scholarly journals Монгол улсад төвлөрлийг сааруулах асуудал

2017 ◽  
pp. 40-45
Author(s):  
Энхтайван Л ◽  
Ариунаа Л
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
The Political ◽  
Local Authorities ◽  
Fiscal Autonomy ◽  
Fiscal Centralization

No Mongolian AbstractIn general decentralization is connected with the transfer of responsibilities for planning, management, resource raising and allocation from the central government to the lower levels of government. In particular fiscal decentralization means that local authorities become responsible for the expenditure and revenue assignment. From the economic and political science perspectives fiscal decentralization will improve resource allocation and accountability, which results in an efficient and effective supply of public goods and support private markets.In last decade Mongolia has introduced a number of decentralization measures, which followed a top dawn approach and were slowly implemented without any integrated decentralization strategy. Currently Mongolia is a de-concentrated state with fiscal centralization. The local governments are still far away from having the political, administrative and fiscal autonomy to manage their own affairs.

Determinants of the Distribution of the Central-Government Budgetary Grants in Turkey

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 954-967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Recep Tekeli ◽  
Muhittin Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
The Political ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Fiscal Disparities ◽  
Grant Allocation ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
Government Grant ◽  
Economic Criteria

Intergovernmental grants are the main revenue source of local governments. In the fiscal decentralization literature it has been argued that fiscal disparities across the regions are accounted for in the central-government grant distribution. However, some argue that grants are given to localities to increase the reelection chances of the incumbent or to increase the votes at election. To compete with the opposition parties the incumbent party may try to allocate the grants to aligned local governments. In this paper we analyze the grant allocation in Turkey. We test empirically whether central-government's budgetary transfers to the municipalities were made on the basis of economic criteria or in accordance with the political interest of politicians, and hence the coalition government. To test the hypothesis we followed the literature but we used additional variables. Using municipal data in sixty-one provinces, we find that the desire to secure reelection motivates politicians.

How Do Land Takings Affect Political Trust in Rural China?

2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 91-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernan Cui ◽  
Ran Tao ◽  
Travis J. Warner ◽  
Dali L. Yang
Keyword(s):  
Policy Implementation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Political Trust ◽  
Good News ◽  
The Political ◽  
Local Authorities ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Rapid Economic Growth

While China's ruling Communist Party has benefited from a reservoir of political trust engendered by more than three decades of rapid economic growth, it is confronted with rising social tensions and the prospect of instability. The number of mass incidents, which is a key measure of instability, has risen enormously, and a major source of such incidents stems from local governments taking land from farmers, often at below-market prices. This article draws upon data from two surveys to assess the political trust implications of land takings. It is found that, as expected, land takings are associated with a decline in political trust. However, the decline affects trust in local authorities only and leaves the central government largely unscathed. Nonetheless, the gap between villagers' trust in central and local authorities is not unalloyed good news for the regime and has major implications for policy implementation and governance.

Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies

2004 ◽  
pp. 126-141
Author(s):  
A. Chernyavsky ◽  
K. Vartapetov
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Finance Reform ◽  
Fiscal Transfers ◽  
Fiscal Autonomy ◽  
Subnational Government ◽  
Tax Autonomy

By employing the methodology developed by the OECD the paper assesses the degree of revenue decentralization in Russia in comparison with other post-communist European countries. The paper provides theoretical arguments underpinning fiscal decentralization, analyzes the composition of subnational government revenues, the level of regional and local tax autonomy and types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The analysis presents the composition of revenues depending on the degree of subnational and local government control. In comparison with other transition countries fiscal decentralization in Russia is relatively low. It is concluded that Russia's public finance reform has not progressed towards providing greater fiscal autonomy for regional and local governments.

scholarly journals Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Soil Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Party Control ◽  
The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

scholarly journals THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN REGIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE HANDLING OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Yurispruden ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 208
Author(s):  
Fahrul Abrori
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Research Methods ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Relationship

 ABSTRAKPandemi Covid-19 yang terjadi di Indonesia membuat pemerintah membuat kebijakan-kebijakan sebagai stimulus untuk menjaga kestabilan masyarakat dan perekonomian. Pemerintah pusat memberikan kewenangan kepada pemerintah daerah untuk mengelola keuangan daerah untuk menangani covid-19 di daerah masing-masing. Hal ini disebabkan karena pemerintah daerah lebih memahami kebutuhan daerahnya. Permasalahan yang diangkat Pertama, bagaimana hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah dalam pengelolaan keuangan untuk penanganan pandemi Covid-19? Kedua, Apa peran Pemerintah Daerah dalam pengelolaan keuangan daerah untuk penanganan pandemi Covid-19? Menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konsep. Hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah dalam Pengelolaan Keuangan untuk Penanganan Pandemi Covid-19 yaitu desentralisasi fiskal yang mana. Peran Pemerintah Daerah dalam Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah untuk Penanganan Pandemi Covid-19 yaitu dengan melakukan refocusing kegiatan, realokasi anggaran, dan Penggunaan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah.Kata kunci: Pemerintah Daerah, Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah, Pandemi Covid-19 ABSTRACTThe Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia led the government to make policies as a stimulus to maintain the stability of society and the economy. The central government authorizes local governments to manage local finances to deal with covid-19 in their respective regions. This is because the local government better understands the needs of the region. The issue raised first, how is the relationship between the Central Government and Local Government in financial management for the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic? Second, What is the role of local governments in regional financial management for the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic? Using normative juridical research methods with statutory approaches and concept approaches. The relationship between the Central Government and Local Government in Financial Management for the Handling of the Covid-19 Pandemic is fiscal decentralization. The role of local governments in regional financial management for the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic is by refocusing activities, reallocating budgets, and using regional budgets.Keywords: Local Government, Regional Financial Management, Covid-19 Pandemic

Collaborative Governance and the Implementation of Fiscal Responsibility Frameworks

2017 ◽  
pp. 463-482
Author(s):  
Sonia D. Gatchair
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Collaborative Governance ◽  
Small Island ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Local Authorities ◽  
Fiscal Responsibility ◽  
Fiscal Management ◽  
And Control

Local governments, like their central government counterparts, must demonstrate increased fiscal responsibility. Although the Jamaican finance ministry has overall responsibility for direction and control of fiscal management at all levels of government, successful implementation cannot be achieved solely by the finance ministry's efforts, but requires the inputs of other actors, including central government, local authorities, the private sector, and civil society groups. This chapter examines the strategic use of collaborations among local authorities and other stakeholders in the implementation of fiscal management policies, in particular revenue-raising efforts in Jamaica, a small island state. The study examines relationships/partnerships (collaborative governance) focusing on the actors, structure, and processes in the implementation of fiscal policy reforms in local authorities. It finds that deliberate efforts must be made to manage complexity arising from overlapping networks with unclear boundaries and fluidity in participation and leadership.

scholarly journals Dampak Desentralisasi Fiskal terhadap Volatilitas Belanja Pemerintah Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-138
Author(s):  
Benedictus Raksaka Mahi ◽  
Syarah Siti Supriyanti
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Government Transparency ◽  
Before And After

The volatility of expenditures sub-local derived from central government transparency in transfers to local governments may aggravate sublocal economy. This study aims to analyze the eect of fiscal decentralization to the level of volatility of local government spending in 230 sub-local in Indonesia. We use two periods, before and after the implementation of Law No. 28 Year 2009. The regression results indicate that the volatility of local government spending may decrease if the degree of fiscal decentralization increases, especially at the time when districts implement that law. As responsive taxation can provide incentives for smooth spending for sub-local government. ================================= Volatilitas belanja pemerintah kabupaten/kota yang berasal dari ketidakpastian transfer pemerintah pusat kepada pemerintah daerah dapat memperburuk perekonomian kabupaten/kota. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis pengaruh desentralisasi fiskal terhadap tingkat volatilitas belanja riil pemerintah pada 230 kabupaten/kota di Indonesia serta membandingkan data sebelum dan sesudah implementasi UU No. 28 Tahun 2009. Hasil menunjukkan semakin tinggi derajat desentralisasi fiskal, cenderung menurunkan volatilitas belanja riil pemerintah kabupaten/kota karena kemampuan fiskal kabupaten/kota cenderung meningkat setelah implementasi UU tersebut. Pajak properti merupakan sumber penerimaan daerah yang dapat diprediksi sehingga pemerintah kabupaten/kota dapat mengelola belanja daerahnya dengan lebih pasti dan terukur.

scholarly journals “In Accordance with Local Conditions”: Policy Design and Implementation of Agrarian Change Policies in Rural China

2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Trappel
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Policy Design ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Agrarian Change ◽  
The Political ◽  
Local Conditions ◽  
Cognitive Framework ◽  
Chinese Agriculture ◽  
Leading Cadres

An important part of Beijing's strategy to reduce the welfare gap between urban and rural parts of China has been the promotion of urbanisation. Replacing peasant agriculture with commercial operations of scale is an integral part of this endeavour. This article analyses the implementation of policies meant to transform the structure of Chinese agriculture. It argues that the central government is using a set of very flexible policies, project-based implementation and adaption to local conditions to guide and support an existing dynamic of structural transformation in agriculture. Local governments, in turn, appreciate the flexibility, the political predictability, the potential revenue improvements and the cognitive framework inherent in these programmes. The article is primarily based on interviews with leading cadres at the township and county levels in the provinces of Shandong, Sichuan and Guizhou between 2008 and 2010.

No taxation, no representation: An investigation of the relationship between natural resources and fiscal decentralization

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (7) ◽  
pp. 1234-1255
Author(s):  
Mohammad Arzaghi ◽  
Andrew Balthrop
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resources ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Government Expenditures ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Resource Rents ◽  
Natural Resource Rents ◽  
The Relationship

Rents from natural resources can alter the relationship between central and local governments by providing a new source of government financing. We develop a model to explore the relationship between fiscal decentralization and resource abundance. Our model indicates that natural resource rents can detach central government expenditures from the tax base so that the central government can spend more to persuade a fractious periphery to remain under central government control. Thus, other things being equal, higher natural resource rents can result in less decentralized government expenditures. We empirically explore the relationship between fiscal decentralization and natural resource rents using a panel of 60 countries over the past 40 years. Empirical results support our economic model: A 1% increase in natural resource rents as a fraction of gross domestic product results in government expenditures that are 0.53% less decentralized.

Fiscal decentralization, preference for government innovation and city innovation

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siying Yang ◽  
Zheng Li ◽  
Jian Li
Keyword(s):  
Development Strategy ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Effect Model ◽  
Fiscal Expenditure ◽  
Government Innovation

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether fiscal decentralization has impacts on city innovation level and to examine the moderating effects of the preference for government innovation in China. Design/methodology/approach Using a panel data of China’s 278 cities from 2003 to 2016, the authors first use fixed-effect model and quantile regression to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on city innovation level and the variations of impacts conditional on different innovation levels, followed by a mediating effect model to test the moderating effects of the preference for government innovation and its temporal and spatial heterogeneity. Findings The paper finds that fiscal decentralization significantly inhibited city innovation, and with the improvement of city innovation level, the inhibition demonstrated characteristics of “V” type variation. When the degree of fiscal decentralization is between 0.377 and 0.600, the inhibition of fiscal decentralization on city innovation level is the weakest. We further show that fiscal decentralization also inhibits the government's preference for innovation, reduces the proportion of fiscal expenditure on innovation and has a negative impact on city innovation. In addition, the influence of fiscal decentralization on city innovation present clear heterogeneity in space and in time. On one hand, the inhibition of fiscal decentralization on city innovation level in eastern China is significantly weaker than that in central and Western China; on the other hand, after the implementation of China’s innovation-driven development strategy in 2013, the negative impact of fiscal decentralization on city innovation disappeared. Research limitations/implications The research findings have certain policy implications. That is, in the process of decentralization reform, on the one hand, the central government should strengthen the supervision over the fiscal expenditure of local governments and ensure that the central government can play a leading role in the local development strategy, on the other hand, the central government should guard against the distortion of fiscal decentralization on local governments' fiscal expenditure behavior. In addition, the central government should also focus on the heterogeneity of the impacts of fiscal decentralization on cities under different strategic backgrounds and different levels of innovation. Originality/value This paper extends prior research by bringing the decentralization system reform into the study of city innovation system and analyzing its mechanism and its temporal and spatial heterogeneity.

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