Why Defend Humean Supervenience?

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (7) ◽  
pp. 387-406
Author(s):  
Siegfried Jaag Siegfried Jaag ◽  
Christian Loew Christian Loew ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Level Structure ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Recent Criticism ◽  
Humean Supervenience ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Fundamental Physics ◽  
Reductive Physicalism ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Fundamental Physical

Humean Supervenience (HS) is a metaphysical model of the world according to which all truths hold in virtue of nothing but the total spatiotemporal distribution of perfectly natural, intrinsic properties. David Lewis and others have worked out many aspects of HS in great detail. A larger motivational question, however, remains unanswered: As Lewis admits, there is strong evidence from fundamental physics that HS is false. What then is the purpose of defending HS? In this paper, we argue that the philosophical merit of HS is largely independent of whether it correctly represents the world’s fundamental structure. In particular, we show that insofar as HS is an apt model of the world’s higher-level structure, it thereby provides a powerful argument for reductive physicalism and explains otherwise opaque inferential relations. Recent criticism of HS on the grounds that it misrepresents fundamental physical reality is, therefore, beside the point.

Best System Approaches to Chance

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Schwarz
Keyword(s):  
Relative Frequency ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Radioactive Elements ◽  
Physical Processes ◽  
Fundamental Physics ◽  
The One ◽  
Fundamental Physical ◽  
System Approaches ◽  
Statistical Summary ◽  
Probabilistic Theories

Certain physical processes, such as the decay of radioactive elements, seem to involve an objective, non-epistemic type of probability, often called “chance”. Best system accounts, first proposed by David Lewis, offer a Humean interpretation of chance. On this account, chance is not a fundamental physical quantity, but a kind of statistical summary of actual outcomes. The interpretation explains the close connection between chance on the one hand and relative frequency, disorder, and rational credence on the other hand. It has also proved useful in understanding probabilistic theories outside fundamental physics. On the downside, the proposal arguably fails to vindicate some philosophical preconceptions about chance.

scholarly journals A Contextual Foundation for Mechanics, Thermodynamics, and Evolution

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harrison Crecraft
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Model ◽  
Classical Mechanics ◽  
Dissipative System ◽  
Objective Measure ◽  
Second Law Of Thermodynamics ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Internal Work ◽  
Measurable Rate ◽  
Production Of Entropy ◽  
Fundamental Physical

The prevailing interpretations of physics are based on deeply entrenched assumptions, rooted in classical mechanics. Logical implications include: the denial of entropy and irreversible change as fundamental physical properties; the inability to explain random quantum measurements or nonlocality without untestable metaphysical implications; and the inability to define complexity or explain its evolution. We propose a conceptual model based on empirically justifiable assumptions. The WYSIWYG Conceptual Model (WCM) assumes no hidden properties: “What You can See Is What You Get.” The WCM defines a system’s state in the context of its actual ambient background, and it extends existing models of physical reality by defining entropy and exergy as objective contextual properties of state. The WCM establishes the irreversible production of entropy and the Second law of thermodynamics as a fundamental law of physics. It defines a dissipative system’s measurable rate of internal work as an objective measure of stability of its dissipative process. A dissipative system can follow either of two paths toward higher stability: it can 1) increase its rate of exergy supply or 2) utilize existing exergy supplies better to increase its internal work rate and functional complexity. These paths guide the evolution of both living and non-living systems.

scholarly journals Memristor Equations: Incomplete Physics and Undefined Passivity/Activity

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (04) ◽  
pp. 1771001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle M. Sundqvist ◽  
David K. Ferry ◽  
Laszlo B. Kish
Keyword(s):  
Second Law Of Thermodynamics ◽  
Second Law ◽  
Passive System ◽  
Circuit Element ◽  
Fundamental Physics ◽  
Seminal Paper ◽  
Passive Device ◽  
Fluctuation Dissipation ◽  
Passive Circuit ◽  
Fundamental Physical

In his seminal paper, Chua presented a fundamental physical claim by introducing the memristor, “The missing circuit element”. The memristor equations were originally supposed to represent a passive circuit element because, with active circuitry, arbitrary elements can be realized without limitations. Therefore, if the memristor equations do not guarantee that the circuit element can be realized by a passive system, the fundamental physics claims about the memristor as “missing circuit element” loses all its weight. The question of passivity/activity belongs to physics thus we incorporate thermodynamics into the study of this problem. We show that the memristor equations are physically incomplete regarding the problem of passivity/activity. As a consequence, the claim that the present memristor functions describe a passive device lead to unphysical results, such as violating the Second Law of thermodynamics, in infinitely large number of cases. The seminal memristor equations cannot introduce a new physical circuit element without making the model more physical such as providing the Fluctuation–Dissipation Theory of memristors.

scholarly journals NESATYS KAIP REDUKTYVISTINĖS PRIEŽASTINGUMO ANALIZĖS ARGUMENTAS

Problemos ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 104-114
Author(s):  
Vytautas Grenda
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Humean Supervenience ◽  
The World ◽  
Supervenience Thesis

Straipsnis supažindina su argumentu už reduktyvistinę, hiumišką priežastingumo sampratą. Remiamasi Davido Lewiso ir Hugh’o Melloro įžvalga, kad negali egzistuoti priežastis ir jų padarinius siejantis santykis, nes priežastimis ar padariniais gali būti vadinami ne tik pozityvūs, bet ir negatyvūs faktai ar įvykiai (nesatys). Jeigu toks santykis neegzistuoja, tai prieš vadinamąją „hiumiškojo supervenavimo“ tezę nukreipti mintiniai eksperimentai negali įrodyti, jog priežastingumas yra neredukuojama pasaulio ypatybė. Daugiausia, ką jie gali įrodyti, – tai įprastinės priežastingumo sampratos prieštaringumą. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: priežastingumas, hiumizmas, nesatys.Absences as an Argument for Reductionist Analysis of CausationVytautas Grenda SummaryThe article advances an argument in favour of the reductionist, Humean conception of causation. The author draws upon an insight of David Lewis and Hugh Mellor: there can be no irreducible relation between causes and their effects, because not only the case that something exists, but also the case that something does not exist (i. e. absence) can be called a cause or an effect. If there’s no such a relation, then the thought experiments that are directed against the so-called “Humean supervenience” thesis cannot prove that causation is an irreducible feature of the world. The utmost such experiments can prove is that the ordinary conception of causation is inconsistent. Keywords: causation, humeanism, absences.ht: 115%; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"> 

Overture for Ants

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Silberstein ◽  
W.M. Stuckey ◽  
Timothy McDevitt
Keyword(s):  
Nobel Laureate ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Theoretical Physics ◽  
Philosophy Of Physics ◽  
Fundamental Physics ◽  
Physical Universe ◽  
Foundations Of Physics ◽  
Main Thread ◽  
Block Universe

This book addresses Nobel Laureate Frank Wilczek’s challenge that “ascending from the ant’s-eye view to the God’s-eye view of physical reality is the most profound challenge for fundamental physics in the next 100 years”, by contesting the dynamical universe paradigm in its entirety. Most of the book is devoted to showing that given the adynamical block universe approach called Relational Blockworld, the current impasse of theoretical physics and philosophy/foundations of physics can be resolved, including the mystery of time as experienced and how that experience relates to the physical universe. This chapter sets the scene for the rest of the work, including defining its audience and sketching how each can read the work successfully. It describes the division of each chapter into three parts: a main thread, a thread devoted to the philosophy of physics, and a thread devoted to foundational physics.

Persistence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristie Miller
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Stage Theory ◽  
Good Sense ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Time Section ◽  
Temporary Intrinsics ◽  
Over Time

We call the phenomenon of objects existing through time, persistence. Theories of persistence aim to spell out the conditions under which objects persist. A useful way to think about this task is to see that in order for an object to persist from one time to another, it needs to be that in some good sense the object that is located at the earlier time, is the same object as the object located at the later time. Competing theories of persistence can be thought of as offering different ways of understanding the sense in which an object located at one time is the same object as an object located at some other time. These different accounts are, in part, motivated by the need to reconcile four apparent truisms: (a) an object persists iff it exists at different times, and at each of those times what exists is numerically identical with what exists at every other one of those times; (b) persisting objects change their intrinsic properties over time; (c) x = y only if x and y share all of the same properties; and (d) no object instantiates incompatible properties. The tension between these four plausible claims is known as the problem of temporary intrinsics, and different attempts to solve the problem lead to different theories of persistence. Historically, there have been two main theories of persistence. The articulation of these theories can be traced to David Lewis, who distinguishes endurance from perdurance. The theory that says that objects persist by enduring is known as endurantism, and the theory that says that objects persist by perduring is known as perdurantism. Put somewhat roughly for now, endurantism is the view that objects persist by being wholly present at more than one time. Perdurantism is the view that objects persist by being partially present at more than one time. Section 1 considers these two theories of persistence in more detail, and then introduces two more recent views: exdurantism (also known as stage theory) and transdurantism. Section 2 considers how these four theories respond to the problem of temporary intrinsics.

Reply to Cameron

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL SHEEHY
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Abstract Entity ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Divine Nature

AbstractRoss Cameron has argued that the modal realism of David Lewis furnishes the theist with the resources to explain divine necessity. Cameron is successful in identifying two theistic strategies, but neither is attractive in light of a commitment to modal realism. The first theistic strategy is to treat God as an abstract entity in the same way that the modal realist treats pure sets. This is undermotivated in light of the nominalistic spirit of modal realism. The second strategy is to regard God as enjoying trans-world identity because the divine nature can possess no accidental intrinsic properties. This approach raises a problem of how one is to understand the notion of actuality.

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD VANCE
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.

Colloids in the study of fundamental physics

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (18) ◽  
pp. 1840008
Author(s):  
Tian Hui Zhang ◽  
Bing Yue Zhang ◽  
Jing Sheng Cao ◽  
Ying Liang ◽  
Xiang Yang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Glass Transition ◽  
Phase Behavior ◽  
Colloidal Particles ◽  
Fundamental Physics ◽  
Modeling Systems ◽  
Physical Phenomena ◽  
Fundamental Physical

Colloidal particles in solution exhibit phase behavior analogous to atoms. In the last decades, colloids have been widely employed as modeling systems in studying nucleation, crystallization, glass transition and melting. A number of advances have been achieved. These advances have greatly extended the understanding of fundamental physical phenomena. In this paper, we give a brief summary on these advances.

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