scholarly journals Christian 5.s parforcejagt i 1600-Tallets aviser

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Kristoffer Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Small Group ◽  
The Other ◽  
Symbolic Power ◽  
Power Combining ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Hunting Dogs ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The One ◽  
350Th Anniversary

Kristoffer Schmidt: Christian V’s par force hunt in 17th century’s newspapersThe year 2020 marks the 350th anniversary of the foundation by Christian V of the par force hunt (also known as chasse à courre) in Denmark. This type of hunting was a spec-tacular sight, where riders and a pack of hunting dogs, imported from England, would hunt a selected animal (often a stag) through large, artificially adapted hunting areas such as the open landscapes at Jægersborg Dyrehave or the geometrically shaped hunt-ing routes at Gribskov or Store Dyrehave. After a pursuit lasting usually several hours the animal would collapse from fatigue. The king would then finish off the exhausted beast with a hirschfænger – a large dagger – or a spear. Studies of the royal hunt tend to depict the Danish stag hunt as primarily a means for absolute rulers to showcase a symbolic power. It enabled the absolute ruler to exhibit athletic strength, exemplary riding skills and extreme courage, and thus to paint the picture of a heroic ruler.Although participation in these hunts was limited to a small group of royal hunts-men, court members and foreign guests (for example, ambassadors and royalty), news of the king’s hunting adventures were conveyed through contemporaneous, partly state-controlled newspapers such as Anders Bording’s Den Danske Mercurius and Ahasver-us Bartholin’s Mercurius.This article examines how the royal hunt – primarily the stag hunt – was covered in Den Danske Mercurius and later Mercurius. It reveals that reports on the stag hunt seem to have two main purposes. On the one hand, the newspaper reports underscore the assess-ment of the royal hunts as a symbolic manifestation of power, combining a description of the hunting skills of Christian V with a more general depiction of him as the hero-king. On the other hand, the reports also reveal a need of the Danish-Norwegian absolutist regime to justify the King’s numerous hunting adventures. In several instances Bording, in particular, pointed to the fact that the hunt was considered a pastime for the King and the court. Therefore, Bording and Bartholin stressed that this type of pastime did not interfere with the King’s other, more important duties, such as affairs of state. In other words, the picture of the athletic hero-king did not carry more weight than the image of the King as a capable and efficient ruler. Thus, it appears that the stag hunt, despite its public grandeur, also had a recreational and more private purpose, and that Christian V withdrew from his more formal duties to go hunting.

Hegel’sOffene: Apperception, Absolution and the Absolute

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-187
Author(s):  
Joshua Wretzel
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Free Thought ◽  
The One

AbstractThis paper offers a limited defence of two seemingly disparate interpretive approaches to free thought in Hegel’s JenaPhenomenology of Spirit. On the one hand, I defend the view of so-called post-Kantian Hegelians, that Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception is central to Hegel’s account of free thinking in thePhenomenology. On the other hand, I argue that the notions ofdas Offenein Heidegger’sVom Wesen der WahrheitandAb-Lösungin his 1930/31 lectures on Hegel’sPhenomenologyare no less crucial to an understanding of free thought in Hegel’s work. I show that absolution is a condition for the possibility ofdas Offene, which is a condition for the possibility of apperception in its reflexive capacity.

Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251–259

1957 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Ackrill
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
The Real ◽  
Clear View ◽  
Absolute Necessity ◽  
Classical Philology ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The One ◽  
Great Stress

My purpose is not to give a full interpretation of this difficult and important passage, but to discuss one particular problem, taking up some remarks made by F. M. Cornford (in Plato's Theory of Knowledge) and by Mr. R. Robinson (in his paper on Plato's Parmenides, Classical Philology, 1942). First it may be useful to give a very brief and unargued outline of the passage. Plato seeks to prove that concepts are related in certain definite ways, that there is a συμπλοκὴ εἰδῶν (251d–252e). Next (253) he assigns to philosophy the task of discovering what these relations are: the philosopher must try to get a clear view of the whole range of concepts and of how they are interconnected, whether in genus-species pyramids or in other ways. Plato now gives a sample of such philosophising. Choosing some concepts highly relevant to problems already broached in the Sophist he first (254–5) establishes that they are all different one from the other, and then (255e–258) elicits the relationships in which they stand to one another. The attempt to discover and state these relationships throws light on the puzzling notions ὄν and μὴ ὄν and enables Plato to set aside with contempt certain puzzles and paradoxes propounded by superficial thinkers (259). He refers finally (259e) to the absolute necessity there is for concepts to be in definite relations to one another if there is to be discourse at all: διὰ γὰρ τήν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν So the section ends with a reassertion of the point with which it began (251d–252e): that there is and must be a συμπλοκὴ εἰδῶν.The question I wish to discuss is this. Is it true to say that one of Plato's achievements in this passage is ‘the discovery of the copula’ or ‘the recognition of the ambiguity of ἔστιν’ as used on the one hand in statements of identity and on the other hand in attributive statements? The question is whether Plato made a philosophical advance which we might describe in such phrases as those just quoted, but no great stress is to be laid on these particular phrases. Thus it is no doubt odd to say that Plato (or anyone else) discovered the copula. But did he draw attention to it? Did he expound or expose the various roles of the verb ἔστιν? Many of his predecessors and contemporaries reached bizarre conclusions by confusing different usesof the word; did Plato respond by elucidating these different uses? These are the real questions.

scholarly journals De Schelling a la ontología de la libertad

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Ciancio
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Metaphysical Tradition ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The One

RESUMENLa filosofía del último Schelling presenta elementos decisivos para una ontología de la libertad. Hay dos temas que en el último Schelling llevan precisamente al desarrollo de la ontología de la libertad, encabezada por Luigi Pareyson: el éxtasis de la razón, a la que dio una interpretación profunda el mismo Pareyson y la estructura de la libertad de Dios, en cuya configuración yo también he insistido. El éxtasis es la interrupción del desarrollo de la razón, que llega a sus límites y está fundada desde el ser – en el ser que la precede, y que escapa de su poder. Desde aquí Schelling intenta elaborar una concepción compleja y no siempre lineal de la libertad de Dios, ya como libertad de la creación, ya –más originariamente– como libertad frente a su propio ser. En este intento Schelling no alcanza a liberarse completamente de la tradición metafísica del principio de necesidad. La ontología de la libertad se libera de éste considerando la libertad no sólo como inicio, sino tambien como elección entre ser y no ser. De esta manera, por un lado, lo originario escapa radicalmente a la necesidad y, por el otro lado, precisamente porque su ser es elegido en una alternativa, la suya no es una simple autoposicion, que sucumbe a la necesidad, sino la posición de algo otro de sí, el ser, respecto al cual puede ejercer su libre poder.PALABRAS CLAVEDIOS, LIBERTAD, ONTOLOGÍA, RAZÓN, EXTASISABSTRACTThe philosophy of the last Schelling presents decisive insights for an ontology of freedom. Particularly two themes of the last Schelling lead to the ontology of freedom proposed by Luigi Pareyson: the ecstasy of reason of which Pareyson himself gave a profound interpretation and the structure of God’s freedom on the configuration of which I insisted too. Ecstasy is the interruption of the development of reason, which comes to its limits and is founded by the being, which is beyond reason’s power. From here, Schelling tries to process a complex and not always linear conception of God’s freedom both as freedom of creation and, more originally, as freedom of his own being. In this attempt Schelling does not depart completely from the metaphysical tradition of the principle of necessity. The ontology of freedom thinks freedom not only as a beginning, but as a choice between being and not being. In this way, on the one hand the absolute origin escapes radically from the necessity and on the other hand, just because its being is chosen within an alternative, its position of the being is not a simple self-position, which would succumb to the necessity, but the position of something different from itself: the being with regard to which it can exercise its free power.KEY WORDSGOD, FREEDOM, ONTOLOGY, REASON, ECSTASY

scholarly journals ONTOLOGICAL AND CONTEXTUAL POSITION OF TIME: BETWEEN AEON AND RETARDATIONS OF NOTHING

2020 ◽  
pp. 128-138
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Time Orientation ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The One ◽  
Temporal Flow

Research on the negative foundations of time will not lose its relevance as long as the connection, stated by M. Heidegger in 1927, remains legitimate and systemically justified. Sein und Zeit do not look like the classical opposition of being and thinking, being and phenomenon, being and existence, which are shaped very antinomically according to the philosophical tradition. M. Heidegger’s “being and time”, in relation to which we are talking about the possibilities of temporal derivatives among the phenomenological and ontological “given”, we have to define as a Wende der Zeit, in other words, the “turn of time” for the philosophy of positive. What times are meant? On the one hand, times of modern metaphysical projects that sought to overcome the framework of existence without the slightest effort in the direction of its own autonomous disclosure. On the other hand, there will remain times that are only maturating: the destruction of philosophy under the onslaught of pointless “twisting of words”, which never had any special consequences. The main issues of the article will be devoted to the ontological and contextual thematization of time among two atypical dimensions for the concept of chronos (from the Greek Χρόνος – “time”): the eon and the retarded Nothing. The aim of the article is to describe the constitution of time on the basis of the negative copula of being and as a subject of radical ontology at the same time. The tasks we will focus on are as follows: first of all, we will conduct a phenomenological analysis of time in relation to the retarded Nothing concepts such as ἐνέργεια (from the Greek “action”, “activity”) of Aristotle, cairological παρουσία (from the Greek – “presence”) of Augustine, transcendental scheme of I. Kant and the absolute temporal flow of E. Husserl. Secondly, we will single out the negative copula of being from the field of essence within the framework of ontological differentiation. Finally, we will deduce the eon from the etymological primacy of “eternity” in favor of the epoch-making experience of active negation. In order for the passage of time to become proportionate to its carrier, and for the philosophy of positivity, which has reached its completion and has ceased to be an obstacle at the “turn of time”, we will critically analyze impersonal time. Orientation to Greek concepts is paradigmatic in this case.

The Supreme One

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 63-86
Author(s):  
Lela Alexidze
Keyword(s):  
Twelfth Century ◽  
The Other ◽  
Productive Activity ◽  
Main Subject ◽  
Son Of God ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The One

Abstract In the prologue to his Commentary on Proclus’ Elements of theology Ioane Petritsi, Georgian Neoplatonist of the twelfth century, argues that the main subject of Proclus’ Elements is the theory of the supreme One. In Petritsi’s opinion, Proclus’ merit was to elaborate the philosophy of the ‘pure’, absolutely transcendent One which is unperceivable even for the Intellect. On the other hand, the supreme One is, in Petritsi’s interpretation, the cause of everything, including matter, and It has some positive (‘kataphatic’) characteristics which cannot be separated from Its hyper-essence. These are, mainly, Its causality and productivity, Its will and providential activity. The aim of this article is to analyse, what the supreme One is in Petritsi’s Commentary and to answer the following question: Do the absolute transcendence of the supreme One and Its positive characteristics contradict each other or are they in a certain way compatible with each other? I argue that for making the transition from the first aspect of the supreme One (Its transcendence) to another one (Its productivity) more coherent, Petritsi made an attempt to introduce in the ontological hierarchy one more one after the supreme One and before the Henads. In my opinion, this ‘second one’, which is almost inseparable from the supreme transcendent One, is Its another aspect, representing Its productive activity. For the same purpose, as I think, Petritsi identified the creative aspect of the One with the Logos/the Son of God and, in certain cases, also with Plato’s Demiurge.

Paul Ricœur et le destin de la phénoménologie

1970 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-160
Author(s):  
Jérôme de Gramont
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
The Other ◽  
Promised Land ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Paul Ricœur ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Historical Phenomenology ◽  
The One

Every reader of Ricœur knows that hermeneutics endeavors to answer the aporiae of historical phenomenology. Hence arises the need to return to those aporiae and those answers. On the one hand, phenomenology, born with the maxim of going “directly to things themselves,” is confronted with the incessant evasion of the thing itself and with its dreams of presence being thereby shattered. This reversal should not be blamed on the failings of this or that thinker, but attributed to the very destiny of phenomenology itself. On the other hand, Ricœurian hermeneutics takes note of a gap (the very remoteness of the thing itself), and of a necessary return (to the thing of the text). Thus, there is nothing for thought itself to grieve over with respect to this enterprise. However, while the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, faced with the same difficulties, orients itself towards political philosophy, the hermeneutics of Ricœur rather seeks to lead us to a philosophy of religion. This article hypothesizes that, in spite of the formula (inherited from Thévenaz) of a “philosophy without an absolute,” the thought of Ricœur heads in fair measure towards the Absolute, and that ontology is not the only name of the Promised Land.

Du sollst Dir ein Bild von mir machen, um es zu überwinden

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 19-33
Author(s):  
Valentin Pluder ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The One ◽  
Absolute Knowledge

The Wissenschaftslehre 1804-ii does not end with absolute knowledge in the 25th lecture, because this absolute knowledge is as sealed off from the common knowledge as the Absolute itself in the 15th lecture was. As matters stand in the 25th lecture the Wissenschaftslehre can neither meet its own claim to unify all knowledge in one system nor can the genesis of the absolute knowledge, which had to begin with common knowledge, be understood by means of the Wissenschaftslehre itself. The problem in linking absolute knowledge and common knowledge is that, on the one hand, absolute knowledge is hermetically closed. Therefore, nothing and especially not common knowledge can derive or result from it. On the other hand, absolute knowledge is not supposed to depend on anything but the Absolute itself. Therefore, it cannot be understood adequately as a condition for common knowledge. Fichte’s solution to this problem is to differentiate between the genesis of absolute knowledge and absolute knowledge itself. Common knowledge is necessary only for the genesis of absolute knowledge. However, the validity of the common knowledge depends on the pursuit of the absolute knowledge.

scholarly journals "Glasið brotnaðist, amma": Viðskeyti eða ekki: Um sagnir sem enda á -na+st

Orð og tunga ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 67-89
Author(s):  
Margrét Jónsdóttir
Keyword(s):  
Small Group ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

Icelandic has a number of anticausative/inchoative verbs suffixed with -na,i.e., verbs like batna, hitna,stirðna ‘become better/warm(er)/stiff(er)’. They are, from a synchronic point of view, all related to adjectives. It has been generally assumed that the na-formation and -st formation do not combine, in other words, that na-verbs can’t be suffixed with -st (sofnast being an exception). This is mainly based on the assumption that -na is a productive suffix forming an agentless verb. The paper concludes that this is not the case. The assumption is that -na is not a suffix any longer. Many examples of st-cliticized na-verbsare found in Icelandic, e.g. batnast, hitnast, stirðnast. They are found in written Icelandic sources, both in the oldest as well as in very young sources of a different kind. For comparison, the behaviour of two verbal groups are discussed in the paper. On the one hand, there are -k(k)a/-ga-verbs suffixed with -st, having an anticausative/ergative meaning, i.e. fjölgast ‘increase’, stækkast ‘become big(ger)’. Numerous verbs belong to this group. On the other hand, there is a very small group of verbs, i.e. batast ‘become better’, hitast ‘become warm(er)’, meyrast ‘become tender’; these verbs, that have the same root as the na-verbs, are used in an anticausative/ergative meaning and have a causative counterpart as well.

Damascius on Self-Constituted Realities

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilena Vlad
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The One ◽  
Different Levels

AbstractThis article analyzes the concept of self-constitution in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem. On the one hand, I try to see how self-constitution functions within the framework of reality. I identify the different levels of self-constituted reality (τὸ αὐθυπόστατον), showing that each of these levels is also constituted by the absolute One, which is the cause of all things. Self-constitution is present throughout the process in which the One is slowly in labor towards plurality, starting from the highest level of intelligible being down to the level of the particular soul. On the other hand, I also try to show how self-constitution appears at a discursive level. In this context I discuss its crucial role in Damascius’ interpretation of the second and third hypotheses in Plato’s dialogue Parmenides.

Stories and the Self

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Krause ◽  
Markus Appel
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lower Degree ◽  
Contrast Effects ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Self Perceptions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Abstract. Two experiments examined the influence of stories on recipients’ self-perceptions. Extending prior theory and research, our focus was on assimilation effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in line with a protagonist’s traits) as well as on contrast effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in contrast to a protagonist’s traits). In Experiment 1 ( N = 113), implicit and explicit conscientiousness were assessed after participants read a story about either a diligent or a negligent student. Moderation analyses showed that highly transported participants and participants with lower counterarguing scores assimilate the depicted traits of a story protagonist, as indicated by explicit, self-reported conscientiousness ratings. Participants, who were more critical toward a story (i.e., higher counterarguing) and with a lower degree of transportation, showed contrast effects. In Experiment 2 ( N = 103), we manipulated transportation and counterarguing, but we could not identify an effect on participants’ self-ascribed level of conscientiousness. A mini meta-analysis across both experiments revealed significant positive overall associations between transportation and counterarguing on the one hand and story-consistent self-reported conscientiousness on the other hand.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document