Washington will prove a paper tiger on North Korea

Significance Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has made steady progress in nuclear weapons technology. The July 4 ICBM test reflects its progress on delivery systems with longer ranges and increased sophistication. Pyongyang routinely claims to possess the status as a full nuclear power with the ability to retaliate with strategic nuclear arms against a US attack. Impacts Beijing is likely to share Washington’s concerns about nuclear technology transfer by a more secure North Korean regime. However, Washington is likely to position more rapid-strike conventional forces in the region, over China’s vociferous objections. Once North Korea is confident in its deterrent, it may be willing to offer a cessation of testing in exchange for sanctions relief.

Significance The NSG was created following India's 1974 nuclear test to prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear technology and material to non-signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pakistan's application is a source of controversy, as it is both a nuclear-armed state and an NPT non-signatory. Impacts Israel is likely to avoid any dependence on imported items from the NSG list to preserve its opaque nuclear status. Foreign firms face insurance-related obstacles to participation in India's nuclear power sector, as well as political barriers. US President Barack Obama's successor -- regardless of party -- is unlikely to share his focus on non-proliferation issues.


2021 ◽  
pp. 217-248
Author(s):  
Jacob Darwin Hamblin

By the mid-1980s, the state-sponsored positive framing of the peaceful atom served a range of government interests. It enabled the United States and European states to use nuclear power as leverage against developing countries in a time when petroleum seemed to swing the pendulum of global resource dominance toward several so-called backward countries. It was useful to countries trying to prop up the legitimacy of their nuclear weapons programs, while secretly working on bombs, and it provided environmental arguments to those whose priority was actually energy security. The peaceful atom’s promise of plenty helped to maintain a veneer of credibility for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at a time when the IAEA seemed to have become the treaty’s policing instrument. The more the United States relied on the IAEA, the more it recommitted to making promises of peaceful nuclear technology, especially to the developing world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 1051-1068
Author(s):  
Edward Howell

Abstract Existing scholarship on North Korea's nuclear programme remains overwhelmingly centred around questions of containment or engagement with the North Korean regime-state, amid international calls for denuclearization. Yet, scholarship has rarely interrogated the precise value of nuclear weapons to the regime-state. This article develops a new theoretical framework of nuclear ideology to explore the puzzle of the survival of North Korea. This framework aims to show how the North Korean nuclear programme is deeply entrenched within the state ideology of juche, as one device for continued regime-state survival. Through interviews with elite North Korean defectors and textual analysis of North Korean and international sources, I show that North Korea's nuclear ideology has been constructed according to different frames of meaning, targeting referent actors of international ‘enemy’ powers and domestic audiences. This article concludes that nuclear ideology functions primarily as a tool to arouse domestic legitimacy for the North Korean regime-state, by targeting elite actors within the highly stratified domestic population. From an international perspective, perception of North Korea's survival remains tied largely to the regime-state's physical possession of nuclear weapons. This article has extremely timely theoretical and policy implications given the current ‘dialogue’ between US and North Korean leaders. First, it opens up fruitful avenues of inquiry surrounding questions of the legitimacy of rogue states within international relations. Secondly, this article calls for a more robust understanding of the domestic-level politics of North Korea, in order to understand the regime-state's foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis its nuclear programme.


1965 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 74-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morton H. Halperin

The detonation of a nuclear device by the People's Republic of China on October 16, 1964, made it unmistakably clear that China attached a very high priority to becoming a militarily effective nuclear power as soon as possible. Although the effect on Chinese economic development has probably been relatively limited thus far, the Chinese are devoting substantial resources to their nuclear programme and may be expected to have militarily effective systems within this decade. The Chinese appear to be considerably further along in the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems than had been previously anticipated.


Significance Unlike during her impeachment when she resisted all summons, Park plans to appear in court tomorrow in hopes of avoiding arrest and detention. Campaigning for the election to succeed her -- originally scheduled for December but brought forward by Park's dismissal -- is already in full swing. Impacts Even a nuclear test or provocation from North Korea would not save the conservatives. Moon’s plan to re-engage North Korea suggests relations with Washington will be rocky. Corporate corruption scandals will make business-bashing popular, but promises to curb the conglomerates will be hard to deliver on.


Headline NORTH KOREA: Nuclear test will spur deterrence efforts


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Citra Ajeng Sofia Monica Setya Riswana ◽  
Moses Glorino Rumambo Pandin

“Nuklir Sukarno: Kajian awal atas politik tenaga atom indonesia 1958-1967” is one of Teuku Reza Fadeli's works published in 2021. This book explains how Sukarno's desire to have nuclear weapons. This book itself has three chapters explaining in detail and coherently how this incident happened, starting from the first chapter, which describes the state of the cold war that caused Indonesia to become involved in it and how President Sukarno's attitude towards nuclear technology. The second chapter describes the formation of LTE, which later turned into BATAN due to changes in Sukarno's thinking in addressing the global political constellation and Western imperialism, which continued to hinder nuclear power. The third chapter describes Sukarno's ambition to have nuclear weapons in Indonesia, then the world response to these conditions, and the last one regarding the end of Sukarno's nuclear politics as it coincided with Suharto's downfall.This book intends to look back on nuclear technology that came to the world's attention in the nuclear arms race after the end of the second world war to inform readers of Soekarno's ideas about nuclear technology, which impacted determining his government in the 1960s. Which at that time, not a few Western countries gave a cautionary attitude. In addition, this book also aims to encourage interest in writing the history of technology in Indonesia because there are still many who ignore science and technology in influencing Indonesian history.This book intends for those who are thirsty for knowledge and always want more insight. Sukarno's Nuclear Book is also very suitable for those who like Indonesian history, especially the history of technology in Indonesia which has had much influence in it. Then for those who like compilation, this book is very suitable because, in the book Nuclear Sukarno, the CIA has been involved in Indonesian history. After reading the book Nuclear Sukarno, much information is obtained by readers, such as in the economic, political, social, and cultural fields that are the reasons for writing Indonesian history; it turns out that technology itself also influences the current situation in Indonesia. The reader also knows that Indonesia wants to have nuclear weapons because of the influence of the cold war that occurred at that time. However, this never happened because of the fall of President Suharto in his leadership.


Subject Saudi plans to build nuclear power facilities Significance Saudi Arabia has made brisk progress with plans to develop nuclear power. Recently published satellite images indicate that an initial small reactor could be complete by late 2019. Nuclear power has long been part of the kingdom’s future energy plans, but concerns have been voiced about the programme’s recent acceleration and about the absence of a high-level inspection accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Impacts The development of nuclear power would make a major contribution to efforts to reduce heavy reliance on oil for electricity generation. The potential scale of the nuclear programme will stimulate intense commercial competition for contracts. Washington will exert pressure to ensure US companies are involved, in recognition of political and military ties between the two countries. Continued lack of enhanced IAEA inspections will deepen suspicion that Riyadh may be exploring a nuclear weapons option.


Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1895
Author(s):  
Yusin Lee

This study analyzes the political viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline project. This analysis demonstrates that North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016 changed the dynamic of the project. Before the test, when inter-Korean relations were good, South Korea and Russia could make efforts to secure political support for the project. However, after the fourth nuclear test, this was no longer the case. As North Korea’s nuclear power status became more evident, this nuclear problem began to have profound implications for U.S. security. In response, Washington not only led the UN Security Council to impose very severe sanctions against North Korea, but also placed its own sanctions on the country. These sanctions began to contain provisions that could prevent the implementation of the pipeline project. In addition to these sanctions, the U.S. sanctions against Russia in 2017 over its intervention in the U.S. election and aggression against Ukraine also contained clauses that could hamper it. Therefore, unless the U.S. lifts or eases all of these sanctions, South Korea and Russia are unwilling to take any concrete actions to secure political support for the RNS pipeline project. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the U.S. now holds the most important key to its political viability.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002190962097133
Author(s):  
Min-hyung Kim

This article seeks to provide a theoretically compelling account for North Korea’s strategic choice to go nuclear and explores its implications for East Asian security. Its main research question is as follows: despite the obvious risks of going nuclear, what makes North Korea so desperate in its pursuit of nuclear capabilities? Contrary to the extant accounts that only emphasize either nonsecurity variables or an “external security” factor, this article conceptualizes North Korea’s security considerations as “regime survival” and explains its strategic choice from it. The central thesis of this article is that North Korea’s decision to go nuclear is a strategic choice, of which the purpose is to achieve its goals of safeguarding independence from external powers as well as ensuring regime security. North Korea pursues nuclear weapons because they not only protect Pyongyang’s regime from foreign aggressions but also help to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s domestic power. North Korea also seeks nuclear weapons in order to safeguard its independence and autonomy from China because the removal of China’s influence is critical to ensuring its regime survival in the long run. North Korea’s strategic choice to go nuclear and its emergence as a de facto nuclear power have significant implications for East Asian security.


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