Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Ann Whittle

The introduction sets the scene for the book by outlining the key questions to be investigated. Are we free? Are we morally responsible for what we do? What is it that we deserve? When is it right to blame someone for a morally wrong action? It introduces basic key terms within the debate regarding freedom and moral responsibility, such as ‘determinism’, ‘compatibilism’, and ‘incompatibilism’, and then outlines the structure of argument for the central claim of the book, namely that there is no truth regarding whether or not determinism is compatible with freedom and moral responsibility. There is only a truth relative to some context of utterance.

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 33-50
Author(s):  
M. N. Abdulsada

This paper explores how academic webinars are translanguaged by drawing on the sort of linguistic strategies and techniques implicated in these webinars. The research, therefore, poses two key questions relevant to how knowledge is communicated and what strategies are used in this communication. The main hypothesis of the research maintains that academic webinars communicate knowledge from a single professional presenter to many knowledge-receiving attendees, based on a presupposed view that presenters and moderators in webinars adhere to certain linguistic and conversational moves. To explore how academic webinars proceed and what they imply, a single academic webinar is randomly sampled for analysis. First, academic webinars are analyzed, key terms defined, and some previous literature on the topic overviewed. Then, the sampled webinar is administered for analysis (gathering, transcription, analysis), and a discourse-conversational model of analysis is applied. The author concludes that webinars are knowledge-specific and highly professional in their character, and they manifest certain linguistic and discourse strategies. The research also reveals that webinars feature such strategies as reformulation, mono-versation, on-screen sharing, speaker invisibility, indirect engagement, inactive moderation, and graphic interaction. Further recommendations suggest a more linguistic investigation into online learning, whether in webinars, online workshops, massive open online courses, or in any virtual learning practices.


The debate about whether moral responsibility has an epistemic condition has traditionally focused on whether and, if so, when moral ignorance can provide an excuse for wrong actions. This chapter takes up the question of moral responsibility for right actions. Its central claim is that whether an agent is morally responsible for her right action depends on whether she knows what the right thing is to do. The chapter’s argument for this appeals to considerations from the philosophy of action. It argues that moral knowledge matters to moral evaluations because it is a central ingredient in intentional action. Our knowledge of what the right and wrong thing is to do partly determines whether we do the right or wrong thing intentionally. Moral responsibility inherits its epistemic condition from the epistemic condition on intentional action.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Montminy

I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a person performs an action A freely, then she thereby knows that she is doing A. The epistemic condition is thus built into the freedom condition. The second challenge contends that no epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, since a person may be blameworthy for an action that she did not know was wrong. The third challenge invokes the quality of will view. On this view, a person is blameworthy for a wrong action just in case the action manifests a bad quality of will. The blameworthy person need not satisfy an additional epistemic condition. I will argue that contrary to appearances, none of these challenges succeeds. Hence, moral responsibility does require a non-superfluous epistemic condition.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele

This chapter introduces the book’s central question: What can we learn about the nature of moral responsibility from thought experiments involving manipulation and related thought experiments featuring designed agents? Various alternative positions on that question are described, and some of the key terms of the discussion are defined, including compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, and libertarianism. Guidance is offered on how the author uses some other key terms, including free will, intuition, and moral responsibility. The technical terms internalism and externalism are introduced, and various kinds of internalism and externalism are distinguished. Work by Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane is discussed to help set the stage for subsequent chapters.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcelo Fischborn

[Note: articles are in English; Intro, Discussion, and Conclusion are in Portuguese.] Responsibility practices that are part of our daily lives involve, among other things, standards about how one should praise, blame, or punish people for their actions, as well as particular acts that follow those standards to a greater or lesser extent. A classical question in philosophy asks whether human beings can actually be morally responsible for what they do. This dissertation argues that addressing this classical question is insufficient if one wants the investigation of moral responsibility to serve the goal of improving ordinary responsibility practices. As an alternative, I offer directions for an interdisciplinary investigation that I take to be in a better position to promote that goal. My argument is developed in five articles and a discussion section. The first four articles describe limitations of skeptical views, which deny the existence of moral responsibility. The first article assesses a skeptical argument based on results from neuroscience that intends to show that there is no free will. I argue that a premise in the argument—which says that choices are determined by events in the brain—is not supported by the available results. The second article argues that, despite the fact that existent results do not show that choices are determined by brain events, further studies in neuroscience could in principle do that. The third article begins the discussion of limitations that concern the implementability of some of the changes in responsibility practices recommended in skeptical approaches. Specifically, I describe challenges that attempts to reduce the severity of legal punishment are likely to face due to psychological facts about belief in free will and desire to punish. The forth article presents results from an original experiment that sought to test a hypothesis about the workings of belief in free will and the desire to punish, namely the hypothesis that the desire to punish causally affects beliefs about free will. Results failed to support the hypothesis. Finally, the fifth article presents what I call the enhancement model, i.e., a proposal about how to structure an interdisciplinary investigation that can promote the enhancement of ordinary responsibility practices. The final discussion section shows how the enhancement model overcomes some of the limitations of recent discussions about the existence of moral responsibility, which includes not just the skeptical views considered in earlier articles, but also views that affirm the existence of moral responsibility and free will. The central claim of this dissertation, therefore, is that the investigation of moral responsibility can be rearranged so as to further the goal of improving ordinary responsibility practices.


Author(s):  
Amee P. Shah

In this paper, I present accent-related variations unique to Asian-Indian speakers of English in the United States and identify specific speech and language features that contribute to an “Indian accent.” I present a model to answer some key questions related to assessment of Indian accents and help set a strong foundation for accent modification services.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 5-11
Author(s):  
E. Randolph Soo Hoo ◽  
Stephen L. Demeter

Abstract Referring agents may ask independent medical evaluators if the examinee can return to work in either a normal or a restricted capacity; similarly, employers may ask external parties to conduct this type of assessment before a hire or after an injury. Functional capacity evaluations (FCEs) are used to measure agility and strength, but they have limitations and use technical jargon or concepts that can be confusing. This article clarifies key terms and concepts related to FCEs. The basic approach to a job analysis is to collect information about the job using a variety of methods, analyze the data, and summarize the data to determine specific factors required for the job. No single, optimal job analysis or validation method is applicable to every work situation or company, but the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission offers technical standards for each type of validity study. FCEs are a systematic method of measuring an individual's ability to perform various activities, and results are matched to descriptions of specific work-related tasks. Results of physical abilities/agilities tests are reported as “matching” or “not matching” job demands or “pass” or “fail” meeting job criteria. Individuals who fail an employment physical agility test often challenge the results on the basis that the test was poorly conducted, that the test protocol was not reflective of the job, or that levels for successful completion were inappropriate.


2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Brigham ◽  
Kathryn Mueller ◽  
Douglas Van Zet ◽  
Debra J. Northrup ◽  
Edward B. Whitney ◽  
...  

Abstract [Continued from the January/February 2004 issue of The Guides Newsletter.] To understand discrepancies in reviewers’ ratings of impairments based on different editions of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides), users can usefully study the history of the revisions as successive editions attempted to provide a comprehensive, valid, reliable, unbiased, and evidence-based system. Some shortcomings of earlier editions have been addressed in the AMA Guides, Fifth Edition, but problems remain with each edition, largely because of the limited scientific evidence available. In the context of the history of the different editions of the AMA Guides and their development, the authors discuss and contextualize a number of key terms and principles including the following: definitions of impairment and normal; activities of daily living; maximum medical improvement; impairment percentages; conversion of regional impairments; combining impairments; pain and other subjective complaints; physician judgment; and causation analysis; finally, the authors note that impairment is not synonymous with disability or work interference. The AMA Guides, Fifth Edition, contrasts impairment evaluations and independent medical evaluations (this was not done in previous editions) and discusses impairment evaluations, rules for evaluations, and report standards. Upper extremity and lower extremity impairment evaluations are discussed in terms of clinical assessments and rating processes, analyzing important changes between editions and problematic areas (eg, complex regional pain syndrome).


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