NEARSHORE OPERATIONS RESPONSE STRATEGY: Overcoming Spill Response Challenges in Remote Areas

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 300126
Author(s):  
Mike Popovich ◽  
Tim L. Robertson ◽  
Gary Folley

Conducting oil spill recovery operations in remote regions/environments is a daunting challenge. Increased shipping and oil exploration in the Arctic drives the need for developing innovative ways to mitigate oil spills in remote regions. This includes bolstering near-shore spill response to protect coastal resources. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, in conjunction with the United States Coast Guard, and Alaska oil spill response organizations, has developed a Nearshore Operations Response Strategy (NORS) that provides planners and responders with a framework to plan for and carry out long-term oil removal and shoreline protection strategies in the Alaskan near-shore environment. NORS addresses the logistical challenges that exist when considering sustained operations in remote areas without shore-based support facilities. This strategy begins with tactics developed using best available technology to recover oil and protect resources in the near-shore environment. The components of a Nearshore Response Group designed to implement these tactics over a ten mile radius are described. Finally, the elements of a marine logistical base to support the Group for up to 21 days in remote regions are developed.

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017027
Author(s):  
Tim Gunter

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 711-714
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Timothy P. Holmes ◽  
Norma A. Hernandez Ramirez

ABSTRACT Exercise and evaluation of the Pacific Annex of the Joint Contingency Plan Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons or Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUSPLAN) uncovered a significant need for joint training between spill responders, planners, decision-makers and stakeholders on both sides of our border. Sponsored by U.S. Coast Guard District 11 (USCG Dll) and the Second Mexican Naval Zone (ZN2), a series of training sessions were held for Mexican officials from the Northern Baja California region and Mexico City in early 2003. The first of these well-attended sessions was held in two locations: San Diego, CA and Ensenada, Mexico in February 2003. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Hazmat facilitated the first session, the Joint Mexico-United States Oil Spill Science Forum. It provided a scientific view of oil spills. The following joint session facilitated by USCG Dll and held in Ensenada was a tabletop exercise designed in preparation for the signing of the MEXUSPAC Annex. Through the use of a spill drill scenario, this session included instruction and dialogue about the roles and responsibilities of both U.S. and Mexican spill responders. Both sessions included presentations from several agencies of the Regional Response Team IX/Joint Response Team: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Dept. of the Interior and California's Office of Spill Prevention and Response. Industry partners also contributed topics of discussion, further complementing the U.S. response landscape. Mexican response agencies, including PEMEX, SAGARPA, SEMARNAT and PROFEPA, provided valuable input ensuring dialogue helping to identify additional joint response gaps. Upon the most significant gaps brought to light was the need for additional information regarding dispersant use by Mexican agencies, particularly in light of the approaching international SONS Exercise in April 2004. To this end, USCG Dll and NOAA HAZMAT developed and presented a modified Ecological Risk Assessment for their Mexican counterparts. Hosted by ZN2 in October 2003, this highly successful workshop brought together many key decision makers, planners and stakeholders from both sides of the border to discuss tradeoffs inherent in the use of existing spill response tools, including dispersants. Joint training and discussion sessions such as these are key to ensuring any measure of success in a joint spill response. Several additional training and discussion topics designed for the Mexican-U.S. joint response forum have been identified with many in the planning phase. Acknowledging the similarities as well as differences in response systems of our two nations' is essential to the success of these joint collaborations. Such continued efforts will help bridge existing gaps.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.


1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-224
Author(s):  
Warren G. Hansen ◽  
Ernest Clements ◽  
Elizabeth A. Lundt

ABSTRACT In response to Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Coast Guard regulations, the United States Navy has undertaken a comprehensive program to minimize the potential for land-based oil spills originating from naval shoreline oil storage and handling facilities. Construction and maintenance projects have been begun to prevent land-based oil spills from occurring or from reaching adjacent navigable waters. These projects were preceded by careful policy development, surveys of existing conditions, and analyses of remedial alternatives. Specifically, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command divisions have assisted shoreline activities in the preparation of oil spill prevention, control, and countermeasures (SPCC), and oil spill contingency plans. Improved spill containment and cleanup technologies, as well as improved personnel training, have contributed greatly to the refinement and upgrading of these plans. SCS Engineers (SCS) has been involved in all phases of compliance with these plans. Plan and manual reviews were supplemented by detailed field surveys and subsequent development of remedial projects to be instituted at all deficient facilities. Based on the preliminary recommendations and design sketches prepared for tank farm sites at San Clemente Island, SCS is now providing design and related services for oil spill prevention and control facilities.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017-102
Author(s):  
Scott Knutson ◽  
Craig Dougans

Abstract number: 2017-102The Salish Sea comprises the North American inland marine waters of Washington State and British Columbia; an international border between Canada and the United States intersects it. Planning for oil spills that threaten to cross the international border is under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) as described in the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan. As Canadian companies gain approval to construct new pipelines to move oil-sands-derived crude oil from the landlocked province of Alberta to the tidewater province of British Columbia, governments, agencies and citizens are publicly questioning whether current levels of oil spill preparedness and response equipment will be adequate for the increased tanker traffic from Canadian ports. These stakeholders may likewise be unaware of forthcoming spill prevention and response enhancements, by the Canadian government and industry, associated with new energy infrastructure projects.This paper will expand on a 2014 IOSC paper entitled CANADA – UNITED STATES (SALISH SEA) SPILL RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARISON,1 which was a snapshot of regulations, actual inventories and philosophies that made up the 2014 response picture for the south Salish Sea shared between Canada and the United States. In order to see the entire picture, the reader is encouraged to have both documents at hand.2 The updated paper reviews changes to American Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) and Canadian Response organization (RO) equipment inventories, changes to the Canada Shipping Act 2001, Canada's new Oceans Protection Plan (OPP), United States newly implemented non-floating oil ORSO classification, Washington State's oil spill contingency plans and the future buildup of response equipment and personnel.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker ◽  
Scott R. Knutson ◽  
Andy Nicoll ◽  
Tim Wadsworth

ABSTRACT During the Macondo 252 incident in 2010, it became apparent that the lack of clear guidance to effectively manage the flood of response assistance offered and required from other nations and organizations. To help address these concerns, the U.S. Coast Guard hosted an international ad hoc workgroup after the 2011 International Oil Spill Conference to discuss challenges and issues associated with sharing equipment, technology and expertise among nations and organizations to support a national response authority faced with a significant oil spill exceeding the domestic response capacity. Ideas and recommendations were captured and the need for the development of a comprehensive set of guidelines for International Offers of Assistance (IOA) was formed. The U.S. Coast Guard recognized the importance of establishing these guidelines with a broad, global perspective and proposed the concept to the International Maritime Organization's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). In July 2011, MEPC approved the proposal submitted by the United States, and added this item to the work program of the Technical Working Group of the IMO Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS TG). The OPRC-HNS TG began this work during its 13th session in March 2012, and continues to conduct the bulk of guideline development during intersessional periods via an International Correspondence Group, comprised of a range of national response authorities, spill contractors and industry representatives from around the world. These international guidelines will be available for use by nations as a tool to assist in managing a multitude of requests for and offers of assistance from other countries, regional coordinating bodies, or other entities. This paper summarizes work already completed and still in progress on the development of the IMO International Offers of Assistance Guidelines for oil spills. The ultimate goal for these Guidelines, once completed within the OPRC-HNS TG and approved by MEPC, will be adoption and utilization by IMO Member States, particularly those that are party to OPRC Convention and to the OPRC-HNS Protocol which require States to establish procedures for international cooperation during pollution incidents.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2146-2158
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring

ABSTRACT This paper examines the oil pollution response fund created by Section 311(k) of the 1972 CWA and then modified, culminating with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) established by OPA. Could the CWA have been successful absent the provision for a federal fund? This Fund is now four decades old. Has it passed the “test of time”? Did it meet the goals set at its birth? Is it still relevant? Should it continue? CWA Section 311 and later OPA created a range of response tools to deal with oil and hazmat spills on the waters of the US. They established a public/private solution to spill response. Key components:An expectation that the spiller was responsible and liable to clean up the spill;The National Contingency Plan and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator/FOSC;Establishing expertise on “special teams”: the CG's National Strike Force and EPA's Emergency Response Team;An up-front trust fund available only to the FOSC that pays for removals if the responsible party (RP) does not step forward. The fund exists to:Pre-empt the RP from using delay as a response option, despite the law.Give the FOSC money to quickly hire private response companies, if the RP does not act or if the spill's origin is a mystery. Equally important, the CWA and OPA did NOT designate a government agency to “clean up” oil spills. Rather, the law envisioned private companies performing that role, paid for by the spillers/RP or the 311(k)/OSLTF Fund, under the oversight of the USCG or the EPA. It tasked the USCG with managing this Fund. The Fund achieved its results. The US has a robust private oil spill removal sector that responsible parties hire when needed. If an RP does not act, the CG and EPA FOSCs use the Fund to mobilize those same companies to remove oil spills on US waters. The US economy has grown, as has the number of oil spills reported. Cases each year requiring Fund use have not increased proportionally. Responsible parties continue to clean up their spills, as the CWA envisioned. The Fund retains its ability to respond simultaneously to major spills, even during Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon. In forty two years, the Fund has always been available for an FOSC directed removal. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 311-315
Author(s):  
John Bauer ◽  
Jean Cameron ◽  
Larry Iwamoto

ABSTRACT The Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force (Oil Spill Task Force) and the Alaska Regional Response Team (RRT) are collaborating to develop decision-making and planning guidelines which “operationalize” the International Maritime Organization's Places of Refuge guidelines. These guidelines will incorporate the authorities of the US and Canadian Coast Guards, state, provincial, local, and tribal governments, and resource agencies. The decision-making section of the guidelines provides step-by-step procedures and checklists to analyze the risks of allowing a ship in need of assistance to proceed to a place of refuge. The planning section of the guidelines provides a process to pre-identify information necessary for responding to requests for places of refuge and identifying potential places of refuge prior to an incident. The Oil Spill Task Force effort involves a workgroup of regional stakeholders co-chaired by the Task Force agencies and the US Coast Guard, Pacific Area. The separate Alaska initiative is being accomplished by a workgroup of the Alaska RRT co-chaired by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) and US Coast Guard, District 17. Both projects are developing concurrently and include persons serving as liaisons between the two efforts in order to promote consistency and share information. The Oil Spill Task Force Guidelines provide a template for member states and the province to use in developing decisionmaking and pre-incident plans tailored to their area. The Alaska guidelines were drafted concurrently with the Oil Spill Task Force process, and sections of their guidelines were modified to reflect area-wide conditions. The Oil Spill Task Force's final guidelines are to be used as a planning annex to US Area Contingency Plans on the West Coast. Alaska will include their guidelines in the Federal/State Unified Plan and subarea plans. Transport Canada and Canadian Coast Guard authorities will adapt the guidelines as appropriate for Canada.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 743-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael de Bettencourt

ABSTRACT An act of terrorism resulting in an oil spill triggers a unique set of response considerations that bring diverse agencies together under crisis conditions. To manage such incidents effectively, a systematic approach is needed to standardize incident response, command, and control methods and to better define the planning process for these demanding scenarios. The National Interagency Incident Management System-Incident Command System (NIIMS-ICS) is the common denominator that has been adopted by the United States Coast Guard for oil spill response. This paper highlights recommendations to adopt the NIIMS-ICS nationally for combined law enforcement and environmental response incidents to ensure efficient and effective response methods.


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