The Relation of Rights to the Real

Author(s):  
Frederic R. Kellogg

This paper approaches Bentham's ontology of rights from a viewpoint influenced by American philosophical pragmatism. I examine how rights are conceived and discussed in relation to the real. Jeremy Bentham maintained that all rights are "fictitious entities." But, in privileging "political" over moral and natural rights, Bentham implies that legal rights stand in a privileged position over natural rights with regard to the relation of mind to the actual. By reason of its enforceability through sanctions, a legal right for Bentham has a privileged connection to the real. I argue that nonlegal rights can be conceived as bearing a roughly parallel relation to the real in guiding human conduct by suasion rather than sanctions. Their relationship to "something real and observable" is their relation to voluntary conduct through belief. Bentham's ontology dictates a distinct legal and political system. Practically, it leaves the real existence of rights entirely in the hands of government officials, and the only choice of humans interested in securing rights lies in their enactment and enforcement in and through a legal regime.

Author(s):  
Ross Harrison

Jeremy Bentham held that all human and political action could be analysed in terms of pleasure and pain, and so made comprehensible. One such analysis is how people actually do behave; according to Bentham, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Another such analysis is of how they ought to behave. For Bentham, this is that they should maximize utility, which for him is the same as producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which, again, is the same for him as maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. His chief study was planning how there could be a good system of government and law; that is, how laws could be created so that people being as they actually are (seeking their own pleasure) might nevertheless do what they ought (seek the greatest pleasure of all). The instruments which government use in this task are punishment and reward, inducing action by threats and offers. For Bentham, punishment is done not for the sake of the offender, but to deter other people from doing the same kind of thing. Hence on his theory it is the apparent punishment which does all the good, the real punishment which does all the harm. Bentham thought that the primary unit of significance was the sentence, not the word. He used this idea to produce profound analyses of the nature of law and legal terms, such as’ right’, ‘duty’ or ‘property’. These are what he calls names of fictions – terms which do not directly correspond to real entities. However, this does not mean that they are meaningless. Instead, meaning can be given to them by translating sentences in which they occur into sentences in which they do not occur. Thus legal rights are understood in terms of legal duties, because sentences involving the former can be understood in terms of sentences involving the latter; these in turn can be analysed in terms of threats of punishment or, again, pleasure and pain. This gives sense to legal rights, but sense cannot be given in the same way to natural rights. For Bentham, we have no natural rights and the rights that we do have, such as property rights, are created by government, whose chief task is to protect them. Bentham also worked out how people could be protected from government itself, designing an elaborate system of constitutional law in which representative democracy was a central element. Bentham invented the word ‘international’, and when he died he had an international legal and political influence. His chief influence in philosophy has been as the most important historical exponent of a pure form of utilitarianism.


2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 951-969
Author(s):  
Patrice Garant

Enforcement of court judgments against government and public authorities at all levels has never been studied. It raises two main concerns. First, what is the legal regime for compulsory execution of judgments ? A distinction must be made between situations where the legality of an act or omission is challenged with success by a citizen and situations where the Administration is held to pay a sum of money in civil matters (tort, contract, property). Second, when government officials and administrators agree to comply with court judgments, is their willingness to comply genuinely effective ? Are there means of nullifying the real impact of judgments ?


1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank L. Wilson

Although France is not among those countries most frequently cited as examples of the trend toward corporatism, some observers have seen evidence of corporatist patterns of interest group-government contacts. Others assert that French groups have a distinctive protest form of action, and still others see France as a preserve of traditional pluralism. Interviews with 99 French interest group leaders in 1979 suggest that the pluralist model most accurately describes the actions reported by these leaders. Although the group leaders described some corporatist activities, such as participation in statutory commissions, and indicated a willingness to engage in protest, the most common actions were those more consistent with pluralism: personal contacts with government officials and lobbying. These activities were also the forms judged to be most effective in influencing policy, although the overall impression was of a political system in which organized interests had relatively limited impact.


1965 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard L. Sklar

There are three basic contradictions in the Nigerian political system. They may be stated briefly at the outset. First, the machinery of government is basically regionalised, but the party machinery—the organisation of the masses—retains a strong trans-regional and anti-regional tendency. Secondly, the main opposition party has relied upon the support of a class-conscious regional power group in its drive against the system of regional power. Depending upon a regional section of the political class to effect a shift in the class content of power, it was really asking that section to commit suicide. This contradiction produced a crisis in the Western Region which might easily be repeated elsewhere. Thirdly, the constitutional allocation of power is inconsistent with the real distribution of power in society. The constitution gives dominant power to the numerical majority—i.e., under existing conditions, to the north—but the real distribution of power is determined by technological development, in which respect the south is superior.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-197
Author(s):  
Kadyrbek Umetov ◽  

The article reveals the concept of sovereignty as one of the key categories of political and legal science and international law, which has the character of a fundamental norm; various theories that have taken diametrically opposed positions on the issue of determining the legal nature of sovereignty, ranging from its origins to its modern understanding, are considered. The author studied the processes of creating preconditions and historical conditions that ensure the Kyrgyz Republic's active participation in the sovereignization of the former Soviet republics. He defined the specific directions, course and degree of transformation of the Political System of Kyrgyzstan on the basis of declarations of sovereignty and independence, as well as the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic. Sovereignty is a property inherent in each subject in itself, and cannot be derived from the sovereignty of another entity, in which it sees the embodiment of the real sovereignty of the State.


2020 ◽  
pp. 93-131
Author(s):  
Nigel Biggar

This chapter completes the testing of the Sceptical Tradition’s objections to natural rights, by examining the thought of a selection of contemporary thinkers, in addition to that of John Finnis (in Chapter 4). Those selected are Onora O’Neill (and in relation to her, John Tasioulas, Elizabeth Ashford, and Henry Shue), Nicholas Wolterstorff, and James Griffin (and in relation to him, Allen Buchanan). From this examination the conclusion is drawn that the arguments made by Shue, Tasioulas, Ashford, and Griffin fail to dislodge O’Neill’s ‘radical’ critique, namely, that where capable holders of feasible correspondent duties have not been identified, universal human rights are illusory. This implies that rights are contingent on the circumstances of feasibility and capability, and that there is no constant natural right. The chapter then proceeds to draw general conclusions from the testing of natural rights-talk in Chapters 2 to 5. One seminal conclusion is that the paradigm of a right is positively legal, commanding the support of such institutions as police and courts. This is what explains its distinctive authority vis-à-vis other claims. It follows that a natural right, existing apart from civil society and so lacking institutional support, is, at best, analogous to a proper, legal right. However, since the very concept of a right connotes the stability and security of a legal right, natural rights-talk misleads and is best avoided. Therefore, while there is natural right or law or morality, and while there are legal rights justified by natural morality, there are no natural rights.


2021 ◽  
pp. 185-232
Author(s):  
Carlos A. Ball

This chapter explores the ways in which some progressives, in the years leading up to Trump’s election, had grown skeptical of expansive First Amendment protections, viewing them as impediments to the pursuit of equality objectives. Although some of that skepticism is understandable, the chapter details the multiple ways in which free speech and free press protections helped curtail some of Trump’s autocratic policies and practices. In doing so, the chapter argues that progressives, going forward, should not allow what it calls “First Amendment skepticism” to grow to the point that it undermines the amendment’s ability to shield democratic processes, dissenters, and vulnerable groups from future autocratic government officials in the Trump mold. The chapter ends with an exploration of future hate speech regulations. While it would be understandable for progressives, after Trump’s repeated use of hate speech, to call for greater regulations of such speech, the chapter urges progressives to be cautious in this area because of the real possibility that the regulations will be used by future government officials in the Trump mold to target and discriminate against both progressive viewpoints and racial and religious minorities.


Author(s):  
Feng Chongyi

Charter 08 is a document that seeks to forge a grand alliance of Chinese liberal elements within the system and outside the system. Its signatories and supporters include known dissidents as well as officials, retired officials, and others from within the system. More significantly, Charter 08 symbolizes yet another alliance between political dissidence and the weiquan movement which is more rooted in Chinese society. The two political forces have been sharply divided since 1989. While the former challenges the CCP directly and calls for a fundamental political change, the latter takes concrete actions in protecting the legal rights of citizens within the framework of the existing political system. Charter 08 provides a common ground for the two forces.


1991 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Broome

“Utility,” in plain English, means usefulness. In Australia, a ute is a useful vehicle. Jeremy Bentham specialized the meaning to a particular sort of usefulness. “By utility,” he said, “is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered” (1823, p. 2). The “principle of utility” is the principle that actions are to be judged by their usefulness in this sense: their tendency to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness. When John Stuart Mill (1969, p. 213) spoke of the “perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct,” he was using “Utility” as a short name for this principle. “The greatest happiness principle” was another name for it. People who subscribed to this principle came to be known as utilitarians.


1972 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-127
Author(s):  
N.G.E. Harris

In 1955 Professor H. L. A. Hart put forward the claim that ‘if there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal right of all men to be free’, and this thesis and the arguments he adduces in its support have been thought sufficiently important for the article to be reprinted in a recent book of readings on political philosophy for students and general readers. The truth of Hart's thesis as stated is clearly meant to be independent of the moral stance of the asserter. Yet to my mind it is untenable as it stands, and could be modified only at the expense of taking up a particular moral position.England has long been fertile ground for scholars (usually American) concerned to locate the antecedents of stable and democratic government. More often than not they have stressed a particular configuration of attitudes as a basic support for such government. Evaluation of the consequences for the political system of these attitudes has frequently proceeded along very inferential and impressionistic lines, and has resulted in a benign view of the British political system.


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