The semantics of the Dyirbal avoidance style

Alongside the everyday speech style, Dyirbal had an avoidance style called Jalnguy, which had to be used in the presence of relatives with whom direct contact should be avoided. The two styles had identical grammar, phonology, and phonetics, but every lexeme was different. Jalnguy was pitched at a more general level so that, in many cases, several lexemes in the everyday style would be grouped under one term in Jalnguy. For example, six varieties of oak tree would each have its own name in the everyday style, but fell together under one Jalnguy term.Examination of the Jalnguy correspondences given for adjectives shows that the Jalnguy lexicon is less rich and less well-developed when dealing with adjectives than with verbs and nouns. There are, of course, Jalnguy correspondents Ev adjectives expressing the most common qualities, found across languages world-wide. There are a number of many-to-one everyday-to-Jalnguy correspondences, which can be semantically revealing. Speakers provided sentential definitions for some adjectives (in terms of verbs), often quite ingenious. But for many everyday style adjectives referring to rather recondite qualities, my consultants could offer no appropriate Jalnguy term. What they did instead was provide an evaluative judgment, most often 'not good', sometimes 'good' (or occasionally a dimensional description, 'big' or 'little'). The principle of not using any everyday style words in Jalnguy discourse was thus maintained by commenting on the worth of a quality, rather that specifying what the quality is.

Multiple feedback sources in learning clinical history-taking skills: Developing evaluative judgement

Introduction: Contemporary feedback models emphasise the value of multiple feedback opportunities. Effective feedback participation requires evaluative judgement—the ability to discern the quality of one’s own and others’ work. Self and peer assessment may enable repeated practice and feedback for developing evaluative judgement. However, attitudes to self and peer assessment may present a barrier to effective implementation. This study explored whether congruence between marks from self and peer assessment improved with assessment task participation. Participants’ attitudes towards self and peer assessment and approaches to learning were also evaluated.Methods: Participants undertook simulated history-taking tasks in semester 2, 2018. Group 1 undertook formative and summative assessments and participated in self and peer assessment . Group 2 undertook formative and summative assessment. Group 3 undertook only summative assessment. All groups received faculty feedback for each submitted assessment. Participants completed the modified Study Process Questionnaire (mSPQ) and the Peer Perception of Assessment (PPA) before (T1) and after the formative task (T2) and after the summative task (T3).Results: Summative task scores improved for group 1 (n = 9, p 0.01) and group 2 (n = 26, p 0.01). Within-group (p = 0.02) and between-group differences (p = 0.01) were identified for surface learning approaches. All groups’ perceptions of peer assessment decreased significantly (p 0.01) across all three time periods.Conclusions: Participants receiving self and peer assessment and faculty feedback improved performance and increased congruence of their self- and peer-assessment marks, potentially developing their evaluative judgment skills. Peer assessment perception became less positive, while surface learning approaches increased. Future research should assess the role of self and peer assessment in developing evaluative judgment.

Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research in Evaluative Judgment

The value of students developing the capacity to accurately judge the quality of their work and that of others has been widely studied and recognized in higher education literature. To date, much of the research and commentary on evaluative judgment has been theoretical and speculative in nature, focusing on perceived benefits and proposing strategies seen to hold the potential to foster evaluative judgment. The efficacy of the strategies remains largely untested. The rise of educational tools and technologies that generate data on learning activities at an unprecedented scale, alongside insights from the learning sciences and learning analytics communities, provides new opportunities for fostering and supporting empirical research on evaluative judgment. Accordingly, this paper offers a conceptual framework and an instantiation of that framework in the form of an educational tool called RiPPLE for data-driven approaches to investigating the enhancement of evaluative judgment. Two case studies, demonstrating how RiPPLE can foster and support empirical research on evaluative judgment, are presented.

Evaluative Judgment Across Domains

Evaluative judgment—i.e., assessing to what degree a stimulus is liked or disliked—is a fundamental aspect of cognition, facilitating comparison and choosing among alternatives, deciding, and prioritizing actions. Neuroimaging studies have shown that evaluative judgment involves the projection of sensory information to the reward circuit. To investigate whether evaluative judgments are based on modality-specific or modality-general attributes, we compared the extent to which balance, contour, symmetry, and complexity affect liking responses in the auditory and visual modalities. We found no significant correlation for any of the four attributes across sensory modalities, except for contour. This suggests that evaluative judgments primarily rely on modality-specific sensory representations elaborated in the brain’s sensory cortices and relayed to the reward circuit, rather than abstract modality-general representations. The individual traits art experience, openness to experience, and desire for aesthetics were associated with the extent to which design or compositional attributes influenced liking, but inconsistently across sensory modalities and attributes, also suggesting modality-specific influences.

Ethics in the GDPR: A Blueprint for Applied Legal Theory

Ethics is seen as a critical resource for data law. But beyond this almost slogan-like truism, the exact functions which ethics might play in data law are often left unclear. This contribution clarifies the ways in which data ethics and data law are intertwined and, on this basis, offers guidelines for practitioners in terms of interpreting the GDPR. Two types of norms allow for modulation between the law and ethics of data. The first type of norms is the ‘principles’ of the GDPR. Ethical resources can be used for the interpretation of these norms using a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium approach. The second type of norms is evaluative judgment norms, the most well-known of which derive from the characteristically risk-based responsibility that the GDPR bestows on controllers. For these evaluative norms, ethical resources could be used in three different functions: as a tool for the identification and assessment of risks, as a resource for improving data controller processes, and as the basis for the codes of conduct foreseen by the GDPR. These three potential modulations between ethics and the law of data help controllers of data make sense of their responsibilities in light of the GDPR’s requirements.

TEACHING ENGLISH VOCABULARY TO THE FIRST-YEAR STUDENTS MAJORING IN ORIENTAL PHILOLOGY

This publication is a detailed lesson plan on the topic “Power and Money” within the course of the English language taught as the second foreign language to the first-year students majoring in the oriental languages. The lesson focuses on enhancing topical vocabulary through practicing speaking, listening, reading, and writing skills. It also aims at developing students’ skills of reasoning and evaluative judgment. The tasks are introduced in the plan in accordance with the principles of the contemporary communicative student-oriented approach to teaching foreign languages.

The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience

Some philosophers claim that emotions are, at best, hindrances to the discovery of evaluative truths, while others omit them entirely from their epistemology of value. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. Drawing an evaluative parallel with Frank Jackson’s Mary case, I show there is a distinctive way in which emotions epistemically enhance evaluative judgment. This is, in fact, a conclusion philosophers of emotion have been eager to endorse. However, after considering several influential proposals—such as the view that emotions generate evaluative concepts, or the view that emotions justify evaluative beliefs on the model of perception—I conclude that the most promising contender is the notion that emotional experience acquaints us with evaluative properties.