp. 311-316
Author(s):  
Edward Fuller

In December 1974, the economist Art Laffer had dinner at a Washington D.C. restaurant with Jude Wanniski, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney. The tax rate was so high in the United States, Laffer argued, that reducing the tax rate would increase government tax revenue. As legend has it, he drew the Laffer Curve on a napkin to illustrate how reducing the tax rate would raise tax revenue. The Laffer Curve has been a mainstay of Supply-Side Economics ever since.The Laffer Curve relates government tax revenue to the tax rate. Figure 1 is the Laffer Curve (Laffer, 2004). The x-axis shows tax revenue and the y-axis shows the tax rate. The Laffer Curve plots the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenue. As figure 1 shows, tax revenue is maximized, or optimal at RO, when the tax rate is TO. [Fig 1: LAFFER CURVE] Further, the Laffer Curve illustrates that tax revenue decreases as the tax rate rises above the optimal tax rate. For example, imagine the tax rate is suboptimal at TS. At this tax rate, government revenue is suboptimal at RS. Even though the tax rate TS is higher than TO, tax revenue RS is actually lower than RO. In this case, government can increase tax revenue by reducing the tax rate. Generally, government can increase tax revenue by lowering the tax rate whenever the economy is located on the downward sloping part of the Laffer Curve. In short, the Laffer Curve suggests that extremely high taxes are counterproductive even from the government’s own perspective.Murray N. Rothbard stressed that Laffer’s analysis contains a hidden value judgement: maximizing government tax revenue is desirable. Rothbard writes,“Laffer assumes that what all of us want is to maximize tax revenue to the government. If—a big if—we are really at the upper half of the Laffer curve, we should then all want to set tax rates at that “optimum” point. But why? Why should it be the objective of every one of us to maximize government revenue? To push to the maximum, in short, the share of private product that gets siphoned off to the activities of government? I should think we would be more interested in minimizing government revenue by pushing tax rates far, far below whatever the Laffer Optimum might happen to be” (Rothbard, 1984: 17-18; Block, 2010).Economists who use the Laffer Curve conduct their analysis with a fixed curve. However, in a progressing economy, the Laffer Curve is constantly expanding. Put differently, the Laffer Curve is always shifting to the right in a progressing economy. Advocates of the Laffer Curve fail to realize that the position of the curve is far more important than the economy’s place on a given curve.The position of the Laffer Curve depends on the stock of accumulated capital. As economists underscore again and again, capital accumulation is the only way to raise overall living standards. Ludwig von Mises writes,“there is but one method available to improve the conditions of the whole population, viz., to accelerate the accumulation of capital as against the increase in population. The only method of rendering all people more prosperous is to raise the productivity of human labor, i.e., productivity per man hour, and this can be done only by placing into the hands of the worker more and better tools and machines.” (1951: 282)Significantly, capital accumulation and hence overall living standards depend on the tax rate. As economists have known for centuries, high taxes impair capital accumulation:“If the funds which the successful businessmen would have ploughed back into productive employments are [taxed and] used by the state for current expenditure or given to people who con-sume them, the further accumulation of capital is slowed down or entirely stopped. Then there is no longer any question of economic improvement, technological progress, and a trend toward higher average standards of living” (Mises, 1955: 51).

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Philip Bazel ◽  
Jack Mintz

The authors examine the implications of Canada's response to the 2017 US tax reform. Canada's focus on accelerated tax depreciation will achieve lower marginal effective tax rates on capital for taxpaying companies, well below the US levels achieved with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that came into effect on January 1, 2018. By ignoring neutrality, the government offsets some of the potential gains by reducing the tax burden on capital, thereby failing to maximize efficiency gains from a better corporate tax system. Further, Canada's approach fails to respond to competitiveness effects of US reforms on corporate tax base erosion in Canada as companies shift profits to the United States. The low US tax rate on intangible income will draw certain functions to the United States. A more comprehensive approach to corporate tax reform, including some reduction in corporate income tax rates, would have been a preferable response.


2022 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Seiichiro Mozumi

Abstract In the United States, tax favoritism—an approach that has weakened the extractive capacity of the federal government by providing tax loopholes and preferences for taxpayers—has remained since the 1930s. It has consumed the amount of tax revenue the government can spend and therefore weakened the possibility of the redistribution of fiscal resources. It has also made the federal tax system complicated and inequitable, resulting in undermining taxpayer consent. Therefore, since the 1930s, a tax reform to create a simple, fair, and equitable federal income tax system with the capacity to raise revenue has been long overdue. Many scholars have evaluated the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA69), which Richard M. Nixon signed into law on December 30, 1969, as one of the most successful steps toward accomplishing this goal. This article demonstrates that TRA69 left tax favoritism in the United States. Furthermore, it points out that TRA69 turned taxpayers against the idea of federal taxation, a shift in public perception that greatly impacted tax reform in the years to follow.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 598-609
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Vasilev

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to show a standard RBC model, when augmented with a VAT evasion channel, where evasion depends on the consumption tax rate, can produce a hump-shaped consumption-Laffer curve. Design/methodology/approach The methodology is in the spirit of modern quantitative macroeconomic literature. Findings The model with VAT evasion can generate a peaking consumption tax revenue curve, which is a little discussed result in the taxation literature. Research limitations/implications The paper contributes to the public finance literature by providing evidence for the importance of the evasion mechanism, while at the same time adding to the debate about the existence of a peak tax rate for consumption tax revenue. Practical implications Contrary to popular belief, raising VAT rate as a cheap way (being a tax on demand) to finance government expenditure, is still not a free lunch, and raising the rate, especially in a country with substantial VAT evasion, quickly leads to a drop in the revenue associated with that category. Originality/value This is the first study that provides a tractable model of VAT evasion, and a setup where consumption tax revenue curve is peaking.


SERIEs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nezih Guner ◽  
Javier López-Segovia ◽  
Roberto Ramos

AbstractCan the Spanish government generate more tax revenue by making personal income taxes more progressive? To answer this question, we build a life-cycle economy with uninsurable labor productivity risk and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face progressive taxes on labor and capital incomes and proportional taxes that capture social security, corporate income, and consumption taxes. Our answer is yes, but not much. A reform that increases labor income taxes for individuals who earn more than the mean labor income and reduces taxes for those who earn less than the mean labor income generates a small additional revenue. The revenue from labor income taxes is maximized at an effective marginal tax rate of 51.6% (38.9%) for the richest 1% (5%) of individuals, versus 46.3% (34.7%) in the benchmark economy. The increase in revenue from labor income taxes is only 0.82%, while the total tax revenue declines by 1.55%. The higher progressivity is associated with lower aggregate labor supply and capital. As a result, the government collects higher taxes from a smaller economy. The total tax revenue is higher if marginal taxes are raised only for the top earners. The increase, however, must be substantial and cover a large segment of top earners. The rise in tax collection from a 3 percentage points increase on the top 1% is just 0.09%. A 10 percentage points increase on the top 10% of earners (those who earn more than €41,699) raises total tax revenue by 2.81%.


2016 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerasimos T. Soldatos

AbstractThis short article underlines the efficiency considerations reflected by a Laffer curve. In a static context in which inflation is assumed away, the Laffer curve describes what would the response of tax revenue to tax rate change be under increasing inflation


2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Saez ◽  
Joel Slemrod ◽  
Seth H Giertz

This paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates using tax return data. First, we provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis. We discuss what other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic. Second, we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income tax rate increase in the United States to illustrate those issues. Third, we provide a critical discussion of selected empirical analyses of the elasticity of taxable income in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out. Finally, we discuss avenues for future research. (JEL H24, H31, J22)


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Anita King

<p>A model is proposed here to investigate how the relationships between health, production, and wellbeing contribute to the achievement (or otherwise) of potential government objectives. This model uses a basic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous individuals and two goods (healthcare and other). Public health and publically and privately provided healthcare affect health level, which in turn affects productivity. Several different potential objectives of the government agent are investigated, which determine the distribution of public healthcare. The model is solved numerically to understand the effects of the choices of government objectives including the level of inequality aversion and varying tax rates. For governments with high inequality aversion that maximise social welfare from utility, a non-zero tax rate may be optimal, even with high levels of public health.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3(S)) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Wei-Bin Zhang

This paper makes an original contribution to the literature of optimal taxation by introducing Ramseytaxation to the Solow-Uzawa growth model to examine genuine dynamic interdependence between growth andoptimal taxation. We introduce a public sector to the Uzawa two-sector growth model. The public sector suppliespublic goods and services. The government financially supports by the public sector by collecting taxes on thehousehold’s wage income and wealth income under the assumption that the utility level is maximized. We derivethe optimal taxation rule and construct the dynamics of the national economy. The model studies a nonlineardynamics between national and sectoral growth, economic structural change, wealth/capital accumulation, andoptimal tax rates in perfect competitive markets with the government intervention. The model has a uniquestable equilibrium point with the chosen parameter values. We carry out comparative dynamic analysis toanalyze effects of exogenous changes in a few parameters on the transitional process and long-term economicstructure of the economic dynamics.


Ekonomika ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Jevcak

This paper explores the consequences of a difference in the levels of public inputs accumulated over time in a small open economy model where capital tax revenues are used exclusively for the provision of public inputs, while the government sets the capital tax rate in way to maximise its country’s national income. It is shown that in this case the optimal capital tax rate in a country is a decreasing function of its stock of accumulated public inputs. The model thus implies that capital tax harmonisation could actually be detrimental to the so-called core EU member states as it could fix their capital tax rates at an in-optimally high levels and thus hinder their ability to dampen undesirable capital out- flows.


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