Moral rules for the word. A few remarks from the perspective of linguistics, philosophy and religious ethics

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-358
Author(s):  
Dominika Dziurosz-Serafinowicz

In this paper, I present some directives concerning the ethical use of speech and conversation. I focus on three areas – linguistics, philosophy and religion – and moral rules elaborated there with regard to what should and what should not be revealed by words. From the point of view of linguistics, I analyse modern principles of politeness and maxims of conversation. From the point of view of philosophical reflection, I consider ancient ethics of speech, and in particular: the three sieves of Socrates, rhetoric (lat. ars bene dicendi), and the Aristotelian golden mean. From the point of view of religion, I show the moral rules for words in Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Confucianism, and the Toltec faith.

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-253
Author(s):  
Ainur D. Kurmanalieva

Al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd interpreted religion and philosophy as two forms of knowledge which complete rather than nullify each other. This point of view was unique and novel. In this regard, both of them emphasized that, if philosophy were an instrument of a select few people for the comprehension of the meaning of existence, then religion is what gives the general populace a way to express their understanding of life. Ibn Rushd strove to draw the attention of representatives of religious teaching to philosophy, and aimed together with them at the understanding of the world which surrounds humankind. While al-Farabi tried by means of logical arguments to establish the priority of philosophy with reference to religion, Ibn Rushd did not restrict himself to the harmonizing of religion and philosophy, but attempted to use religion for the popularization of philosophy, as well as the raising of its prestige. Ibn Rushd fully realized that it was not necessary for science to argue with religious orthodoxy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
M Nur Prabowo S

This paper is a philosophical reflection and analysis by the writer, who is doing research on religious radicalism in Indonesia. The main idea is the principle of religious harmony as a social norm and ethical idealism. From the perspective of philosophical and religious ethics, the condition of harmonious diversity represents the social-good that should be manifested in ways that justified ethically as well. Theoritically, the norm of harmony contains etiquettes, rational consideration, and can be justified in terms of obligations and responsibilities, and in line with the principles of moderation.Keywords: Religious harmony, Ethics, Religion.


1969 ◽  
pp. 77-100
Author(s):  
Madalena Natsuko Hashimoto Cordaro

In an attempt to define (neo)confucianist ideas which are known to permeate Edo period, this essay deals with Confucianist Studies (Jugaku), Classic Studies (Kogaku),Vernacular Studies {Kokugaku) and Heart Studies (Shingaku), with no discrimination between philosophy and religion, but aware of the diversity of approaches in different historical moments and social classes, as well as of those ideas transformation processed in Japan. It is analised mainly the giri-ninjô (obligation-human feelings) conflict, which is so abundant in literary pieces of the time and in the society as a whole, under the essay conclusions point of view.


Hypatia ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger S. Gottlieb

Neither secular moral theory nor religious ethics have had much place for persons in need of constant physical help and cognitive support, nor for those who provide care for them. Writing as the father of a fourteen-year-old daughter with multiple disabilities, I will explore some of moral issues that arise here, both from the point of view of the disabled child and from that of the child's caretaker(s).


Author(s):  
Joshua Schwartz

<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p>Widespread deflationistic readings of Quine misrepresent his view of disquotation’s significance and the truth predicate’s utility. I demonstrate this by answering a question that philosophers have not directly addressed: how does Quine understand the philosophical problem of truth? A primary thesis of this paper is that we can answer this question only by working from within Quine’s naturalistic framework. Drawing on neglected texts from Quine's corpus, I defend the view that, for Quine, the problem of truth emerges from the development of science, in particular, from logical theorizing. I show that disquotation itself, from this Quinean point of view, is the problematic phenomenon calling for philosophical reflection. I conclude by arguing that Quine does not envisage the kind of explanatory role for disquotation taken up by contemporary deflationists, and he shows no interest in the task that animates deflationism, namely, to show that concerns with truth’s nature are fundamentally confused.</p></div></div></div>


Author(s):  
L’ubica Učník

In order to get out of present day discussions between (for example) determinism and free will, creationism and evolution, bios and zoē, human existence and biological life – those dead end binaries of our present day thinking into which we have manoeuvred ourselves – we need to revisit the Ancient discussions relating to the care of the soul and human existence. I will draw together these two themes from Jan Patočka’s writings by anchor-ing them in his account of Socrates who was the first to emphasise the idea of human re-sponsibility not only for thinking but also for human acting in the world. I will argue that the significant common feature – the care for our own being, our existence – brings Patočka’s reflections on the care for the soul and care for our human existence together. While, according to Patočka, the notion of the care for the soul was displaced from the philosophical reflection by the modern scientific venture, the idea of human existence is, although problematic from the scientific point of view, still a part of our experience.Para librarnos de discusiones contemporáneas entre (por ejemplo) determinismo y libre albedrío, creacionismo y evolución, bios y zoē, existencia humana y vida biológica, estos binomios, callejones de salida del pensamiento de hoy en los que nos hemos metido, tenemos que volver a escuchar las discusiones de la Antigüedad sobre el cuidado del alma y la existencia humana. Voy a recuperar estos dos temas de escritos de Jan Patočka, anclándolos en su interpretación de Sócrates, el primero en poner énfasis en la idea de responsabilidad humana no solo de su pensamiento sino también de su actuar en el mundo. Argumentaré que el significativo rasgo común, esto es, el cuidado por nuestro propio ser, nuestra existencia, es lo que une las reflexiones de Patočka sobre el cuidado del alma y el cuidado de la exitencia humana. Mientras que, según Patočka, la noción del cuidado del alma ha sido desplazada de la reflexión filosófica por la empresa científica moderna, la idea de la existencia humana, a pesar de lo problemático que puede resultar desde un punto de vista científi-co, todavía forma parte de nuestra experiencia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Ignatius Nnaemeka Onwuatuegwu

The issue of death has engaged many thinkers in almost every epoch or era. More so, different philosophers of various cultures have varied conceptions of death as well as rendering differing definitions and interpretations of the concept. Heidegger, for instance, sees man as a being destined to die and, therefore, man lives towards death. Death, simply put in that line of thought, therefore, is the primary purpose or destination of man on earth. This idea renders everything man does on earth as a venture in futility. Nevertheless, man is a being unto immortality. Death from the Igbo-African ontological point of view is but only a vehicle with which man is conveyed to immortality. It is an unavoidable path which every single individual person must unavoidably pass through if one is to be translated and transformed into immortality. The writer in the work resorted simply to the methodological approach of expository and philosophical reflection to accomplish the goal of the study. Invariably, the conclusion that death is, therefore, not a destination but a journey is drawn.


2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 137-159
Author(s):  
Mikhail Yu. Sergeev ◽  
Aleksandr E. Rybas

The article, written in the form of a dialogue/discussion, examines the problem of freedom in the context of its interpretation in religious and philosophical thought. The starting point for considering freedom is the thesis that the concept of freedom, as it is presented in the metaphysical and spiritual traditions, hinders both the philosophical understanding of freedom and its implementation in practice since the status of the concept requires the identification of freedom with the knowledge of freedom. However, the knowledge, as it always implies being universal, excludes the possibility of a different understanding of freedom, which leads to the confusion of freedom and necessity. While criticizing this thesis, Mikhail Sergeev insists that the adoption of a particular system of beliefs, including religious faith, does not necessarily make other people understand freedom the same way, which leads to the elimination of freedom in real life and to the substitution of freedom by necessity on theoretical level: as the history of philosophy and religion shows, there have always been many different concepts of freedom, even within the same school or tradition. From the point of view of Aleksandr Rybas, the variety of interpretations of freedom is such only formally since each of these interpretations is aimed at formulating the only one, “true” concept of freedom, resulting from the chosen point of view and therefore making it necessary to characterize alternative views as false: the very idea of “true” freedom is rooted in the specifics of metaphysical thinking, which should be seen the reason for the rejection of freedom. As a result of the discussion, however, some common views on freedom were developed. In particular, freedom was defined as the inherent ability of man to consciously initiate his own changes and determine the parameters of his own existence. Moreover, it was argued that there could not be the only valid or universal form of human life.


Dialogue ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-512
Author(s):  
Gary F. Greif

Piaget's work represents, f?om his own point of view, not only a study of intelligence, but a remedy for philosophical studies of the same subject matter. Philosophy in general, according to Piaget, “does not give us knowledge, as it lacks methods of verification”, that is, it does not give knowledge of anything except the personality of the philosopher “sim-ply meditating in his study by the light of his own reason”. Philosophical reflection can serve a heuristic function, but cannot yield objective knowledge, of truth. Piaget succinctly states this crucial methodologicalposition as follows:Although speculative reflection is a fertile and even necessary heuristic introduction to all inquiry, it can only lead to the elaboration of hypotheses, as sweeping as you like, to be sure, but as long as one does not seek verification by a group of facts established experimentally or by a deduction conforming to an exact algorithm (as in logic), the criterion of truth can only remain subjective, in the manner of an intuitive satisfaction, of “self-evidence,” etc.


2015 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Christopher Hamilton

There are many ways of doing philosophy of religion. No doubt all of them have need of abstract concepts and passages where reflection is more technical than it usually is, say in everyday thought and reflection. But it is well known that, in this area of philosophy, and not only in this area of philosophy, abstract reflection can run the risk of losing contact with the ins and outs, the finer-grained details, of the lived experience of reality. One way to seek to reduce this risk is to approach abstract or general reflection through philosophical reflection on specific cases. This is what I intend to do in this paper. My aim is to explore in detail a specific and, in my view, extraordinarily striking example, in this case, an example of forgiveness in a religious, indeed, Christian context, drawing out where possible general or abstract conclusions, but seeking always to root reflection in the specific case in order to understand better from a philosophical point of view what is at stake, what is important, when thinking about the issue in question. Of course, I shall be seeking primarily to elucidate philosophically the example I shall discuss, but, by implication, I hope that the kinds of questions, worries and concerns I discuss might raise consciousness – philosophical consciousness – of the kinds of questions that we might explore in other examples, specifically those which involve forgiveness in a religious context.


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