scholarly journals Das Gespräch Zwischen Hölderlin, Hegel und Schelling Über Kants Antinomien

Author(s):  
Fernando Manuel Ferreira da Silva ◽  

«Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit vereiniget, scheint mir eigentlich den ganzen Geist seines Systems zu enthalten»; This quotation, which originated the present essay, is solely extracted from a letter sent by Hölderlin to Hegel, and yet, it condensates three different approaches from the three Tübingen friends to the problem of Kant’s philosophy of religion and to its possible resolution between 1795 and 1796. From this epistolary dialogue emerges a simultaneous study of Kant, originated by the growing dissension towards the orthodox thought of the Stift. The tuming point - or the maximum cumulative point - of this discordance happens precisely with the discovery of the «spirit of Kant’s System», as a combined explanation of the religious and philosophical phenomena [«Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmässigkeit vereiniget»]. This, I think, is something which the three friends discover gradually and not independently from the concept of «providence», which Kant himself, according to Hölderlin, had used to «attenuate his antinomies», which Hegel uses in his first religious writings and the initial formation of his own philosophy and which Schelling will later explore in his System of Transcendental Idealism. In a word, providence is consensually the comprehension axis between man, God and nature and, thus, the explanatory link between the antinomical poles which regulate human existence. On the other hand, however - this being the aspect I would like to stress - , this decisive moment for a whole generation, for the history of philosophy itself, means the consummation of a new revolutionary perspective born in Kant, a new vision of the absolute and the divine and, therefore, a new way to write philosophy about philosophy, less philosophical than before, to the extent that the new situation of man and his reflection within the problem ultimately destined them - as is the case in the three young philosophers - to silence and death. The final aim of this essay is, therefore, to know what this «last step of philosophy» is and what dies along with it, what such a step may have meant and what it already foretold in terms of the development of philosophy.

2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-60
Author(s):  
Davide Sparti

Obwohl jede menschliche Handlung mit einem gewissen Grad an Improvisation erfolgt, gibt es kulturelle Praktiken, bei denen Improvisation eine überwiegende Rolle spielt. Um das Risiko zu vermeiden, einen zu breiten Begriff von Improvisation zu übernehmen, konzentriere ich mich im vorliegenden Beitrag auf den Jazz. Meine zentrale Frage lautet, wie Improvisation verstanden werden muss. Mein Vorgehen ist folgendes: Ich beginne mit einem Vergleich von Improvisation und Komposition, damit die Spezifizität der Improvisation erklärt werden kann. Danach wende ich mich dem Thema der Originalität als Merkmal der Improvisation zu. Zum Schluss führe ich den Begriff affordance ein, um die kollektive und zirkuläre Logik eines Solos zu analysieren. Paradigmatisch wird der Jazzmusiker mit dem Engel der Geschichte verglichen, der nur auf das Vergangene blickt, während er der Zukunft den Rücken zugekehrt hat, und lediglich ihr zugetrieben wird. Weder kann der Improvisierende das Material der Vergangenheit vernachlässigen noch seine genuine Tätigkeit, das Improvisieren in der Gegenwart und für die Zukunft, aufgeben: Er visiert die Zukunft trotz ihrer Unvorhersehbarkeit über die Vermittlung der Vergangenheit an.<br><br>While improvised behavior is so much a part of human existence as to be one of its fundamental realities, in order to avoid the risk of defining the act of improvising too broadly, my focus here will be upon one of the activities most explicitly centered around improvisation – that is, upon jazz. My contribution, as Wittgenstein would say, has a »grammatical« design to it: it proposes to clarify the significance of the term »improvisation.« The task of clarifying the cases in which one may legitimately speak of improvisation consists first of all in reflecting upon the conditions that make the practice possible. This does not consist of calling forth mysterious, esoteric processes that take place in the unconscious, or in the minds of musicians, but rather in paying attention to the criteria that are satisfied when one ascribes to an act the concept of improvisation. In the second part of my contribution, I reflect upon the logic that governs the construction of an improvised performance. As I argue, in playing upon that which has already emerged in the music, in discovering the future as they go on (as a consequence of what they do), jazz players call to mind the angel in the famous painting by Klee that Walter Benjamin analyzed in his Theses on the History of Philosophy: while pulled towards the future, its eyes are turned back towards the past.


Author(s):  
Alexander V. Koltsov ◽  

The paper is an attempt to narrow down the notion of spiritual crisis which is now widely applied in research on history of culture of the 19th–20th centuries, with respect to history of German philosophy and observation of modern reli­giosity. The shift from the history of philosophy to the religious context is ful­filled through analysis of texts of two religious thinkers, A. Reinach and S. Frank, whose thought clearly demonstrates strong interconnection between the both fields. Analysis of contemporary studies on history of phenomenological philos­ophy (C. Möckel and W. Gleixner) lets firstly observe ways of application of Koselleck’s notion of crisis to investigations in the history of philosophy. Sec­ondly it discovers two possibilities of philosophical contextualization of the con­cept of spiritual crisis – on the one hand, as a constituent rhetorical element of the philosophical statement (Möckel), on the other hand, as a term which de­scribes the uniqueness of an intellectual situation of the beginning of the 20thcentury (Gleixner). Then these aspects of the rhetoric of crisis are applied to reli­gious philosophy of Reinach and Frank, what leads to interpretation of their works as a particular statement discovering the divine (or the holy) as a new cat­egory of religious consciousness.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-217
Author(s):  
David Sidorsky

The search for moral objectivity has been constant throughout the history of philosophy, although interpretations of the nature and scope of objectivity have varied. One aim of the pursuit of moral objectivity has been the demonstration of what may be termed its epistemological thesis, that is, the claim that the truth of assertions of the goodness or rightness of moral acts is as legitimate, reliable, or valid as the truth of assertions involving other forms of human knowledge, such as common sense, practical expertise, science, or mathematics. Another aim of the quest for moral objectivity may be termed its pragmatic formulation; this refers to the development of a method or procedure that will mediate among conflicting moral views in order to realize a convergence or justified agreement about warranted or true moral conclusions. In the ethical theories of Aristotle, David Hume, and John Dewey, theories that represent three of the four variants of ethical naturalism (defined below) that are surveyed in this essay, the epistemological thesis and the pragmatic formulation are integrated or combined. The distinction between these two elements is significant for the present essay, however, since I want to show that linguistic naturalism, the fourth variant I shall examine, has provided a demonstration of the epistemological thesis about moral knowledge, even if the pragmatic formulation has not been successfully realized.


Author(s):  
Karin de Boer

This chapter examines Hegel’s lectures on the history of modern philosophy in view of the tension between, on the one hand, his ambition to grasp philosophy’s past in a truly philosophical way and, on the other hand, the necessity to account for the actual particularities of a wide range of philosophical systems. Hegel’s lectures are put in relief by comparing their methodological principles to those put forward by his Kantian predecessor Tennemann. After discussing Hegel’s conception of modern philosophy as a whole, the chapter turns to his reading of Locke, Leibniz, and, in particular, Kant. In this context, it also compares Hegel’s assessment of Kant’s achievements to that of Tennemann. The chapter concludes by considering Hegel’s account of the final moment of the history of philosophy.


1919 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-198
Author(s):  
F. A. Foraker

Leibnitz and Descartes made remarkable contributions to both mathematics and philosophy. Newton obtains a high rank in the history of the former subject, but only a minor place in the history of philosophy, while Kant, who possessed a well-founded knowledge of the science and mathematics of his time, receives one of the foremost positions in the history of philosophy. Upon the basis of these facts, if we neglect a few of the lesser lights, the statement is often made that there is a relationship between the study of mathematics and the study of philosophy, and that he who studies one of them will also find himself a devotee in the pursuit of the other.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (136) ◽  
pp. 279
Author(s):  
Bento Silva Santos

Resumo: O artigo comenta globalmente algumas anotações da Vorlesung não proferida – “Os Fundamentos Filosóficos da Mística Medieval” (1918-1919) – na tentativa ainda fragmentária de esboçar uma compreensão fenomenológica da experiência mística. Assim, destaco, primeiramente, as duas observações iniciais de Heidegger sobre o sentido ambíguo da formulação “fundamentos filosóficos da mística medieval” ora com base na história da filosofia (1), ora com base na abordagem fenomenológica. Em segundo lugar, optando pela mística medieval como expressão (Ausdruck) da religiosidade cristã, Heidegger estabelece uma dupla distinção: de um lado, a religiosidade se distingue tanto da filosofia da religião como da teologia; de outro lado, a separação entre o problema da teologia e problema da religiosidade cristã (2). Por fim, em função desta oposição problemática entre teologia escolástica e mística medieval, trato brevemente da permanência ambígua do esquema de pensamento da teologia cristã no Denkweg de Heidegger, que pressupõe inegavelmente suas origens católicas (3).Abstract: This article broadly discusses Heidegger’s notes for his undelivered Vorlesung - “The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism” (1918-1919) - in a still fragmentary attempt to outline a phenomenological understanding of the mystical experience. In order to do so, I first highlight the two initial observations of Heidegger concerning the meaning of the ambiguous wording “philosophical foundations of medieval mysticism”, sometimes referring to the basis of mysticism in the history of philosophy (1), sometimes to its phenomenological approach. Second, I discuss Heidegger’s option to consider medieval mystic as expression (Ausdruck) of Christian religiousness. Thus, the author establishes a double distinction: on the one hand, religiousness distinguishes itself from both the philosophy of religion and theology, and on the other hand, the problem of theology is separated from that of Christian religiousness (2). Finally, in light of this problematic opposition between scholastic theology and medieval mysticism, I briefly deal with the ambiguous persistence of the model of thinking of the Christian theology in Heidegger’s Denkweg, that unmistakably presupposes his Catholic origins (3).


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Catana

Abstract This article critically explores the history and nature of a hermeneutic assumption which frequently guided interpretations of Plotinus from the 18th century onwards, namely that Plotinus advanced a system of philosophy. It is argued that this assumption was introduced relatively late, in the 18th and 19th centuries, and that it was primarily made possible by Brucker’s methodology for the history of philosophy, dating from the 1740s, to which the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’ was essential. It is observed that the concept is absent from Ficino’s commentary from the 15th century, and that it remained absent in interpretations produced between the 15th and 18th centuries. It is also argued that the assumption of a ‘system of philosophy’ in Plotinus is historically incorrect—we do not find this concept in Plotinus’ writings, and his own statements about method point in other directions. Eduard Zeller (active in the second half of the 19th century) is typically regarded as the first to give a satisfying account of Plotinus’ philosophy as a whole. In this article, on the other hand, Zeller is seen as having finalised a tradition initiated in the 18th century. Very few Plotinus scholars have examined the interpretative development prior to Zeller. Schiavone (1952) and Bonetti (1971), for instance, have given little attention to Brucker’s introduction of the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’. The present analysis, then, has value for an understanding of Plotinus’ Enneads. It also explains why “pre-Bruckerian” interpretations of Plotinus appear alien to the modern reader; the analysis may even serve to make some sense of the hermeneutics employed by Renaissance Platonists and commentators, who are often eclipsed from the tradition of Platonism.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Fernanda Henriques

This paper explores the thought of Paul Ricœur from a feminist point of view. My goal is to show that it is necessary to narrate differently the history of our culture – in particular, the history of philosophy – in order for wommen to attain a self-representation that is equal to that of men. I seek to show that Ricoeur’s philosophy – especially his approach to the topics of memory and history, on the one hand, and the human capacity for initiative, on the other hand– can support the idea that it is possible and legitimate to tell our history otherwise by envisioning a more accurate truth about ourselves. 


2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-84
Author(s):  
Jacek Filek

The history of philosophy is a history of the basic paradigms of philosophical thinking. These paradigms are marked out by the changing ways of experiencing being. Philosophy „declines“ being. Expressing this more grammatico, philosophy conjugates the infinitive „to be“. The first word of the first First Philosophy is „is“ - this is the „antiquity“ of philosophizing, the objective paradigm, the philosophy of objectivity, for which reason is the dominant human faculty and truth is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the past. The first word of the second First Philosophy is „I am“ - this is the „modernity“ of philosophizing, the subjective paradigm, the monological philosophy of subjectivity, for which the will is the dominant human faculty and freedom is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the future. The first word of the third First Philosophy is „you are“ - this is „the now“ of philosophizing, the dialogical paradigm, the philosophy of „the other“, for which feeling is the dominant faculty and responsibility is the primary notion. The basic notion of this new paradigm of thinking is responsibility, and its time is the present. These paradigms, however, are not in conflict with one another; rather, in showing the various aspects of being they help us to experience its fullness. The full experience of being can therefore be summarized in a triad of notions: truth - freedom - responsibility. However, what responsibility consists of remains to be determined.


Philosophy ◽  
1962 ◽  
Vol 37 (141) ◽  
pp. 229-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur W. H Adkins

Heidegger's thought has recently been made more available to English readers by the publication of two books: one a translation of one of Heidegger's works, the other, by Thomas Langan, an American scholar, described as a critical study of Heidegger. Heidegger's philosophy has had little or no influence in England; and this seems a good opportunity for considering whether this neglect is merited, or whether some defence can be offered of Heidegger's curious manipulations of the German and Greek tongues. Since An Introduction to Metaphysics philosophises on a basis of Greek, though it purports to be philosophy, not history of philosophy, most of this article will be concerned with Heidegger's use and abuse of that language. I shall suggest, however, that the same conclusions hold good of Heidegger's use of German.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document