CHANGES IN FRANCE’S STRATEGIC CULTURE AFTER THE COLD WAR

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (32) ◽  
pp. 273-292
Author(s):  
Stanisław Zarobny

The author of the article attempted to examine the main conditions and characteristics of the French strategic culture, a country with huge arms traditions and the high social authority of the armed forces in society. All this means that France has made a huge contribution to the development of theory and practice in the field of military art and strategy, as well as in shaping the order of international security. The main strategic documents of France and its activity in the international arena confirm the traditional line of French security policy and strategic culture. It is a political culture of a superpower conscious of its great past which still radiates into current and global relations of France.

Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Lantis ◽  
Darryl Howlett

This chapter discusses the ways that strategic culture can be relevant to scholarship and policymaking with regard to international security. It first provides an overview of three main approaches to the study of culture and strategy, paying attention to political culture as well as the relationship between strategic culture and nuclear deterrence. It then examines various sources of strategic culture identified in the literature, along with theoretical issues related to strategic culture. In particular, it explores the link between constructivism and strategic culture, the question of continuity in state behaviour and how strategic cultural dilemmas can cause changes in security policy, and the ‘keepers’ of strategic culture. The chapter also asks whether non-state, state, and multistate actors can possess distinctive strategic cultures before concluding with an analysis of the role of strategic culture in the acquisition of — and threats to use — weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).


Author(s):  
Yu. Skorokhod

Since the accession of the People’s Republic of China to the UN in 1971, its approach to UN peacekeeping operations underwent significant alterations at least three times: after 1981, 1989/1990 and after 2003. This article examines the peculiarities of China’s approach to UN peacekeeping operations in 1971–1980 as to the tool of interference in the internal affairs of small states exercised by superpowers. The article claims that although Beijing’s approach to participation in UN peacekeeping efforts changed when in 1981 China began to vote on the UN Security Council for extending the mandates of UN current operations and began to pay contributions to the budget for peacekeeping, the evolution of China’s stance towards UN peacekeeping activities in fact became apparent only following the end of the Cold War, when China was able to take part in launching and implementation of the new peacekeeping operations. Beijing’s vision of the settlement of conflicts in the Persian Gulf (1990–1991) and Somalia, which had a significant impact on China’s position on the new trends in the development of UN peacekeeping practices, was also explored in the article. The author provides a thorough analysis of the main features of Chinaʼs stance on the development of theory and practice of UN peacekeeping in 1981–2003 and points out that in contrast to the previous period of 1971–1980 the countryʼs opposition to it was limited but not overwhelming, since China had elaborated its attitude towards peacekeeping in terms of its own national interests but not ideological reasons, in particular because of the need to create favorable external conditions for implementation of domestic reforms. The article also pays much attention to the study of changes which Chinaʼs peacekeeping policy has undergone since 2003 and which were marked by a significant increase in Chinaʼs participation in UN peacekeeping. The author explains the reasons behind reconsideration by the Chinese leadership of the role which UN peacekeeping played in Beijingʼs strategy of foreign policy; the article also defined political and reputational benefits which China derived from participating in UN peacekeeping operations. The conclusion is that Beijingʼs position on UN peacekeeping evolved from vivid obstructionism to active participation because of significant changes in Chinaʼs foreign and security policy and the development of theory and practice of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. The article proves that the core traits of Chinaʼs policy towards UN peacekeeping are flexibility and pragmatism.


Author(s):  
Filip Ejdus

During the cold war, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was a middle-sized power pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy and a defence strategy based on massive armed forces, obligatory conscription, and a doctrine of ‘Total National Defence’. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s resulted in the creation of several small states. Ever since, their defence policies and armed forces have been undergoing a thorough transformation. This chapter provides an analysis of the defence transformation of the two biggest post-Yugoslav states—Serbia and Croatia—since the end of the cold war. During the 1990s, defence transformation in both states was shaped by the undemocratic nature of their regimes and war. Ever since they started democratic transition in 2000, and in spite of their diverging foreign policies, both states have pivoted towards building modern, professional, interoperable, and democratically controlled armed forces capable of tackling both traditional and emerging threats.


Author(s):  
Fabrizio Coticchia

Since the end of the bipolar era, Italy has regularly undertaken military interventions around the world, with an average of 8,000 units employed abroad in the twenty-first century. Moreover, Italy is one of the principal contributors to the UN operations. The end of the cold war represented a turning point for Italian defence, allowing for greater military dynamism. Several reforms have been approved, while public opinion changed its view regarding the armed forces. This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive perspective of the process of transformation that occurred in post-cold-war Italian defence, looking at the evolution of national strategies, military doctrines, and the structure of forces. After a brief literature review, the study highlights the process of transformation of Italian defeshnce policy since 1989. Through primary and secondary sources, the chapter illustrates the main changes that occurred, the never-ending cold-war legacies, and key challenges.


The armed forces of Europe have undergone a dramatic transformation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces provides the first comprehensive analysis of national security and defence policies, strategies, doctrines, capabilities, and military operations, as well as the alliances and partnerships of European armed forces in response to the security challenges Europe has faced since the end of the cold war. A truly cross-European comparison of the evolution of national defence policies and armed forces remains a notable blind spot in the existing literature. This Handbook aims to fill this gap with fifty-one contributions on European defence and international security from around the world. The six parts focus on: country-based assessments of the evolution of the national defence policies of Europe’s major, medium, and lesser powers since the end of the cold war; the alliances and security partnerships developed by European states to cooperate in the provision of national security; the security challenges faced by European states and their armed forces, ranging from interstate through intra-state and transnational; the national security strategies and doctrines developed in response to these challenges; the military capabilities, and the underlying defence and technological industrial base, brought to bear to support national strategies and doctrines; and, finally, the national or multilateral military operations by European armed forces. The contributions to The Handbook collectively demonstrate the fruitfulness of giving analytical precedence back to the comparative study of national defence policies and armed forces across Europe.


Author(s):  
Sir Richard Dearlove

This article discusses the changing perceptions on national security and civic anxiety. During the Cold War and its aftermath, security was rather a simple and straightforward issue. The countries knew their enemies, where they are and the threats they presented. On the event that, the enemies's secrets were unknown, probing techniques were employed to determine the weaknesses of the enemy. This formulaic situation which seeped through in to the twenty-first century left little room for innovation. In fact, in some countries, security maintained at the Cold War levels despite criticisms that new and emerging national security threats should be addressed at a new level. Of the powerful nations, America maintained the role of a world policeman and adapted its national security priorities according to its perception of a new series of strategic threats; however these new security strategies were without a sense of urgency. However, the perception of global threats and national security radically changed in the event of the 9/11 attack. The sleeping national security priorities of America came to a full force which affected the national security priorities of other nations as well. In the twenty-first globalized world, no conflict remains a regional clash. The reverberations of the Russian military action in Georgia, the Israeli intervention in Gaza, and the results of the attacks in Mumbai resonates loudly and rapidly through the wider international security system. While today, nations continue to seek new methods for addressing new security threats, the paradox of the national security policy is that nation-states have lost their exclusive grip of their own security at a time when the private citizens are assailed by increased fears for their own security and demand a more enhanced safety from the state. Nation-states have been much safer from large-scale violence, however there exists a strong sense of anxiety about the lack of security in the face of multiplicity of threats. Nations have been largely dependent on international coordinated action to achieve their important national security objectives. National policies and security theory lack precision. In addition, the internationalization of national security has eroded the distinction between domestic and foreign security. These blurring lines suggest that the understanding of national security is still at the height of transformations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096834452110179
Author(s):  
Raphaël Ramos

This article deals with the influence of Gen. George C. Marshall on the foundation of the US intelligence community after the Second World War. It argues that his uneven achievements demonstrate how the ceaseless wrangling within the Truman administration undermined the crafting of a coherent intelligence policy. Despite his bureaucratic skills and prominent positions, Marshall struggled to achieve his ends on matters like signals intelligence, covert action, or relations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet he crafted an enduring vision of how intelligence should supplement US national security policy that remained potent throughout the Cold War and beyond.


1994 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Croft

For almost fifty years there has been constant argument between those who have supported the development and possession of nuclear weapons by Britain and those opposed to those policies. This article argues that there has been a continuity in the arguments made by policy-makers and their critics, both operating within an unchanging series of linked assumptions forming a paradigm or mind-set. This article sets out the character of the assumptions of the orthodox and alternative thinkers, as they are termed in the article, examining their coherence and differences, particularly during the cold war. It concludes by attempting to draw out some implications for the British security policy debate in the post-cold war period.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-47
Author(s):  
Yinan Li

The development of the PRC’s armed forces included three phases when their modernization was carried out through an active introduction of foreign weapons and technologies. The first and the last of these phases (from 1949 to 1961, and from 1992 till present) received wide attention in both Chinese and Western academic literature, whereas the second one — from 1978 to 1989 —when the PRC actively purchased weapons and technologies from the Western countries remains somewhat understudied. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap. The author examines the logic of the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States in the context of complex interactions within the United States — the USSR — China strategic triangle in the last years of the Cold War. The first section covers early contacts between the PRC and the United States in the security field — from the visit of R. Nixon to China till the inauguration of R. Reagan. The author shows that during this period Washington clearly subordinated the US-Chinese cooperation to the development of the US-Soviet relations out of fear to damage the fragile process of detente. The second section focuses on the evolution of the R. Reagan administration’s approaches regarding arms sales to China in the context of a new round of the Cold War. The Soviet factor significantly influenced the development of the US-Chinese military-technical cooperation during that period, which for both parties acquired not only practical, but, most importantly, political importance. It was their mutual desire to undermine strategic positions of the USSR that allowed these two countries to overcome successfully tensions over the US arms sales to Taiwan. However, this dependence of the US-China military-technical cooperation on the Soviet factor had its downside. As the third section shows, with the Soviet threat fading away, the main incentives for the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States also disappeared. As a result, after the Tiananmen Square protests, this cooperation completely ceased. Thus, the author concludes that the US arms sales to China from the very beginning were conditioned by the dynamics of the Soviet-American relations and Beijing’s willingness to play an active role in the policy of containment. In that regard, the very fact of the US arms sales to China was more important than its practical effect, i.e. this cooperation was of political nature, rather than military one.


Author(s):  
Brian James Baer

Abstract The ideological incommensurability of the worldviews or master narratives represented by the two opposing superpowers during the Cold War and embodied in the image of an impenetrable iron curtain gave particular salience to translation theory while also questioning the very possibility of translation. At the same time, the neoimperialist projects of the two superpowers produced startlingly similar approaches to the instrumentalization of translation as a vehicle for propaganda and diplomacy. Presenting polarization as a distinct state of semiosis, the effects of which are highly unpredictable, this article explores the various ways in which the radical polarization of the Cold War shaped the theory and practice of translation both within and across the ideological divide. Plotting the entanglements of the light and dark sides of translation during this time challenges traditional histories of the field that construe the period as one of progress and liberation.


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