September 11, 2016

2021 ◽  
pp. 208-217
Author(s):  
Jessica DuLong
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
September 11 ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Port Security ◽  
Security Systems ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Port Of New York ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
Evacuation Plan ◽  
First Time

This chapter assesses the overwhelming task of building up Coast Guard security operations after the 9/11 attacks. A decade and a half later, the new captain of the port, Captain Michael Day said that the current culture of vigilance combined with an even stronger “unity of purpose and effort” than that which he extolled in 2001 have created a far safer port. Today's security systems are much more integrated across agencies than they were before. These important, although somewhat intangible, differences between then and now have also been reinforced by the very tangible reality of infrastructure. The Port of New York and New Jersey has received what Day called the “enabling mechanism of fairly robust port security grants.” Not only does the Coast Guard have better tools and equipment, it also has better systems in place for addressing security issues with a multiagency approach. And now, for the first time, there is an actual maritime evacuation plan.

“Okay, I am in charge.”

2021 ◽  
pp. 191-198
Author(s):  
Jessica DuLong
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New Jersey ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Port Authority ◽  
Port Of New York ◽  
Large Vessels

This chapter recounts how, on September 13 at 8 a.m., the Coast Guard reopened the Port of New York and New Jersey, with significant restrictions in place. Commercial and vessel movements required Coast Guard approval. Vessels were subject to Coast Guard boarding and inspection. Meanwhile, large vessels were subject to further restrictions, including mandated advanced notice of arrival; provision of certified crew lists, including nationality; and other constraints. Anchorages remained closed, and commercial port traffic in general was significantly constricted under these new rules. Similar issues confronted land-based traffic as the Port Authority reopened area bridges and tunnels, as well as the bus terminal on that Thursday. Two days of bridge, tunnel, and road closures into Manhattan led to widespread disruption of commercial deliveries of all sorts. The chapter then considers the stories of the mariners who continued finding ways to offer their services after the waterborne evacuation.

“Shut it down! Shut it down!”

2021 ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Jessica DuLong
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New Jersey ◽  
Problem Solving ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Creative Problem Solving ◽  
Shared Purpose ◽  
Port Of New York ◽  
The Face ◽  
Creative Problem ◽  
The U.S

This chapter recounts how, in the face of the massive incident of 9/11, the shared purpose and common ties that connect mariners of all types ruled the day as the different agencies cooperated with civilian boat crews. As it turned out, the lack of a plan wound up setting the stage for creative problem solving and improvisation. Throughout that historic morning, the New York harbor community joined forces to carry out an unprecedented and remarkably successful evacuation effort. As the second attack hit, the U.S. Coast Guard shut down the Port of New York and New Jersey to commercial traffic. Other maritime forces, such as the marine fire company, were also kicked into action.

Non-Importation, 1806–1812

1941 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Heaton
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Federal District ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
District Attorney ◽  
Woolen Cloth ◽  
Port Of New York ◽  
To Come ◽  
First Time

Peter A. Schenck, Surveyor of Customs and Inspector of Revenue for the Port of New York, must have felt slightly exhilarated when he left his office on the evening of December 30, 1807. He had that day wielded for the first time the two-edged sword placed in his hands by Congress for the destruction of British maritime arrogance. Nay more, he had struck at least seven times, by seizing that number of shipments of British goods which had arrived in two vessels ten days before. In a few days Nathan Sanford, the District Attorney, would file seven separate libels in the Federal District Court on behalf of the United States vs. twenty-two bales of woolen cloth, two cases of hats, eight boxes linen cloth, sixteen boxes of linens, one case of woolen hosiery, two cases of plated ware, and two boxes of woolen hosiery. The goods would doubtless be condemned, for Sanford was a clever lawyer and the district judge was not, like the fellow up in Massachusetts, unfriendly to Jeffersonian policies. Later the United States marshal, Peter Curtenius, would have them sold by auction outside the Tontine Coffee House; the court and marshal's costs—totaling about $120 in each case—would be paid, and the balance, where there was any, would be shared equally between the customs staff and the Treasury. If this process could be repeated often enough, John Bull might soon be willing to come to terms.

The Freight Congestion at the Port of New York

1915 ◽  
Vol 113 (26) ◽  
pp. 554-555
Author(s):  
Herbert T. Wade
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Port Of New York

Healthcare and Terrorism: The Lebanese Experience

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Nooreddine Iskandar ◽  
Tatiana Rahbany ◽  
Ali Shokor
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Thematic Analysis ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Common ◽  
First Time

Abstract Background: Due to the common instability caused by political and security issues, Lebanese hospitals have experienced acts of terrorism multiple times. The most recent Beirut Explosion even forced several hospitals to cease operations for the first time in decades—but studies show the preparedness levels for such attacks in similar countries are low. Objective: The aim of this study is to explore the experience of Lebanese hospitals with terrorist attacks. Methods: This qualitative study used semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders to assess their experience with terrorist bombings. Data was analyzed using the thematic analysis method. Results: The researchers found that Lebanese hospitals vary greatly in their structures and procedures. Those differences are a function of 3 contextual factors: location, culture, and accreditation status. Hospitals found near ‘dangerous zones’ were more likely to be aware and to have better response to such events. A severe lack of communication, unity of command, and collaboration between stakeholders has made the process fragmented. Conclusion: The researchers recommend a larger role for the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) in this process, and the creation of a platform where Lebanese organizations can share their experiences to improve preparedness and resilience of the Lebanese healthcare system in the face of terrorism.

scholarly journals EU Operational Powers and Legal Protection: A Legal Theory Perspective on the Operational Powers of the European Border and Coast Guard

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 625-649
Author(s):  
Bas Schotel
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Blind Spot ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Public Power ◽  
Legal Constraints ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

AbstractFor the first time in its history, the EU is in the process of acquiring significant and genuine permanent operational powers. A new Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard provides Frontex with a permanent corps of 10,000 border guards—3,000 of which will be EU agents—its own equipment, and its own competences to intervene along the EU borders and beyond. The operational powers will allow the EU to directly and physically intervene in tangible reality.This Article argues that the conferral of operational powers on the EU poses a risk to individual legal protection. This is because once authorities have acquired operational powers of a certain extent and quality, they can afford to act against or without the law by simply overpowering or eluding the legal mechanisms that normally constrain the exercise of public power. So far, Members of the European Parliament and academics critical of Frontex and the new Regulation have overlooked this issue and concentrated exclusively on how to legally constrain the exercise of operational powers. This Article addresses this blind spot by examining whether and how public law should place legal constraints not only on the exercise but also on the build-up of operational powers.

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