scholarly journals La autonomía del ordenamiento de la Unión y las «funciones esenciales» de su sistema jurisdiccional = The autonomy of the european legal order and the «indispensable tasks» of its jurisdictional system

Author(s):  
Miguel Azpitarte Sánchez

La renovada defensa que el Tribunal de Justicia hace del concepto de autonomía contrasta con los impulsos políticos que intentan abrir la jurisdicción de la Unión, sea prolongando su intervención hacia fuera, o reconociendo competencia a tribunales ajenos a ella. Dada esta situación paradójica, mi intención es reflexionar sobre el vínculo entre autonomía del ordenamiento y funciones esenciales del sistema jurisdiccional. Para ello, en el epígrafe II, al modo de un intento de arqueología jurídica, me planteo cuáles han sido las razones constitucionales que condujeron a diseñar ese vínculo que el Tribunal de Justicia ha subrayado. En mi opinión, tres divisiones esenciales —la funcional, la institucional y la de parámetros de validez— dan sentido al modelo de cooperación vigilada que sostendría la autonomía del ordenamiento. A continuación, en el epígrafe III, intento mostrar las debilidades actuales del sistema jurisdiccional de la Unión. En primer lugar, pese a que el Tribunal de Justicia hace causa firme de la autonomía, la realidad y las propias exigencias de los Tratados constitutivos llaman a su complemento por otros actores. La pregunta esencial es saber qué función cumplen tales actores en esa labor de adición. En segundo lugar, la tutela que ofrece el sistema jurisdiccional de la Unión es hoy doblemente asimétrica, de un lado porque no extiende la garantía de la tutela judicial mediante recursos; de otro, porque opera de forma distinta si controla actos del Estado o de los particulares. Finalmente, intentaré defender que estos dos flancos abiertos —una autonomía necesitada de complemento y una tutela asimétrica— explican al menos la razón política encaminada a abrir la jurisdicción más allá de la Unión.The European Court’s renew vindication of the autonomy of the European Union Legal order opposes against the political impulses directed to open the judicial power of the Union, taking its jurisdiction beyond the Union or giving jurisdiction to court outside the Unión. Do to this paradox, I try to analyze the link between autonomy of the legal order and indispensable tasks of the judicial power of the Unión. In title II, in an effort of juridical archeology, I wonder which have been the constitutional reasons that moved to the link mentioned. In my opinion three fundamental divisions —functional, institutional and validity divisions— justify the jurisdictional model of vigilant cooperation that build the autonomy of the legal order. In title III, I try to show the weakness of this model. Firstly, although the European Court holds strong on autonomy, reality and the constitutive Treaties call for a complement. The essential question is to know what function develop several actors. Secondly, the protection offered by the judicial power of the Union is asymmetric in a double sense: it does not extend the protection through a system of appeals and it works in a different way attending to state or private origin of the wrong. Finally, I try to defend that those two asymmetries explain the political reason towards the opening of the judicial power of the Union.

Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

The European Union was born as an international organization. The 1957 Treaty of Rome formed part of international law, although the European Court of Justice was eager to emphasize that the Union constitutes “a new legal order” of international law. With time, this new legal order has indeed evolved into a true “federation of States.” Yet how would the foreign affairs powers of this new supranational entity be divided? Would the European Union gradually replace the member states, or would it preserve their distinct and diverse foreign affairs voices? In the past sixty years, the Union has indeed significantly sharpened its foreign affairs powers. While still based on the idea that it has no plenary power, the Union’s external competences have expanded dramatically, and today it is hard to identify a nucleus of exclusive foreign affairs powers reserved for the member states. And in contrast to a classic international law perspective, the Union’s member states only enjoy limited treaty-making powers under European law. Their foreign affairs powers are limited by the exclusive powers of the Union, and they may be preempted through European legislation. There are, however, moments when both the Union and its states enjoy overlapping foreign affairs powers. For these situations, the Union legal order has devised a number of cooperative mechanisms to safeguard a degree of “unity” in the external actions of the Union. Mixed agreements constitute an international mechanism that brings the Union and the member states to the same negotiating table. The second constitutional device is internal to the Union legal order: the duty of cooperation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-106
Author(s):  
Catarina Vieira Peres

In March this year, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “CJ”) answered the first preliminary question regarding the Private Enforcement Directive (“Directive”).1 One might expect this decision2 to remain relevant for the next few years, as it sheds some light on the rather intricate issue of the Directive’s temporal application. The CJ explains what rules are applicable to actions for damages regarding infringements which occurred prior either to the Directive’s adoption or to its implementation in the respective Member States. The case is also of major interest since it illustrates the role that the principle of effectiveness can play when applied alongside Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).3 Finally, albeit not expressly addressed, the case is also of interest regarding the controversial issue of parent company liability in private enforcement, where it represents a novelty in the Portuguese legal order.


Author(s):  
Bernard Stirn

Chapter 3 shows that the confluence of the law of the European Union and of the European Convention on Human Rights is a European legal order worthy of the name. It outlines the law of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty, setting out its principles and the ways in which competences are shared in the EU post Lisbon, between the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The chapter further sets out the outline of the system of rules of the European Union. Then the chapter turns to the characteristics of what has been termed a Europe of human rights, and how the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in conjunction with domestic courts, police the law of the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, the chapter brings together the law of the European Union and the ECHR.


2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 622-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. DANIEL KELEMEN

This article analyzes the politics of supranational dispute resolution, focusing on trade-environment disputes in the context of the European Union (EU) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO). The author analyzes how the interaction of political and legal pressures has influenced decision making by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and by GATT/WTO panels in trade-environment disputes.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eileen Denza

The conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam and its progress through the ratification procedures of the 15 member States of the European Union provides an occasion to re-examine a familiar question. What is meant by the claim by the European Court of Justice that the European Com-munity Treaties have created “a new legal order of international law”1 or, more radically, “a new legal order”?2 Is EC law to be regarded as a particularly effective system of regional international law, or has it been created as, or mutated into, an entirely new species of law? If there are indeed two legal orders, to what extent are they still capable of cross-fertilisation? What about “European Union law”? Have the Treaty on European Union and now the Treaty of Amsterdam eroded the dichotomy between the two legal orders of public international law and EU law? Is public international law itself taking on some of the characteristics which have made EC law an attractive as well as an effective system for regulating relations between sovereign States? Are the two streams converging?


2021 ◽  
pp. 313-356
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter studies three executive powers in the context of the European Union. It begins with an examination of the political power to act as government. The ‘steering’ power of high politics belongs to two EU institutions: the European Council and the Commission. The Union ‘government’ is thus based on a ‘dual executive’. The chapter then moves to an analysis of the (delegated) legislative powers of the Union executive. The central provisions here are Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. The European legal order has allowed for wide delegations of power to the Commission; while nonetheless insisting on substantive and procedural safeguards to protect federalism and democracy. Finally, the chapter looks at the (administrative) enforcement powers of the Union. Based on the idea of ‘executive federalism’, the power to apply and enforce European law is here divided between the Union and the Member States. The Union can—exceptionally—execute its own law; yet, as a rule, it is the Member States that primarily execute Union law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 313-356
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter studies three executive powers in the context of the European Union. It begins with an examination of the political power to act as government. The ‘steering’ power of high politics belongs to two EU institutions: the European Council and the Commission. The Union ‘government’ is thus based on a ‘dual executive’. The chapter then moves to an analysis of the (delegated) legislative powers of the Union executive. The central provisions here are Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. The European legal order has allowed for wide delegations of power to the Commission; while nonetheless insisting on substantive and procedural safeguards to protect federalism and democracy. Finally, the chapter looks at the (administrative) enforcement powers of the Union. Based on the idea of ‘executive federalism’, the power to apply and enforce European law is here divided between the Union and the Member States. The Union can—exceptionally—execute its own law; yet, as a rule, it is the Member States that primarily execute Union law.


Author(s):  
Edorta COBREROS MENDAZONA

LABURPENA: Zentzuzko epea funtsezko eskubidea da Europar Batasunaren ordenamenduan. Askotan eztabaidatu da eskubide hori urratzeak eragin ahal izan dituen kalteak konpentsatzeko moduaren gainean, eta Justizia Auzitegiaren interpretazioa eboluzionatuz joan da. Horren inguruko azken jarreraren ondorioz, kalte ordaina emateko errekurtsoa abiarazi behar da Auzitegi Nagusiaren aurrean, konpentsazioa jaso nahi bada. Ondorio berri bat ekar dezake horrek Europar Batasunaren kontratuz kanpoko erantzukizun-sisteman; hau da, oinarrizko eskubide bat kaltetzeak per se ekar lezake behar beste ezaugarritutako urraketa egotea. Horrek indartu egingo luke oinarrizko eskubideek lehentasunezko kokalekua edukitzea Europar Batasunaren ordenamenduan. RESUMEN: El plazo razonable es en la actualidad un derecho fundamental en el ordenamiento de la Unión Europea. La compensación de los daños que pudiera haber producido su conculcación ha sido una cuestión debatida y en la que la interpretación del Tribunal de Justicia ha experimentado una clara evolución. La última postura al respecto obliga a iniciar un recurso de indemnización ante el Tribunal General para obtenerla. Ello plantea una posible consecuencia novedosa en el sistema de responsabilidad extracontractual de la Unión Europea, como es que la lesión de un derecho fundamental podría constituir per se una violación suficientemente caracterizada, lo que reforzaría la posición preferente de los derechos fundamentales en el ordenamiento de la Unión Europea. ABSTRACT: Reasonable period of time is currently a fundamental right in the EU legal order. The compensation of damages that might have been caused by its infringement is a discussed matter and there the interpretation provided by the Court of Justice has experienced a clear evolution. The last position on this matter calls for filing an action for damages before the General Court in order to obtain a compensation. This raises a possible new consequence within the legal regime of the non contractual liability of the European Union, that is that the impairment of a fundamental right might be considered per se as a sufficiently serious breach which would strengthen the prevalent position of fundamental rights in the legal order of the European Union.


Oikos ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (29) ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Olga María Cerqueira Torres

RESUMENEn el presente artículo el análisis se ha centrado en determinar cuáles de las funciones del interregionalismo, sistematizadas en los trabajos de Jürgen Rüland, han sido desarrolladas en la relación Unión Europea-Comunidad Andina de Naciones, ya que ello ha permitido evidenciar si el estado del proceso de integración de la CAN ha condicionado la racionalidad política del comportamiento de la Unión Europea hacia la región andina (civil power o soft imperialism); esto posibilitará establecer la viabilidad de la firma del Acuerdo de Asociación Unión Europea-Comunidad Andina de Naciones.Palabras clave: Unión Europea, Comunidad Andina, interregionalismo, funciones, acuerdo de asociación. Interregionalism functions in the EU-ANDEAN community relationsABSTRACTIn the present article analysis has focused on which functions of interregionalism, systematized by Jürgen Rüland, have been developed in the European Union-Andean Community birregional relation, that allowed demonstrate if the state of the integration process in the Andean Community has conditioned the political rationality of the European Union towards the Andean region (civil power or soft imperialism); with all these elements will be possible to establish the viability of the Association Agreement signature between the European Union and the Andean Community.Keywords: European Union, Andean Community, interregionalism, functions, association agreement.


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