scholarly journals How to Be Critical and Realist about Economics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaakko Kuorikoski ◽  
Petri Ylikoski

In this paper we argue that, despite its influence, critical realism is not the most promising version of scientific realism for economics. The main problem with critical realism is its hermetic insulation from the mainstream of the philosophy of science. We argue that this intellectual isolation is unfortunate, as it has meant that critical realism has missed many opportunities to develop its central concepts, such as causal mechanism, emergence, and explanation. At the same time, we argue, critical realists have missed some crucial aspects of the intellectual strategy of modern economics. Our point is not to defend mainstream economics, rather it is to show that a better understanding of modeling as a scientific research strategy opens up the possibility of a more penetrating analysis of its possible shortcomings.

Author(s):  
Dominik Giese ◽  
Jonathan Joseph

This chapter evaluates critical realism, a term which refers to a philosophy of science connected to the broader approach of scientific realism. In contrast to other philosophies of science, such as positivism and post-positivism, critical realism presents an alternative view on the questions of what is ‘real’ and how one can generate scientific knowledge of the ‘real’. How one answers these questions has implications for how one studies science and society. The critical realist answer starts by prioritizing the ontological question over the epistemological one, by asking: What must the world be like for science to be possible? Critical realism holds the key ontological belief of scientific realism that there is a reality which exists independent of our knowledge and experience of it. Critical realists posit that reality is more complex, and made up of more than the directly observable. More specifically, critical realism understands reality as ‘stratified’ and composed of three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. Here lies the basis for causation.


Author(s):  
John Brekke ◽  
Jeane Anastas ◽  
Jerry Floersch ◽  
Jeffrey Longhofer

Any definition of social work science must make its philosophy of science manifest. While not the only ones in social work to espouse realism, especially critical realism, the IslandWood Group used key ideas from this school of thought to guide many discussions. The main tenets of scientific realism are described followed by a description of some key features of critical realism. Basic tenets of the realisms include the existence of a mind-independent reality, the existence of the unseen, upward and downward causation, stratified reality, emergence, the embrace of multiple methodologies, and the importance of theory in science. This epistemological and ontological stance differs from positivist and behaviorist approaches. The chapter concludes with a summary of other frameworks—pragmatism, constructionism, and critical theories—that are also relevant to a science of social work.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (46) ◽  
pp. 353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Bunge

Mario Bunge nasceu em Buenos Aires, em 21 de setembro de 1919. Realizou seus estudos na Universidade Nacional de la Plata, obtendo seu doutorado em ciências físico-matemáticas em 1952. Foi professor de Física Teórica e Filosofia em Buenos Aires, entre 1956 a 1966. Em seguida, tornou-se professor de Lógica e Metafísica na Universidade McGill, em Montreal, onde trabalha desde 1966. Bunge recebeu vinte e quatro doutorados Honoris Causa, sendo membro da American Association for the Advancement of Science (desde 1984) e da Royal Society of Canadá (desde 1992). Em 1982, Bunge foi premiado com o Prêmio Príncipe das Astúrias, em 2009 com a bolsa Guggenheim e, em 2014, com o prêmio Ludwig Von Bertalanffy em Complexity Thinking. É autor de dezenas de livros, entre os quais estão Metascientific Queries (Charles C. Thomas, 1959); Intuition and Science (Prentice-Hall, 1962; Greenwood Press, 1975); The Myth of Simplicity. (Prentice-Hall, 1963). Scientific Research, 2 volumes (Springer, 1967); Foundations of Physics (Springer, 1967); Philosophy of Science: From Problem to Theory, Vol. 1 (Transaction Publishers, 1998); Philosophy of Science: From Explanation to Justification, Vol. 2(Transaction Publishers, 1998); Scientific Realism: Selected Essays by Mario Bunge. Ed. Martin Mahner (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2001); El problema mente – cerebro (Madrid: Tecnos, 2002); Emergence and Convergence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), entre outros.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe

We report the results of a study that investigated the views of researchers working in sevenscientific disciplines and in history and philosophy of science in regard to four hypothesizeddimensions of scientific realism. Among other things, we found (i) that natural scientiststended to express more strongly realist views than social scientists, (ii) that historyand philosophy of science scholars tended to express more antirealist views than naturalscientists, (iii) that van Fraassen’s characterization of scientific realism failed to clusterwith more standard characterizations, and (iv) that those who endorsed the pessimistic inductionwere no more or less likely to endorse antirealism.


Author(s):  
Curtis Forbes

The debate over scientific realism, simply put, is a debate over what we can and should believe about reality once we've critically assessed all the available arguments and empirical evidence. Thinking earnestly about the merits of scientific realism as a philosophical thesis requires navigating contentious historiographical issues, being familiar with the technical details of various scientific theories, and addressing disparate philosophical problems spanning aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and beyond. This issue of Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science aims to make participating in the scientific realism debate easier for both newcomers and veterans, collecting over twenty invited and peer-reviewed papers under the title "The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate: Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism."


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brian Tweed

<p>In this thesis, the learning of conventional curriculum mathematics in indigenous Māori schools is conceptualised as a site of struggle within the wider context of a national New Zealand education system. For example, the research literature documents the effects of inadequate mathematics education resources, detrimental impacts on the nature of traditional Māori language and cultural practices, and concerns about under-achievement of Māori students in mathematics and access to powerful societal knowledge. The thesis aims to uncover a causal mechanism for the struggle with mathematics education in one Māori school.  Empirical data about mathematics learning activities are examined using a theoretical perspective strongly influenced by Dialectical Critical Realism. The methodological frameworks are based on Basil Bernstein’s sociology of education, Systemic Functional Linguistics and Legitimation Code Theory. Using these theoretical and methodological tools, empirical data are related to deeper-level ontological determinations which underpin practices in the Māori school.  The major conclusion of the thesis is that struggle derives from two conflicting ontological determinations about the nature of a person. Mathematics education tends to construe people, and create subjectivities, in terms of their knowledge. The ethos of the Māori school considered in this thesis tends to construe people, and create subjectivities, in terms of their genealogically-embedded, unique, material and spiritual natures.  Based on this conclusion, the thesis indicates some potential consequences and future developments of mathematics education in Māori schools. These developments may be thought of in general terms as a disengagement from current relations with mathematics education, an establishment of autonomy, and a re-engagement with mathematics on different terms.</p>


Author(s):  
David Wallace

This chapter briefly discusses central key topics in the philosophy of science that the remainder of the book draws upon. It begins by considering the scientific method. ‘Induction’—the idea that we construct scientific theories just by generalizing from observations—is a very poor match to real science. ‘Falsification’—Popper’s idea that we create a theory, test against observation, and discard it if it fails the test—is much more realistic, but still too simple: data only falsifies data given auxiliary assumptions that can themselves be doubted. The issues are illustrated through an example from modern astrophysics: dark matter. The chapter then explores how we can resolve issues of underdetermination, where two theories give the same predictions. Finally, it introduces ‘scientific realism’, the view that our best theories tell us things about the world that go beyond what is directly observable.


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