‘Something of an Autobiography’

In this chapter I wish to place the short but exceptionally rich and important life of Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–69) in the context of the most vital events of his deeply consequential life. Born during the waning years of the Qajar dynasty (1789–1925) and dead at the age of forty-six, soon after the June 1963 uprising of Ayatollah Khomeini against Mohammad Reza Shah, Al-e Ahmad lived an enduringly influential life, leaving his indelible mark on the fate of his homeland. His intellectual and political career began at a very young age in his late teens, and he died of a sudden stroke at the prime of his literary and intellectual productivities.

NHÂN VẬT NỮ TRONG TRUYỆN NGẮN “TRE RỪNG” CỦA LYNH BACARDI

Thế kỷ XXI phát triển với những thành tựu của khoa học kỹ thuật, sự phổ biến của máy tính, cách mạng mạng hóa, mạng xã hội, viễn thông hoá, cùng những đại sự kiện xã hội như: Đánh sập bức tường Berlin, vụ ám sát tổng thống Mỹ Jonh F. Kennedy, vụ giáo chủ Iran Ayatollah Khomeini tuyên bố tử hình vắng mặt nhà văn Salman Rushdie, sự cố Holocaust… Tất cả đã tạo nên hỗn mang và mất niềm tin vào đại tự sự của con người hậu hiện đại. Trong xã hội ấy hiện lên những con người “dửng dưng với tất cả những gì đang diễn ra xung quanh mình”, cô đơn, lạc lõng. Nhưng trong sâu thẳm họ vẫn khát khao được yêu thương, được trân trọng, được bình đẳng (đặc biệt là phụ nữ). Và ở nơi ấy, tình người vẫn còn đang hiện hữu.

Watching Khomeini

The fall of the Shah of Iran is often quoted as a significant intelligence failure, this chapter focuses on Ayatollah Khomeini and the CIA analysis and assessments of this key individual. The chapter provides a potted biography of Khomeini, including his influence whilst in a series of exiles from Iran, whilst also detailing the misguided CIA analysis at the time of the extent of his influence within Iran, and how they evolved over time. The chapter concludes with a short overview of contact US officials had with Khomeini and his key advisers. Document: The Politics of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Systematization and the Model of Political Management in Contemporary Iranian Thinker’s Idea

The present article, with its analytical-descriptive method, will consideration the thought of the most prominent systematization thinkers of Iran in the contemporary era. Examining the opinions of some thinkers throughout history, it will be shown that some of them have always sought political systematization and a model of political management for the societies. Their goal and aspiration from the past to the present was achieve the societies and human beings to the happiness. The efforts of thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Farabi, Khajeh Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Moore, Will Durant, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Popper, Russell, etc., indicate this situation. Among Iranian thinkers of the contemporary era also many efforts were made to achive the political systematization and the model of political management. Akhundzadeh, Malek Khan, Talibuv Tabrizi, Ayatollah Mirza Naeini, Ahmad Kasravi, Mohammad Ali Foroughi and Ayatollah Khomeini are among the thinkers who have theorized in this field and each of them has provided a model of political management for Iranian society. In the following, their thoughts will be investigated.

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY OF ALI AKBAR HASHEMI RAFSANJANI

The paper analyzes the political and religious activities of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the most famous politicians of modern Iran. His political and religious activities from youth to the end of his life are subject of the study. In particular, three periods of hislife are of interest here: his acquaintance with Ayatollah Khomeini and studying, religious activity before the Islamic revolution, and religious activity after the Islamic revolution. It is clear that Rafsanjani paid much attention to the study of the Quran and Islamic law, and after the Islamic revolution, he sought to promote religious ideas and Islamic legal regulations among Iranians. At the same time, after the revolution, Rafsanjani became very actively involved in the political life of Iran, occupying key positions in the main government bodies, including the presidency, as a result of what his own religious activity decreased significantly, although he nonetheless sought to combine politics and religion. The paper states that Rafsanjani took a moderate and pragmatic political position and changed his views depending on the circumstances in which the country found itself.

QUESTION ON THE WOMEN IDJITIHAD AND RELIGIOUS MENTORSHIP IN RELIGIOUS PRACTICES OF IRANIAN SHIITES

The article examines the question of the women religious mentorship in modern Iran. It is shown that Iranian theologians differed in their opinion whether a woman can be a religious mentor (marja): many of them supported it, others agreed to it only if she should mentor other women, and many others, including Ayatollah Khomeini, opposed it. Brief biographies of two most prominent female marjas are given: those of Nesrat Amin and Zahra Sefati. Both of them received a permission to interpret Islamic texts from distinguished Iranian ayatollahs. With theirinitiative and eagernessfor knowledge, they managed to succeed in Shiite theology and their works were highly regarded by Iranian ayatollahs. It is evident that their activities were closely linked to important events that happened in Iranian society during their lifetime: the Constitutional Revolution, anti-religious Shah regime, Islamic Revolution. Currently due to increase in the education and social activity among women, a need arose to officially allow women to become marja. Today, in Iran there works the Women Council on Islamic Law, what allows to expand the role of women in development of Islamic Law

Sunni and Shiite Political Thought of Islam State Relationship: A Comparison between Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia and Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran

This paper discusses how the Indonesian Sunni Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid and the Iranian Shiite Muslim leader Ayatollah Khomeini responded to the debate about the relationship between Islam and the state. Their responses impacted on the struggle of Indonesian and Iranian Muslims in considering the ideological basis of Indonesian and Iranian states. On the one hand, Wahid with his educational and social background and Indonesian political context rejected the concept of an Islamic state. He did not agree with the formalization of Islamic sharia. To implement his idea, he promoted the idea of Pribumisasi Islam. For Wahid, islamization was not arabization. Khomeini, on the other hand, believed that Islam is a religion that has complete laws and way of life including social rules. According to Khomeini, to effectively implement these rules, Muslims need to have executive power. In Khomeini’s view, when the Quran calls for Muslims to obey Allah, the messenger, and ulil amri, this means that Allah instructs Muslims to create an Islamic state. To realise his views, Khomeini proposed the doctrine of Velayat-e al Faqeeh. Thus, different religious-political contexts of these two leaders contributed to their different responses to the relationship between Islam and the state.

Faded networks: the overestimated Saudi Legacy of anti-Shi‘i sectarianism in Pakistan

This article questions the often-assumed centrality of Saudi Arabia for the development of anti-Shi‘i sectarianism in Pakistan. I argue that those groups and individuals who have been most vocal about the Shi‘i ‘threat’ since the 1980s lacked (and continue to lack) any strong lineages with the Kingdom. Instead, their local polemics in Urdu foregrounded Pakistan as a political idea and global promise for Islam. This status of Pakistan’s self-view was acutely threatened by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent establishment of a religious state under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. Consequently, Pakistani sectarian scholars transcended earlier Salafi-inspired arguments and tried to render Sunni Islam ‘fit’ to compete with powerful Shi‘i symbols. In doing so, they displayed a remarkable willingness to appropriate and rework Shi‘i concepts, something that is far from the mind of Saudi clerics.