scholarly journals Critical Loss Analysis in Market Definition and Merger Control

2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 757-794 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Hüschelrath
Keyword(s):  
Merger Control ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Loss Analysis

scholarly journals The impact of geographic market definition on the stringency of hospital merger control in Germany and the Netherlands

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Varkevisser ◽  
Frederik T. Schut
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
The United States ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Hospital Mergers ◽  
Hospital Markets ◽  
Hospital Merger ◽  
The Impact

AbstractIn markets where hospitals are expected to compete, preventive merger control aims to prohibit anticompetitive mergers. In the hospital industry, however, the standard method for defining the relevant market (SSNIP) is difficult to apply and alternative approaches have proven inaccurate. Experiences from the United States show that courts, by identifying overly broad geographic markets, have underestimated the anticompetitive effects of hospital mergers. We examine how geographic hospital markets are defined in Germany and the Netherlands where market-oriented reforms have created room for hospital competition. For each country, we discuss a landmark case where definition of the geographic market played a decisive role. Our findings indicate that defining geographic hospital markets in both countries is less complicated than in the United States, where antitrust analysis must take managed care organisations into account. We also find that different methods result in much more stringent hospital merger control in Germany than in the Netherlands. Given the uncertainties in defining hospital markets, the German competition authority seems to be inclined to avoid the risk of being too permissive; the opposite holds for the Dutch competition authority. We argue that for society the costs of being too permissive with regard to hospital mergers may be larger than the costs of being too stringent.

On the Risks of Using the Sequential Product-Level SSNIP Approach to Identify Relevant Antitrust Markets‡

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Padilla ◽  
Salvatore Piccolo ◽  
Pekka Sääskilahti
Keyword(s):  
Market Definition ◽  
Wrong Answer ◽  
Demand Functions ◽  
Product Level ◽  
Loss Analysis ◽  
Merger Analysis ◽  
Influential Paper ◽  
Sequential Product

Abstract In a recent influential paper Coate et al. (2021) have criticized the sequential product-level approach to market definition in merger review. They argue that a simultaneous market-level approach to critical loss is more appropriate than a product-level critical loss analysis, because under certain plausible demand scenarios (nonlinear demand functions) the latter could yield the wrong answer on market definition—i.e., excessively broad or narrow markets. We extend their analysis by showing that a sequential product-level approach actually leads to an excessively narrow market definition when the typical nonlinear demand functions used in merger analysis are employed.

Innovation Considerations in Horizontal Merger Control

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannis Kokkoris ◽  
Tommaso Valletti
Keyword(s):  
Structural Analysis ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
Unilateral Effects ◽  
Innovation Space ◽  
Innovation Competition

Abstract This paper focuses on the assessment of mergers and in particular on unilateral effects analysis where innovation plays an important role. The paper discusses the economic theories behind innovation, how we move from the traditional product-by-product market definition to pipeline competition and innovation competition and the concept of innovation space. The paper provides a structural analysis of unilateral effects in such markets analyzing how competition authorities should assess a transaction where the main theory of harm is based on innovation considerations.

You Say You Want an Antitrust Revolution? The Paradox of Modern Merger Control

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 568-578
Author(s):  
John Kwoka
Keyword(s):  
Merger Control ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Paradoxical Effect ◽  
The Past ◽  
Unilateral Effects ◽  
Time Period ◽  
New Methodologies

Over the past twenty years, merger control has made what appear to be substantial advances in concepts and methodology, claiming the mantle of a “revolution.” This essay observes, however, that over this very same time period, merger control has in fact weakened and concentration risen throughout the economy. It reexamines two of the most heralded new methodologies—market definition and unilateral effects. It shows ways in which these have had the paradoxical effect of actually weakening merger control rather than strengthening it.

High energy resolution spectrometer for the dedicated STEM

1984 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 558-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
P.E. Batson
Keyword(s):  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Core Loss ◽  
Beam Current ◽  
High Energy ◽  
High Energy Resolution ◽  
Acquisition Time ◽  
Good Definition ◽  
Loss Analysis ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Acceleration Voltage

Use of the STEM to obtain precise electronic information has been hampered by the lack of energy loss analysis capable of a resolution and accuracy comparable to the 0.3eV energy width of the Field Emission Source. Recent work by Park, et. al. and earlier by Crewe, et. al. have promised magnetic sector devices that are capable of about 0.75eV resolution at collection angles (about 15mR) which are great enough to allow efficient use of the STEM probe current. These devices are also capable of 0.3eV resolution at smaller collection angles (4-5mR). The problem that arises, however, lies in the fact that, even with the collection efficiency approaching 1.0, several minutes of collection time are necessary for a good definition of a typical core loss or electronic transition. This is a result of the relatively small total beam current (1-10nA) that is available in the dedicated STEM. During this acquisition time, the STEM acceleration voltage may fluctuate by as much as 0.5-1.0V.

An old friend is better than two new ones? Approaches to market research in the context of digital transformation for the antitrust laws enforcement

2020 ◽  
pp. 37-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. E. Shastitko ◽  
O. A. Markova
Keyword(s):  
Business Models ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Digital Transformation ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Pass Through ◽  
Type Ii Errors

Digital transformation has led to changes in business models of traditional players in the existing markets. What is more, new entrants and new markets appeared, in particular platforms and multisided markets. The emergence and rapid development of platforms are caused primarily by the existence of so called indirect network externalities. Regarding to this, a question arises of whether the existing instruments of competition law enforcement and market analysis are still relevant when analyzing markets with digital platforms? This paper aims at discussing advantages and disadvantages of using various tools to define markets with platforms. In particular, we define the features of the SSNIP test when being applyed to markets with platforms. Furthermore, we analyze adjustment in tests for platform market definition in terms of possible type I and type II errors. All in all, it turns out that to reduce the likelihood of type I and type II errors while applying market definition technique to markets with platforms one should consider the type of platform analyzed: transaction platforms without pass-through and non-transaction matching platforms should be tackled as players in a multisided market, whereas non-transaction platforms should be analyzed as players in several interrelated markets. However, if the platform is allowed to adjust prices, there emerges additional challenge that the regulator and companies may manipulate the results of SSNIP test by applying different models of competition.

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