scholarly journals A RACIONALIDADE TECNOCIENTÍFICA E O SEU DESAFIO À FILOSOFIA DA CIÊNCIA

DoisPontos ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Cupani

resumo: A Filosofia da Ciência ocupa-se com a racionalidade da ciência, mas a ciência tradicional vai sendo crescentemente substituída pela tecnociência, que implica uma diferente racionalidade, ou seja, uma diferente maneira de justificar seus propósitos e métodos. Neste artigo descrevemos as origens e a evolução histórica da tecnociência e as mudanças que ela introduz na pesquisa científica, particularmente no seu ethos. Essas mudanças deveriam causar uma transformação na Filosofia da Ciência, fazendo com que inclua questões éticas e políticas junto com as epistemológicas, e que trabalhe em cooperação com outros estudos sobre a ciência.abstract: Philosophy of science deals with the rationality of science, but traditional science is increasingly replaced by technoscience, which implies a different rationality, that is, a different way of justifying its goals and methods. In this paper we describe the origins and historical evolution of technoscience, and the changes it introduces in scientific research, particularly in its ethos. Those changes should cause a transformation in the philosophy of science, making it to include ethical and political questions along with epistemological ones and to work in cooperation with other studies on science.

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Dunleavy

Despite continued attention, finding adequate criteria for distinguishing “good” from “bad”scholarly journals remains an elusive goal. In this essay, I propose a solution informed by thework of Imre Lakatos and his methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP). I beginby reviewing several notable attempts at appraising journal quality – focusing primarily on theimpact factor and development of journal blacklists and whitelists. In doing so, I note theirlimitations and link their overarching goals to those found within the philosophy of science. Iargue that Lakatos’s MSRP and specifically his classifications of “progressive” and“degenerative” research programmes can be analogized and repurposed for the evaluation ofscholarly journals. I argue that this alternative framework resolves some of the limitationsdiscussed above and offers a more considered evaluation of journal quality – one that helpsaccount for the historical evolution of journal-level publication practices and attendantcontributions to the growth (or stunting) of scholarly knowledge. By doing so, the seemingproblem of journal demarcation is diminished. In the process I utilize two novel tools (themistake index and scite index) to further operationalize aspects of the MSRP.


2021 ◽  
Vol VII ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Sławomir Sztobryn

The article deals with the problems of Comenius’ pansophism in his interpretation and in the research of selected contemporary Polish scholars. One of the significant differ-ences between the author of the above dissertation and other contemporary researchers is the treatment of pansophism as a primary concept in relation to didactic solutions. The argu-ments cited in the dissertation justify the importance of pansophism as the basis of Comenius’ work. The characteristics of pansophism present in synthesis the richness of its meanings that are not commonly perceived in the source literature. Authors who pondered over this issue have noticed its historical evolution. However, pansophism is not a historical artifact, but carries numerous consequences that, at least in part, are close to contemporary trends in scientific research.


2020 ◽  
pp. 112-123
Author(s):  
Subrena E. Smith

Anna Morandi was the foremost anatomist in eighteenth-century Bologna. Although her work was widely recognized as exceptional by the scientists of her day, she was not granted the standing of a scientist. In this chapter, the author uses Morandi as a case study to illuminate aspects of the philosophy of science. In particular, the chapter addresses conceptions of scientific objectivity and the role of social values in science, drawing on the work of Helen Longino. In addition to the phenomena described by Longino, the author argues that social values enter into science and impact scientific research by determining how individuals are positioned in scientific communities, or excluded from them.


2019 ◽  
pp. 227-244
Author(s):  
Steven J. Osterlind

This chapter describes quantifying events in America and their historical context. The cotton gin is invented and has tremendous impact on the country, bringing sentiments of taxation and slavery to the fore, for state’s rights. Events leading to the American Civil War are described, as are other circumstances leading to the Industrial Revolution, first in England and then moving to America. Karl Pearson is introduced with description of his The Grammar of Science, as well as his approach to scholarship as first defining a philosophy of science, which has dominated much of scientific research from the time of the book’s publication to today. Pearson’s invention of the coefficient of correlation is described, and his other contributions to statistics are mentioned: standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and goodness of fit, as well as his formal introduction of the contingency table.


2021 ◽  
pp. 175407392110587
Author(s):  
Peter Zachar

Advocates for the psychological construction of emotion view themselves as articulating a non-essentialist alternative to basic emotion theory's essentialist notion of affect programs. Psychological constructionists have also argued that holding essentialist assumptions about emotions engenders misconceptions about the psychological constructionist viewpoint. If so, it is important to understand what psychological constructionists mean by “essentialism” and “non-essentialism.” To advance the debate, I take a deeper dive into non-essentialism, comparing the non-essentialist views of the early empiricists with those of the psychological constructionists, focusing on the theories of James Russell and Lisa Barrett. Using Lakatos’ notion of scientific research programs, I also describe how Russell's and Barrett's views have evolved into different and potentially competing research programs under the psychological constructionist banner.


Data ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 90
Author(s):  
Stefano Canali

In this commentary, I propose a framework for thinking about data quality in the context of scientific research. I start by analyzing conceptualizations of quality as a property of information, evidence and data and reviewing research in the philosophy of information, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of biomedicine. I identify a push for purpose dependency as one of the main results of this review. On this basis, I present a contextual approach to data quality in scientific research, whereby the quality of a dataset is dependent on the context of use of the dataset as much as the dataset itself. I exemplify the approach by discussing current critiques and debates of scientific quality, thus showcasing how data quality can be approached contextually.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaakko Kuorikoski ◽  
Petri Ylikoski

In this paper we argue that, despite its influence, critical realism is not the most promising version of scientific realism for economics. The main problem with critical realism is its hermetic insulation from the mainstream of the philosophy of science. We argue that this intellectual isolation is unfortunate, as it has meant that critical realism has missed many opportunities to develop its central concepts, such as causal mechanism, emergence, and explanation. At the same time, we argue, critical realists have missed some crucial aspects of the intellectual strategy of modern economics. Our point is not to defend mainstream economics, rather it is to show that a better understanding of modeling as a scientific research strategy opens up the possibility of a more penetrating analysis of its possible shortcomings.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 917-943 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet A. Kourany ◽  
Manuela Fernández Pinto

A coherent and helpful public policy based on science is difficult to achieve for at least three reasons. First, there are purely practical problems—for example, that scientific experts often disagree on policy-relevant questions and their debates often continue well beyond policy appropriate timelines. Second, there are epistemic problems—for example, that science is hardly the neutral supplier of factual information (free of contested social values) that traditionally has been supposed. And third, there are social problems: given the commercialization of today’s science and its enduring limitations (sexism, racism, homophobia, ableism, etc.), much of scientific research today fails to meet the moral and political standards one would expect it to meet in order to inform public policy. In this paper, we examine such problems in the context of breast cancer screening policy and suggest the role philosophy of science should play in dealing with the situation.


1990 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 135-154
Author(s):  
Michael Redhead

In what sense do the sciences explain? Or do they merely describe what is going on without answering why-questions at all. But cannot description at an appropriate ‘level’ provide all that we can reasonably ask of an explanation? Well, what do we mean by explanation anyway? What, if anything, gets left out when we provide a so-called scientific explanation? Are there limits of explanation in general, and scientific explanation, in particular? What are the criteria for a good explanation? Is it possible to satisfy all the desiderata simultaneously? If not, which should we regard as paramount? What is the connection between explanation and prediction? What exactly is it that statistical explanations explain? These are some of the questions that have generated a very extensive literature in the philosophy of science. In attempting to answer them, definite views will have to be taken on related matters, such as physical laws, causality, reduction, and questions of evidence and confirmation, of theory and observation, realism versus antirealism, and the objectivity and rationality of science. I will state my own views on these matters, in the course of this essay. To argue for everything in detail and to do justice to all the alternative views, would fill a book, perhaps several books. I want to lead up fairly quickly to modern physics, and review the explanatory situation there in rather more detail.


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