scholarly journals Systems-of-Systems MS&A for Complex Systems, Gaming and Decision for Space Systems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tien M. Nguyen

This chapter discusses advanced modeling, simulation and analysis (MS&A) approaches for supporting complex space system, gaming and decision support system (DSS) using systems-of-systems perspective. The systems-of-systems MS&A approaches presented here also address capability-based approach for supporting US defense acquisition life cycle with a laser focus on the pre-award acquisition phase and combined game theory and wargaming for acquiring complex defense space systems. The chapter also provides an overview of existing models and tools for the design, analysis and development of the government reference system architecture solution and corresponding acquisition strategy in a complex defense systems-of-systems environment. Although, the proposed MS&A approaches presented here are focused on defense space systems, but the approaches are flexible and robust that can be extended to any civilian and commercial applications.

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Budge ◽  
Valentine Herman

Traditional theories of government coalition formation concentrate on formal criteria inspired by – if not directly drawn from – game theory. One such criterion is that the coalition which forms must be winning; another is that it should have no surplus members without whom it would still be winning, i.e. it should be minimal; and a third is that the number of parties should be as few as possible. The closest that such theories come to considering the substantive issues affecting the formation of coalitions in the real world is their focus on reducing the ideological diversity of parties within the government. On many occasions, however, such ideological considerations receive negligible attention from politicians, who often ignore size factors altogether.


2012 ◽  
Vol 253-255 ◽  
pp. 1895-1899 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Li Ding ◽  
Zheng Wei Wang ◽  
Lu Yan Li

This paper proposes a game-based model to conduct the issue of road congestion pricing. The ride comfort of travel modes, e.g., cars or buses, is introduced into the travel cost function of the traditional bottleneck model. Furthermore, based on different travel cost functions of various travel modes, the Nash equilibriums are achieved among the government and various travelers. The results can be employed to describe internality and externality of traffic system respectively. Finally, numerical examples are presented. The findings of our work indicate a relationship between the government’s goal and the charge rate and that the emergence of ride comfort obviously is a key determinant of travelers’ behavior.


2021 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. 01025
Author(s):  
Yanying Zhang ◽  
Gui Jiang ◽  
Ziwei Yu

The pollution problem of SMEs is an important problem to be solved in the process of China’s economic development. Based on the game theory, this paper takes the government and SMEs as the two sides of the game, constructing the game theory model of pollution control of SMEs, putting forward the strategies to promote the pollution control of SMEs according to the analysis results of the model.


2011 ◽  
Vol 474-476 ◽  
pp. 1435-1439
Author(s):  
Sheng Li Chen ◽  
Xiao Dong Liu

We formulate the model of R&D investment scale adjustment of defense procurement by applying game theory and contest theory and study the equilibrium of manufacturers’ R&D investment decision-making in defense procurement. We explore mainly the influence of valuation of monopolistic contract and differences among manufacturers’ abilities on investment. The conclusion shows that manufacturers’ investment equilibrium of R&D projects is what the government expects under certain conditions, however, manufacturers’ abilities effect on the investment equilibrium and makes it deviate from the government expectation. Therefore, the government must keep practically manufacturers’ anticipation about the monopolistic contact being consistent with government’s and set basic admission criterion to enable manufactures’ ability well-matched to induce the manufacturers’ investment decisions to the investment equilibrium that it desired.


Author(s):  
Yan Liu ◽  
Chenyao Lv ◽  
Hong Xian Li ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Zhen Lei ◽  
...  

Managing quality risks of prefabricated components is one of the challenges for prefabricated construction. The Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components (QLIPC) is an effective approach to transfer such risks; however, limited research has been conducted regarding the development of QLIPC. This study introduces an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-based approach incorporating decisions from both the government and insurance companies. In the EGT model, a payoff matrix under disparate strategies is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are deduced. The simulation calculation is then carried out by MATLAB using sample virtual data to demonstrate the analysis. The results show that the government should act as the game promoter because the QLIPC can reduce governance cost and has significant social benefits. This research contributes a theoretical framework to analyze the QLIPC development using the EGT theory, and it could help the government to make long-term strategies for developing the QLIPC market.


2014 ◽  
Vol 641-642 ◽  
pp. 279-282
Author(s):  
Xiao Yu Ji ◽  
Min Song

From the perspective of quasi-public goods, this paper studies the investment of the farmland water infrastructure, and uses game theory to analyze government and private investors. It is found that in the presence of investment constraints, the government can not complete quasi-public goods investment in farmland water infrastructure independently, so the government needs to provide appropriate policies to increase the marginal benefit of private investors to attract private cooperation. Then this paper compares spontaneous investments and incentive investment from private investors, and concludes with policy recommendations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 712-715 ◽  
pp. 3038-3043
Author(s):  
Fang Miao Hou

The supply of environment-friendly products is an integral part of the green supply chain. Due to such reasons as lack of high-tech and lack of price competitiveness in contrast to traditional products, the manufacturers will not have incentive to produce and supply green products, so the Government should grant financial subsidies to producers which will compensate the profits entitled to them. Through the analysis based on game theory, the article concludes that there is disadvantage in constant subsidy and the variable subsidies will have more positive effects on the supply of environment-friendly products since the subsidy amount varies with the production scale.


2012 ◽  
Vol 446-449 ◽  
pp. 3885-3888
Author(s):  
Yan Qin Zhang ◽  
Qi Xun Fu

The construction fund of the security housing is in shortage, the financing way is single and not smooth. In order to effectively solve the capital bottleneck problems and to speed up the construction progress of the security housing, this paper introduces PPP pattern into the construction of the security housing. Based on the perspective of game theory, analyses the bargaining model during the process of income distribution between the government and the private agency in the construction of the security housing,then puts forward some related suggestions to promote the construction of the security housing in PPP-pattern.


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