scholarly journals L'étiquetage des aliments irradiés et la liberté d'expression

2005 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-90
Author(s):  
Manon Corriveau

Faced with technological advances in the field of food preserving methods, Canadian consumers are concerned and call for legislative action to require food processing industries to clearly indicate "irradiated food" on product labels. The author questions the constitutionality of such action. After having attempted to define the meaning of the concept "freedom of expression " (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Subsection 2.b) to see if it includes commercial speech as well as the right to remain silent, the author sets out to determine whether such measures constitute a "reasonable limit that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 245-270
Author(s):  
Cláudio de Oliveira Santos Colnago ◽  
Bethany Shiner

Abstract The right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, yet current jurisprudence interprets the right as a mere dimension of freedom of expression, also protected by Article 13. Contemporary neurotechnology research presents the possibility for human thoughts to be tracked, recorded, analysed and predicted. This applies pressure upon the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ current understanding of the right to freedom of thought. Firstly, this paper will examine how Article 13 has been interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at different stages of its jurisprudence. Secondly, by considering both technological advances and the other rights guaranteed by the Convention, this paper argues for an evolution in the interpretation of Article 13 whereby the right to freedom of thought is understood as a distinct right, separate from freedom of expression. Finally, this paper proposes that the positive duty to secure Convention rights requires States to enact preventative legislation and regulations. Existing bioethics principles should be drawn upon to inform human rights-compliant laws and regulations that require the architectural design of technologies to limit the potential to infringe upon freedom of thought.


Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-45
Author(s):  
Casey McDermott

Since the entrenchment of the Cana-dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, much debate has focused on the legal, equali-ty, and democratic rights of both individuals and groups. While acknowledging the pro-gress in areas such as legal and equality rights, debates regarding democratic rights seem timeless and unsusceptible to the idea of the “living tree.”; This paper will analyze the high-ly controversial debate surrounding prisoner disenfranchisement and assert that voting is a fundamental right in democratic society. Through the analysis of the political objectives as well as the upholding and dissenting judge-ments in Sauvé 2, a decision where the Court held that prisoners have the right to vote un-der section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [...]


Author(s):  
Gabru Naeema

This contribution is a review of a book on actions which may offend religious feelings even if it was not the intention of the offender to do so. This book illustrates how, drawings (amongst others) on the face of it, may be construed to be a mere exercise of the right to freedom of expression or free speech in a democratic society. This is regardless of the content of the drawing which, to other societies, may constitute an offence.  


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Vaidas Jurkevičius ◽  
Jūratė Šidlauskienė

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate a criterion of potential consequences of liability of an Internet portal for unlawful comments of its visitors and set certain general waymarks, which would apply to cases of this kind. Research methodology – The European Court of Human Rights has ruled in four cases (Delfi AS v. Estonia, MTE & Index v. Hungary, Pihl v. Sweden and Tamiz v. the United Kingdom) on whether civil liability can be justified to the website operators for anonymous comments made on their portals that violate the right to privacy. One of the criteria of such evaluation was the possible negative consequences of the civil liability of these entities, but its content and meaning have not been thoroughly studied in the doctrine. Therefore the authors analyse the content of this criterion on the basis of a comparative method. Taking into account the legal context of this study, specific methods of legal interpretation are used in this article (such as, systemic, teleologic, histrorical). Findings – Authors conclude that addressing the civil liability of website operators for damages caused by anonymous comments violating the right to privacy must consider not only the financial, and not only ad hoc, short- and long-term adverse effects of the website operators in general, but the impact of the ruling on the concept of free media and other property and non-material consequences for a democratic society as a whole. Research limitations – This article deals with one criteria for the application of civil liability of website operators for the infringement of an individual’s right to privacy by anonymous comments, that is – the possible negative consequences of the civil liability of these entities. That is the continuation of the authors’ research on the topic of website operator’s liability for unlawful anonymous comments. Practical implications – The research reveals that the consequences of applying the civil liability to the website operator are conditions for assessment of extent of the already existing civil liability; therefore, the criteria of the consequences that arose and / or could arise to website operator are not to be considered as factors justifying the application of civil liability, but rather as factors determining, i.e. extending or limiting, the extent of civil liability. Originality/Value – The vacuum of a consistent concept of assessing the behavior of website operators in response to unlawful comments poses a threat not only to the sustainability of website operators as business or public interest entities, but also to the stability of the legal system as a whole. It is therefore important to disclose the content of elements of assessment of the necessity of restricting the freedom of expression of website operators in a democratic society, which are unregulated and formulated only in the case law of the ECtHR, and which have been applied in national courts for horizontal civil liability claims for anonymous comments. There are no previous research that would focus on these issues.


Author(s):  
Zdravko Planinc

Section 3 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms sets out the democratic rights of Canadian citizens. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein. Donald Smiley has written that “some of the rights contained in the Charter are stated so explicitly that there is little doubt about their meaning and effect,” and that section 3 is one of the best examples of such clarity. But Smiley was wrong. The “meaning and effect” of section 3 has been thrown into doubt by the question whether its guarantee of the right to vote extends to imprisoned criminals. Newfoundland obviously thinks that it does, for in The Charter of Rights Amendment Act 1985, it repealed the traditional prohibition of prisoner voting. Other jurisdictions have chosen to retain the legal prohibition and to defend it against constitutional challenges mounted by inmates of Canadian prisons. The issue is probably headed for the Supreme Court, which will have to decide whether prisoners are full “citizens” within the meaning of section 3, and, if they are, whether a limit on their right to vote can be justified under section 1 as a “reasonable limit, demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.”


1969 ◽  
pp. 625
Author(s):  
Gerald Chipeur

The author considers whether the prerogative priority of the Crown in the collection of debts of equal degree is inconsistent with the guarantee of equality found in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms "Charter." He concludes that the Crown prerogative of priority is not consistent with section 15 and that such prerogative is not a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society under section 1 of the Charter. The author first investigates the origins of the Crown prerogative in general and then the prerogative of priority in particular. The author then proceeds to apply the Charter to the prerogative of priority. The author submits that the purpose of the prerogative priority is to recognize the medieval concept of the personal pre-eminence and superiority of the Queen over her subjects and that such a purpose is inimical to the values promoted by the guarantee of equality found in section 15 of the Charter.


Author(s):  
Natalya OPOLSKA

The article examines the main criteria for the legitimacy of restriction the right to freedom of creation in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular, legitimacy (legality) – the restriction of the right to freedom of creation should be provided for by international and national legislation, the purpose of which is to restrict the right to freedom of creation to be justified, coherent purpose, consistent with the principle proportionality and not to go beyond the bounds of necessity; content – restrictions on the freedom of creation can not be interpreted expanded, correspond to the basic content of freedom of creation and its social purpose. It has been determined that in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights there are various legal positions regarding the restriction of the right to freedom of creation. In order to streamline the practice of applying the Convention, since compliance with the precedent not only meets the requirements of the independence and impartiality of the Court, but also reflects the very essence of judicial policy, consider the most typical decisions of the ECtHR in complaints about limiting the right to freedom of creation. It is concluded that in each case dealt with by the ECtHR, there are grounds for making a decision both in favor of the complainants and in support of governments for limiting the freedom of creativity. The importance of the above mentioned restrictions on the right to freedom of creativity in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is that: - first, they relate to pressing issues concerning the restriction of freedom of creation, as the competence of the right to freedom of expression, which is enshrined in Art. 10 of the Convention; - second, in the cases cited above, the ECtHR ruled that convictions were not in these cases in violation of Article 10 of the Convention and supported the position of national courts in interfering with freedom of expression of the arts; - Thirdly, the decision of the ECHR points to the absence of a single international concept of "public morality", from which it can be concluded that it is expedient to determine the general tendencies in the development of modern morals of mankind; - fourthly, the decision of the ECtHR in complaints concerning the restriction of the right to freedom of creativity, which infringes religious feelings of the population, norms of social ethics and morals, provided that the state intervention was carried out with a high degree of conviction in its expediency, the court turns to the side national courts. Relevant restrictions on the freedom of creativity are considered legitimate if they are aimed at preventing neglect of the feelings of national minorities or believers in protecting the most vulnerable categories of the audience (children) if there is a danger that they may have access to this information. However, we are talking about well-considered decisions, since under the same slogans censorship and other undemocratic institutions can be introduced, and here the important point of the ECHR as a guarantor of the Convention is considered. It is determined that in the European legal tradition, the freedom of creativity is closely connected with the restrictions, the need for which must be proved with a high degree of their legitimacy (legality), proportionality and expediency (purpose). The analysis of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the violation of Article 10 of the Convention made it possible to summarize the case law of the ECHR in the area of restricting the right to freedom of creation and to divide it into three groups, depending on the grounds for interference of the states in the freedom of creativity: Restriction of the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect health; Restrictions on the right to freedom of creativity that are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public security, in order to prevent riots or crimes; Restriction of the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect the reputation or rights of others. When restricting the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect the health or morals of others, the case law of the ECtHR recognizes a broad discretion by the states. In resolving the question of the limits of state intervention in order to protect public morality, the Court proceeds from the absence of a single coherent international concept of "public morality". The limits of freedom of creativity are set by the states in accordance with the norms of social ethics and morals. Relevant restrictions on the freedom of creativity are considered legitimate if they are aimed at preventing neglect of the feelings of national minorities or believers, to protect the most vulnerable categories of the audience (children), etc. (“Müller and Others v. Switzerland”, "Handyside v. Great Britain", "Otto Preminger v. Austria"). The restrictions on creativity in the practice of the ECHR in cases involving encroachments on the democratic foundations of society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public security, in order to prevent riots or crimes are relatively narrower. The precedent of such decisions in assessing the validity of government actions, their determinants of urgent social need, proportionality and compliance with the legitimate aim. When interfering with the right to freedom of creativity, an analysis of the balance between the restrictions that are necessary in a democratic society and the right to freedom of expression are considered. Summing up the practice of the ECHR concerning restrictions on the freedom of creativity that are necessary in a democratic society.


2005 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 491-534
Author(s):  
Denis Buron

Class defamation, for reasons of race, ethnic origin, religion or sex, is in the middle of a confrontation between many rights and liberties : On the one hand, freedom of expression, often considered the most fundamental of them all ; On the other, equality rights, freedom of opinion and the right to security of the person. This conflict may be viewed as a test for freedom of expression, hoping that truth will finally prevail, as well as a challenge for other liberties to be recognized. A choice has to be made : Should we protect expression, or should we protect collectivities from some expression ? The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it is submitted, has already indicated the right direction : Sections 27 and 28, multiculturalism and sex equality, do in fact exclude class defamation from the protected freedom of expression. That which is currently the law of class defamation, as a consequence, will remain. But this might be an unfortunate blessing, since class defamation is virtually non-existent in Canadian law.


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

How should a liberal democracy respond to hate groups and others that oppose the ideal of free and equal citizenship? The democratic state faces the hard choice of either protecting the rights of hate groups and allowing their views to spread, or banning their views and violating citizens' rights to freedoms of expression, association, and religion. Avoiding the familiar yet problematic responses to these issues, this book proposes a new approach called value democracy. The theory of value democracy argues that the state should protect the right to express illiberal beliefs, but the state should also engage in democratic persuasion when it speaks through its various expressive capacities: publicly criticizing, and giving reasons to reject, hate-based or other discriminatory viewpoints. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—expressive and coercive—the book contends that public criticism of viewpoints advocating discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual orientation should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities as speaker, educator, and spender. When the state uses its expressive capacities to promote the values of free and equal citizenship, it engages in democratic persuasion. By using democratic persuasion, the state can both respect rights and counter hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. The book extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.


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