scholarly journals Research on Government Subsidy Strategies for the Development of Agricultural Products E-Commerce

Agriculture ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 1152
Author(s):  
Yaoguang Zhong ◽  
Ivan Ka Wai Lai ◽  
Fangfang Guo ◽  
Huajun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Agricultural Research ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Agricultural Cooperatives ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Profit Model ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
The Government

In many countries, the governments support the development of local agriculture through subsidization. Subsidizing the sales of agricultural products through E-commerce channels is a way to support the development of agriculture in China. This study aims to develop a profit model and apply Stackelberg game theory to determine which type of subsidies and decision-making can provide the maximum benefits for agricultural products E-commerce supply chains. The results indicate that for both centralized decisions and decentralized decisions, the subsidizing to the agricultural cooperative is better than the subsidizing to consumers and no subsidization. The sales volume, preservation level, sales efforts, and overall profit of the agricultural products E-commerce supply chain are significantly higher. It suggests that the government should play a leading role to support the development of agricultural products E-commerce. This study contributes to agricultural research by developing a profit model to examine the effects of different government subsidy strategies on each member of the agricultural online shopping supply chain. Recommendations are provided for agricultural cooperatives, E-commerce platforms, and the government to improve the quality and sales of agricultural products through online shopping channels.

scholarly journals Effect of government subsidies on supply chain decision-making and coordination in the context of COVID-19

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wuyong Qian ◽  
Sen Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Welfare Level ◽  
Coordination Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Considering the two-stage supply chain composed of a leading retailer and a manufacturer under the background of the COVID-19 epidemic, the retailer determines the anti-epidemic effort level and bears the corresponding costs, and the manufacturer determines the cost-sharing rate under the coordination strategy. This paper analyses the pricing decision, anti-epidemic effort level and cost-sharing rate of supply chain under different government subsidy measures and coordination strategies. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the applicability of the conclusion and the model. From the perspective of Stackelberg game, we find that under the background of the epidemic, government subsidy measures, coordination strategies and increasing marginal income of anti-epidemic efforts are conducive to higher anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level. And the government can obtain the maximum anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level by subsidising manufacturers with cost sharing.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zi-yuan Zhang ◽  
Duan-xiang Fu ◽  
Qing Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Preference Behavior ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

Game Analysis on Problem of Food Safety in the Agricultural Products Supply Chain

2010 ◽  
Vol 20-23 ◽  
pp. 1040-1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Hua Shi ◽  
Zi Lai Sun ◽  
Kun Jing Dong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Food Safety ◽  
Health And Safety ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Basic Material ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Survival And Development ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Government ◽  
Material Conditions

Food is the most basic material conditions of survival and development of human society, its security situation is relation to the health and safety of consumer directly. This paper analyze the reasons of causing problems of food quality and safety in the agricultural products supply chain from the perspective of the game theory as well as the government incentive and regulatory mechanisms affect the decision-making of farmers and food producers respectively. In the game between crop growers - farmers and food producers, the government play the outsider role and should give farmers subsidies to encourage them to grow high-quality green crops, as far as possible to ensure food safety from the source. In the game between producers and regulators, the government, as the game participant, should be asked to improve the supervision efficiency and the control ability to prevent unqualified food products entering the market.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing and Green Product Design Strategies in a Sustainable Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Different Channel Power Structures

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (22) ◽  
pp. 12446
Author(s):  
Kelei Xue ◽  
Guohua Sun ◽  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Shuiye Niu
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Design Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Green Product Design

Green product design is a vital measure to support sustainable development in a circular economy era. This paper studies the multi-product pricing and green product design strategies under different supply chain structures and government subsidy strategies. Considering different channel leadership, we establish the centralized (C), manufacturer-led (MS), and retailer-led (RS) supply chain models, respectively. By applying a game-theoretical approach, corresponding equilibrium pricing, green product design, and government subsidy decisions under different supply chain structures are obtained. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we find that: (1) the different subsidy strategies of the government have an important impact on green product development. When the government provides a uniform subsidy strategy, a RS supply chain can bring greener product, more market demands, more profit, and more social welfare; (2) when the government provides a differentiated subsidy strategy, MS and RS supply chain structures can bring greener product and more market demand than the centralized supply chain. They can also bring the same social welfare and the same product to the green design level. However, the MS supply chain structure can bring more profit for the firm; (3) the consumers’ green awareness positively impacts the design and development of green product. Therefore, it is beneficial for the firm to adopt reasonable measures to boost the environmental awareness of consumers in order to realize the sustainable development of our society.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder ◽  
Subrata Saha
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

Construction of New Circulation Model for Green Supply Chain of Agricultural Products in China

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-230
Author(s):  
Syed Shahid Khan ◽  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Rural Economy ◽  
Circulation Model ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Circulation Mode ◽  
The People ◽  
Green Development ◽  
Green Production ◽  
The Government

With the continuous development of China's agricultural economy, the concept of green production has begun to penetrate into the hearts of the people. Exploring a new circulation mode adapted to China's green supply chain of agricultural products is an important way to promote green production in China, and also an important condition to promote the successful transformation and development of China's rural economy. But in the process of building a green supply chain of agricultural products and exploring circulation mode, there are many problems that hinder the development of green industry economy. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to play a guiding role and actively guide farmers to explore green development ways and new circulation mode to meet their own development needs, which provides reference for better optimizing the new circulation mode of agricultural products supply chain in China.

scholarly journals Research on an Enterprise Remanufacturing Strategy Based on Government Intervention

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 6549
Author(s):  
Jian Cao ◽  
Jiayun Zeng ◽  
Yuting Yan ◽  
Xihui Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Green Supply Chain Management ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
The Government

Due to rapid economic development and population growth, environmental pollution problems such as urban pollution and depletion of natural resources have become increasingly prominent. Municipal solid waste is part of these problems. However, waste is actually an improperly placed resource. As a part of green supply chain management, remanufacturing can turn waste products into remanufactured products for resale. Based on the development status of China’s remanufacturing industry, this paper establishes three Stackelberg game models, namely the free recycling model (model N), the government regulation model based on the reward–penalty mechanism (model G), and the government dual-intervention model (model GF). In this study, the standard solution method for the Stackelberg game method, namely the backward induction method, is applied to solve the dynamic game equilibrium. For comparison, a further numerical analysis is also carried. The research results show that: (1) in the closed-loop supply chain based on remanufacturing, the strengthening of cooperation between manufacturers and remanufacturers is beneficial in terms of maximizing supply chain profits; (2) in order to maximize social benefits, the government needs to intervene in green supply chain management; (3) government regulation is particularly important when the remanufacturing industry is in the initial stage of development; (4) government intervention needs to be based on the development level of the remanufacturing industry; (5) in order to maximize social benefits, it is recommended that the government consider the ratio between the green consumption subsidies and the taxes on new products.

Influence of the Chinese Government Subsidy Policies on Supply Chain Members’ Profits: An Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 623-632
Author(s):  
Ran Zhang ◽  
◽  
Jie Lin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Modeling And Simulation ◽  
Agent Based Modeling ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Demand Model ◽  
Profit Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Impact

The series of subsidy policies launched by the Chinese government has affected supply chain members’ profits distribution. To explore this influence, an agent-based model was designed, and experiments were conducted under different subsidy levels. Our model focused on the ordinary business entities and their activities in the supply chain. By investigating the real world and other researchers’ studies, agent simulation class library (e.g., control agents, cooperation/collaboration agents, and fractal simulation agents) and their decision knowledge bases were designed to simulate the supply chain members’ behaviors, decision processes, and operation and production activities and behaviors. Price model, demand model and profit model under the subsidy were built to evaluate the supply chain members’ profits under different subsidy scenarios. Finally, a multi-echelon appliance supply chain model was constructed, and experiments were performed with different levels of subsidy limit. Results showed that the supply chain members’ profits increased under the government subsidy policy. The agent-based modeling and simulation method provides a novel approach to explore the impact on profit distribution.

An Uncertain Supply Chain Problem with Sales Effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (7) ◽  
pp. 1037-1045
Author(s):  
Lengceng Gao ◽  
◽  
Jiayu Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Operating Costs ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Uncertain Variables ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Uncertain Supply ◽  
Constrained Models ◽  
Chain Problem

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain problem that includes a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer plays a leading role in the supply chain and must make efforts to increase sales. Due to many uncertain factors in business, the market demand, manufacturing costs and retail operating costs are assumed to be uncertain variables. Expected and chance-constrained models are developed to address these uncertain variables. Stackelberg game is used to solve the proposed models. The equilibrium optimal wholesale price and unit margin are provided in order to determine the maximum profit. Finally, numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models.

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