scholarly journals ONTOLOGICAL AND CONTEXTUAL POSITION OF TIME: BETWEEN AEON AND RETARDATIONS OF NOTHING

2020 ◽  
pp. 128-138
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Time Orientation ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The One ◽  
Temporal Flow

Research on the negative foundations of time will not lose its relevance as long as the connection, stated by M. Heidegger in 1927, remains legitimate and systemically justified. Sein und Zeit do not look like the classical opposition of being and thinking, being and phenomenon, being and existence, which are shaped very antinomically according to the philosophical tradition. M. Heidegger’s “being and time”, in relation to which we are talking about the possibilities of temporal derivatives among the phenomenological and ontological “given”, we have to define as a Wende der Zeit, in other words, the “turn of time” for the philosophy of positive. What times are meant? On the one hand, times of modern metaphysical projects that sought to overcome the framework of existence without the slightest effort in the direction of its own autonomous disclosure. On the other hand, there will remain times that are only maturating: the destruction of philosophy under the onslaught of pointless “twisting of words”, which never had any special consequences. The main issues of the article will be devoted to the ontological and contextual thematization of time among two atypical dimensions for the concept of chronos (from the Greek Χρόνος – “time”): the eon and the retarded Nothing. The aim of the article is to describe the constitution of time on the basis of the negative copula of being and as a subject of radical ontology at the same time. The tasks we will focus on are as follows: first of all, we will conduct a phenomenological analysis of time in relation to the retarded Nothing concepts such as ἐνέργεια (from the Greek “action”, “activity”) of Aristotle, cairological παρουσία (from the Greek – “presence”) of Augustine, transcendental scheme of I. Kant and the absolute temporal flow of E. Husserl. Secondly, we will single out the negative copula of being from the field of essence within the framework of ontological differentiation. Finally, we will deduce the eon from the etymological primacy of “eternity” in favor of the epoch-making experience of active negation. In order for the passage of time to become proportionate to its carrier, and for the philosophy of positivity, which has reached its completion and has ceased to be an obstacle at the “turn of time”, we will critically analyze impersonal time. Orientation to Greek concepts is paradigmatic in this case.

scholarly journals Heidegger's concept of 'Being-There' and fundamental concepts of traditional ontology

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-291
Author(s):  
Milotka Molnar-Sivc
Keyword(s):  
Decisive Role ◽  
The Other ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Being There ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

Although the question of relationship between basic concepts of traditional ontology and central concepts of fundamental ontology is not a topic which is systematically dealt with in Being and Time, it is obvious that some of the theses which are crucial not only for Heidegger's interpretation of philosophical tradition, but also for the whole project of fundamental ontology, concern this 'conceptual scheme'. In fact, the backbone of Heidegger's critical confrontation with dominant philosophical conceptions is the question of relationship between the concept of 'substance' and the concept of 'Being', i.e. the discussion of philosophical doctrines in which 'Being' is reduced to 'substance'. Besides this context, which concerns the ontological problematics in the strict sense, it is possible to show that the refutation of the basic categories of traditional ontology is an issue which has a decisive role in more concrete phases of the realization of the project of fundamental ontology. This is especially confirmed in Heidegger's discussion of the concept of 'Being-There'. The interpretation of Heidegger's treatment of the relationship between the concepts of 'Being-there', 'existence' and 'existentials' on the one hand, and the concepts of 'substance', 'essence' and 'categories' on the other, shows that one of Heidegger's basic theses is that a transformation of concepts of traditional ontology is necessary for an appropriate understanding of human being.

scholarly journals PAKARTOJIMAS IR NIHILIZMAS

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 46-59
Author(s):  
Rita Šerpytytė
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Models ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Western Tradition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Text Fragment ◽  
Western Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Universal Structure ◽  
The One

Straipsnio tikslas yra atskleisti Vakarų filosofijos tradicijoje savitai įsitvirtinusios patyrimo struktūros, įvardijamos pakartojimu, nihilistinę prasmę. Šioje hermeneutinėje analizėje, viena vertus, re­miamasi tam tikra nihilizmo samprata, numatančia du nihilizmo teorinius modelius – nihilizmą, parem­tą Überwindung teorija, ir nihilizmą, paremtą différance idėja. Kita vertus, remiamasi tam tikru („onto-teologiniu“) pretekstu Vakarų mąstymo tradicijoje atpažįstant pakartojimo struktūrą – Pauliaus Laiško efeziečiams Ef. I, 10 teksto fragmentu, laikomu paradigmine pakartojimo struktūros išsklaida. Herme­neutinė analizė projektuojama į Kierkegaardo ir Agambeno filosofiją, atskirus jų mąstyme atpažįstamus pakartojimo invariantus atskleidžiant kaip minėto Pauliaus Laiško fragmento eksplozijos atvejus. Ke­liamas klausimas, kas yra pakartojimas, kur slypi jo negatyvumas ir kaip pasirodo jo nihilistinė prasmė? Kaip šioje negatyvumo ir nihilizmo atskleistyje „tarpininkauja“ différance? Straipsnyje parodoma, jog skirtis kaip neigimo judesys, atstovaujantis nihilistinei logikai, gali būti traktuojamas ir vien formaliai, ir realiai. Skirties kaip realaus neigimo traktavimas Kierkegaardo ir Agambeno mąstyme atitinka pačios patirties struktūros – pakartojimo – ontologinį (tikrovišką) įšaknytumą.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: pakartojimas, nihilizmas, différance, negatyvumas, laikasPakartojimas ir nihilizmasRita Šerpytytė   AbstractThe purpose of this article is to reveal the nihilistic sense of an experiential structure, which has been distinctively rooted in Western philosophical tradition. On the one hand, this hermeneutical analysis will be based on a certain conception of nihilism presupposing two theoretical models of nihilism – nihilism, which refers to the theory of Überwindung, and nihilism associated with the idea of différance. On the other hand, it builds upon a certain (the so-called “onto-theological”) pretext, which might be used for recognition of the structure of repetition in Western tradition of thinking, – i.e. the fragment of a text from St. Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians Eph. I, 10 – the paradigmatic passage proposing this universal structure of repetition. Focused both on philosophy of Kierkegaard and Agamben, hermeneutical analysis will aim to disclose the separate invariants of such repetition as cases of explosion of the mentioned text fragment. The question is raised – what is repetition? Where does its negativity lie? How does its nihilistic sense appear? How does the différance mediate in this process of revealing of negativity and nihilism? The article argues that difference, as a motion of negation representing nihilistic logic, can be treated both in merely formal and in a realistic way. The treating of différance as real denying in Kierkegaard’s and Agamben’s thinking corresponds to the ontological rootedness of the very structure of experience – repetition.Keywords: repetition, nihilism, différance, negativity, time

The Subversion of Plato's Quasi-Phenomenology and Mytho-Poetics in the Symposium

Janus Head ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Bert Olivier ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Lacan ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The One

Is there a significant difference between Plato's texts and what is known as 'Platonism', that is, the philosophical tradition that claims Plato as its progenitor? Focusing on the Symposium, an attempt is made here to show that, far from merely fitting neatly into the categories of Platonism—with its neat distinction between the super-sensible and the sensible—Plato's own text is a complex, tension-filled terrain of countervailing forces. In the Symposium this tension obtains between the perceptive insights, on the one hand, into the nature of love and beauty, as well as the bond between them, and the metaphysical leap, on the other hand, from the experiential world to a supposedly accessible, but by definition super-sensible, experience-transcending realm. It is argued that, instead of being content with the philosophical illumination of the ambivalent human condition—something consummately achieved by mytho-poetic and quasi-phenomenohgical means—Plato turns to a putatively attainable, transcendent source of metaphysical reassurance which, moreover, displays all the trappings of an ideological construct. This is demonstrated by mapping Plato's lover's vision of 'absolute beauty' on to what Jacques Lacan has characterized as the unconscious structural quasi-condition of all religious and ideological illusion.

Nietzsche’s Therapy of Therapy

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Faustino
Keyword(s):  
Western Culture ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Basic Features

AbstractThis paper examines Nietzsche’s relation to the therapeutic philosophical tradition paradigmatically represented by the Hellenistic schools. On the one hand, given his project of rehabilitating Western culture and his understanding of the philosopher as a “physician of culture”, Nietzsche seems also to hold a therapeutic understanding of philosophy; on the other hand, he is extremely critical of any (philosophical, moral or religious) attempt to heal mankind. This paper does not aim to solve this tension but rather characterizes Nietzsche’s endeavor in this respect as a therapy of therapy. Through analysis of a) the basic features of the Hellenistic conception of philosophy, b) Nietzsche’s development of the analogy of the “philosophical physician”, c) his diagnosis of culture, and d) his criticism of previous therapists, I show that Nietzsche can be formally included in this tradition of thought, even if this inclusion has implications for the tradition itself. As I suggest, given the self-referentiality of Nietzsche’s therapy, his inclusion in this tradition might in fact simultaneously entail its own self-suppression.

scholarly journals Stanislav Krakov: Phenomenology of the inner consciousness of combat

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-342
Author(s):  
Caslav Koprivica
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Aesthetic ◽  
The One

In this text, the work of Serbian writer Stanislav Krakov, between the two world wars, the famous, and later, due to ideological divisions, repressed and forgotten figure, is ovserverd through the lens of philosophy of existence and phenomenology. The ?philosophical? significance of Krakov?s autobiographical war prose, which in the aesthetic, especially formal-innovative aspect, represented the pinnacle of the genre of that time Serbian literature, is that it can be viewed as a first-class document of phenomenological introspection of a man in situation of mortal combat; and the ragne his prose of his prose is, in some respects, without exaggeration, comparable to war prose of Ernst J?nger. But besides his authentic documentality, Krakov?s writing is characterized by brilliant insights. So, on the one hand, Krakov can be viewed as a thinker of war and corporeality avant lettre, and, on the other hand, the interpretative contextualization of his prose within the aforementioned philosophical tradition helps us to better understand his literature.

Hegel’sOffene: Apperception, Absolution and the Absolute

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-187
Author(s):  
Joshua Wretzel
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Free Thought ◽  
The One

AbstractThis paper offers a limited defence of two seemingly disparate interpretive approaches to free thought in Hegel’s JenaPhenomenology of Spirit. On the one hand, I defend the view of so-called post-Kantian Hegelians, that Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception is central to Hegel’s account of free thinking in thePhenomenology. On the other hand, I argue that the notions ofdas Offenein Heidegger’sVom Wesen der WahrheitandAb-Lösungin his 1930/31 lectures on Hegel’sPhenomenologyare no less crucial to an understanding of free thought in Hegel’s work. I show that absolution is a condition for the possibility ofdas Offene, which is a condition for the possibility of apperception in its reflexive capacity.

scholarly journals Dasein and World: Heidegger’s Reconceiving of the Transcendental After Husserl

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-287
Author(s):  
Niall Keane
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Constitutive Relationship ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Early Analysis ◽  
Constitutive Analysis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The One

AbstractThe following examines Heidegger’s analysis of world and Dasein from a transcendental perspective. It is argued that Heidegger’s reflections on the interconnected themes of world and Dasein reveal the tensions that exist between the transcendental claims before and after Being and Time and the analysis of worldliness. It begins by looking at Heidegger’s early analysis of Husserl’s critique of psychologism and naturalism, assessing what this tells us about Heidegger’s analysis of world and nature. It subsequently addresses Heidegger’s transformation of Husserlian phenomenology, and intentionality in particular, arguing against interpreters who claim Heidegger’s interconnected concepts of Dasein and world are reducible to one another and hence phenomenologically problematic. In order to respond to this reading, the article examines the twin themes of, on the one hand, transcendental constitutive analysis in Heidegger’s work, Dasein as disclosive and ‘world entering’, and, on the other hand, the centrality of the world and the realm of nature as always more than Dasein’s constitutive relationship to it. In order to understand what Heidegger means by worldliness, the article will look at Heidegger’s reflections on nature as the world’s other, which nonetheless needs to be understood on the basis of worldliness.

scholarly journals The Phenomenon of Death and the Possibility of Immortality

Problemos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erika Lujza Nagy
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Personal Perspective ◽  
Attitude To Death ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
First Time ◽  
Material Form

This paper is about death and about immortality. It explores the experience and philosophical implications of death from different perspectives. Firstly, in the light of Mamardashvili’s philosophy, it deals with the interconnection and interdependence of death and thinking. Secondly, through Jankélévitch’s philosophy, it changes the perspective on the interdependence of death and thinking from the general to the personal perspective, when death becomes an intimate part of life. Further, thanks to Aries’ research, the paper introduces historical details about what people brooded over death and how they expressed their thoughts in more explicit way. This makes it possible to look at the mediology of death as a philosophy that leads to reflection and critique of our contemporary attitude to death. On the one hand, the mediology of death motivates us to think about death – in this way it follows the philosophical tradition, on the other hand, it attempts to convince us for the first time of the immortality that can happen only in material form – and it is its novelty.

scholarly journals Perception and Passivity Can the Passive Pre-Givenness Be Phenomenalized?

Phainomenon ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-35
Author(s):  
Pedro M. S. Alves
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Passive Synthesis ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Primitive Forms ◽  
The One ◽  
As If

Abstract In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis.

Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251–259

1957 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Ackrill
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
The Real ◽  
Clear View ◽  
Absolute Necessity ◽  
Classical Philology ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The One ◽  
Great Stress

My purpose is not to give a full interpretation of this difficult and important passage, but to discuss one particular problem, taking up some remarks made by F. M. Cornford (in Plato's Theory of Knowledge) and by Mr. R. Robinson (in his paper on Plato's Parmenides, Classical Philology, 1942). First it may be useful to give a very brief and unargued outline of the passage. Plato seeks to prove that concepts are related in certain definite ways, that there is a συμπλοκὴ εἰδῶν (251d–252e). Next (253) he assigns to philosophy the task of discovering what these relations are: the philosopher must try to get a clear view of the whole range of concepts and of how they are interconnected, whether in genus-species pyramids or in other ways. Plato now gives a sample of such philosophising. Choosing some concepts highly relevant to problems already broached in the Sophist he first (254–5) establishes that they are all different one from the other, and then (255e–258) elicits the relationships in which they stand to one another. The attempt to discover and state these relationships throws light on the puzzling notions ὄν and μὴ ὄν and enables Plato to set aside with contempt certain puzzles and paradoxes propounded by superficial thinkers (259). He refers finally (259e) to the absolute necessity there is for concepts to be in definite relations to one another if there is to be discourse at all: διὰ γὰρ τήν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν So the section ends with a reassertion of the point with which it began (251d–252e): that there is and must be a συμπλοκὴ εἰδῶν.The question I wish to discuss is this. Is it true to say that one of Plato's achievements in this passage is ‘the discovery of the copula’ or ‘the recognition of the ambiguity of ἔστιν’ as used on the one hand in statements of identity and on the other hand in attributive statements? The question is whether Plato made a philosophical advance which we might describe in such phrases as those just quoted, but no great stress is to be laid on these particular phrases. Thus it is no doubt odd to say that Plato (or anyone else) discovered the copula. But did he draw attention to it? Did he expound or expose the various roles of the verb ἔστιν? Many of his predecessors and contemporaries reached bizarre conclusions by confusing different usesof the word; did Plato respond by elucidating these different uses? These are the real questions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document