scholarly journals O Conflito de Agência nos Conselhos Municipais: Uma análise à luz das Transformações Organizacionais / Agency Conflict in Municipal Councils: An analysis in light of Organizational Transformations

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (11) ◽  
pp. 102490-102501
Author(s):  
Leonardo Augusto De Campos ◽  
Adriana Perroni Ballerini ◽  
António César Galhardi
Keyword(s):  
Agency Conflict

Pengaruh Mekanisme Konflik Keagenan Terhadap Kinerja Perusahaan (Studi di Pasar Modal Indonesia Periode Tahun 2004-2010)

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Teguh Prasetyo
Keyword(s):  
Service Sector ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Control Variable ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Pooled Data ◽  
Independent Variable

This research aims to test of agency theory in Indonesian Stock Exchange as proxy variables within agency conflict mechanism for firm performance. It is used secondary data from Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) and OSIRIS include all industry manufacture, exclude insurance and finace service sector. It's appropriate sampling criteria's and listing in Indonesian Stock Exchange. Then, using pooled data with observation period 2004th round to 2010th. Variables used in this study is the first Asset Utility as agency cost as dependent variabel. The second variabels is dividen, leverage, institutional ownership as mechanism variables to agency conflict as independent variable. Then, the control variable used firm size. The method of analysis used in this study is multiple regression of pooled data analysis. The results of this study is a positive effect dividend to company's performace of the first. Then, the second is a positive impact leverage to company's performace. The last is a positive impact institutional ownership to company's performace. With the result that, mechanism varibles of agency conflict has been play function of binding and oversight of agency conflict.

Auditors and the Principal-Principal Agency Conflict in Family Controlled Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Michel Magnan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
The Public ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This paper examines whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect audit fees in firms where the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) is a family. Results show that there is a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence, number, and voting power of MLS. This is consistent with the view that auditors consider MLS as playing a monitoring role over the LCS, mitigating the potential for expropriation by the LCS. Therefore, our evidence suggests that auditors reduce their audit risk assessment and audit effort and ultimately audit fees in family controlled firms with MLS. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; M42; D86.

“Imperialism” in Bureaucracy

1966 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 943-951 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Holden
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
The Political ◽  
Systematic Data ◽  
Administrative Organization ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Holding Company ◽  
Internal Politics ◽  
The World ◽  
Critical Problems ◽  
The Moment

If an important part of the political scientist's mission is to anticipate and explain “the critical problems that generate turbulence” in that part of the world which attracts his attention, then, in the study of administration, bureaucratic “imperialism” must be of compelling interest. If systematic data directly assembled for the purpose are lacking, and if there are some signal problems of theory which have been little investigated, there is still enough evidence from studies of other political problems that it seems worthwhile to set out some trial-run ideas in the hope that they will elicit further discussion.Bureaucractic imperialism seems pre-eminently a matter of inter-agency conflict in which two or more agencies try to assert permanent control over the same jurisdiction, or in which one agency actually seeks to take over another agency as well as the jurisdiction of that agency. We are thus primarily concerned with the politics of allocation and shall, except incidentally, bypass some other interesting aspects of inter-agency politics such as cooperation between agencies sharing missions, competition for favorable “one-time-only” decisions which do not involve jurisdictional reallocation, or the critical problems of the “holding company” administrative organization and its internal politics. For the moment, our concern with the politics of allocation leads to a focus on what would appear to be the likely behaviors of those decisionmakers who have both inclination and opportunity to look after the institutional well-being of agencies.

scholarly journals Balanced Scorecard: estudo sobre sua utilização como instrumento de gestão na empresa Novo Nordisk no Brasil

ForScience ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Edmar Souza Moreira ◽  
Wagner de Paulo Santiago ◽  
Igor Veloso Colares Batista
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Balanced Scorecard ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
The Balanced Scorecard ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Pharmaceutical Production

Difundido entre empresas de todo o mundo, o Balanced Scorecard, três décadas após a sua criação, continua sendo um instrumento utilizado pelas empresas para gestão do  Planejamento Estratégico. Este estudo tem o objetivo de analisar a utilização prática do Balanced Scorecard como instrumento de gestão do Planejamento Estratégico na empresa Novo Nordisk Produção Farmacêutica do Brasil Ltda., identificando pontos de divergência em relação à teoria criada por Kaplan e Norton nos anos 90. Para a realização da pesquisa, foi adotada a abordagem metodológica empírico analítica, com a condução de estudo de caso em uma unidade fabril da empresa localizada em Montes Claros – MG. Foram feitas 19 entrevistas semiestruturadas com diretores e gerentes e aplicados 207 questionários aos demais funcionários. Os resultados mostraram que entre os gestores da empresa existe um conhecimento comum em relação às premissas para definição do Planejamento Estratégico e  um alinhamento sobre o Balanced Scorecard.  Contrariamente ao exposto por Kaplan e Norton sobre as etapas de criação do Balanced Scorecard, verificou-se que o processo na Novo Nordisk em Montes Claros é desenvolvido de forma inversa, primeiro são recebidas as metas advindas da matriz, para então ser desenvolvido o Planejamento Estratégico que levará ao atingimento destas metas. A pesquisa mostrou ainda as adaptações feitas pela empresa em estudo ao modelo proposto por Kaplan e Norton, de forma a minimizar as barreiras oriundas do conflito de agência que podem levar ao insucesso na obtenção dos resultados esperados para as metas definidas no Planejamento Estratégico das organizações.Palavras-chave: Balanced scorecard. Metas. Planejamento Estratégico.Balanced Scorecard: study on its use as a management instrument in Novo Nordisk company in BrazilAbstractDiffused among companies around the world, the Balanced Scorecard continues to be an instrument used by the companies to manage the Strategic Planning, even three decades after its creation. This study aims to analyze the practical use of the Balanced Scorecard as an instrument for the management of Strategic Planning in Novo Nordisk Produção Farmacêutica do Brasil Ltda (Novo Nordisk Pharmaceutical Production of Brazil Ltda), identifying points of divergence from the theory created by Kaplan and Norton in the 1990s. To develop the research, the analytical empirical methodological approach was adopted, with the conduction of a case study at a company unit located in Montes Claros - MG. There were 19 semi-structured interviews with directors and managers and 207 questionnaires were applied to the other employees. The results showed that among the managers of the company there is a common knowledge regarding the premises for the definition of Strategic Planning and also an alignment on the Balanced Scorecard. Contrary to what Kaplan and Norton presented about the stages of the creation of the Balanced Scorecard, it was verified that the process at Novo Nordisk in Montes Claros is developed in an inverse way: first, the goals coming from the head quarter are received. Then the Strategic Planning, which will lead to the attainment of these goals, is developed. The research also showed the adaptations made by the company under study to the model proposed by Kaplan and Norton, in order to minimize the barriers from the agency conflict that can lead to the failure to obtain the expected results for the goals defined in the Strategic Planning of the organizations.Keywords: Balanced Scorecard. Goals. Strategic Planning.  

scholarly journals Reaksi Pasar atas Manajemen Laba

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Fery Friyo Handoko ◽  
Mu'minatus Sholichah
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Abnormal Return ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Manufacturing Company ◽  
Simple Regression

Abstract This research examine the capital market reaction on earnings management.  Agency conflict represented by information asymetry caused earnings management.  Managers have incentive to play accounting method and estimate to gain certain amount of earnings.  Hereafter, investor have interest regarding their invesment decision.  They rely on accounting information that represented in financial statement.Based on premise in Signalling Theory, we then hypothesized that investor would response any information addressed to them.Sample and population that used to test hypothesis taken from listed manufacturing company during 2015-2017.  We documenting data from financial statement items.  We obtain 40 manufacturing company that comply to purposive sampling requirement.  We use simple regression to do data analysis.  We found the empirical evidence that market reac the earnings management indication.  There is empirical fact that cummulative abnormal return decreas when determinate by discretionarry accruals.  This research conclude that market reacting the earnings management indication generally.

scholarly journals Legal Deterrent Strategy Against Illegal Management Actions

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 98-104
Author(s):  
S I Lutsenko
Keyword(s):  
Agency Costs ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Main Principle ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Flexible System ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Management Actions ◽  
Legal Strategy ◽  
Corporate Legislation

The author considers legal strategy of restriction from illegal actions of the management, allowing to protect interests of shareholders. The author analyzes the agency problem between shareholders and management in the corporate legislation through a prism of legal strategy. The shareholder of the company possesses powers which allow it with a view of efficiency achievement as independently, and under the responsibility to appoint to (choose) the management. The management is allocated with large powers. Legal strategy of restraint assumes co-ordination of actions of management and the shareholder, allowing to lower the agency costs connected with wrongful acts (infringements of the fiduciary duties) from management. In the corporate legislation main principle is the priority of interests of the company in whole (the corporate blessing) over interests of other participants of corporate relations. The key role is played by the control of the shareholder of actions of management within the limits of legal strategy of restraint. The effective and flexible system of compensation allows to lower level of the agency conflict between management and the shareholder of the company. The motivation program should be focused on important long-term objectives of the company. Compensation directly is connected with results of activity of the company and professionalism of its management. A part of legal strategy of restraint is use of fiduciary rates which protect interests of the shareholder as a class. The legislation demands, that the management acted in good fair and reasonably in interests of the company. The author focuses the companies on provision of independence as a part of controls for the purpose of decrease in the agency conflict between management and participants of the company. The legal strategy of restraint offered by the author, allows to soften the agency conflict between interests of a management and interests of participants of the company.

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