Costs and liabilities of US public pension systems in a low-return environment

In recent years, a growing number of capital market professionals have projected a low-return environment in US investment portfolios – where returns in most asset classes are expected to drop below historical rates. While these specific forecasts may not fully materialize, it is natural for cyclical investment markets to go through extended periods of lower returns, creating significant risks for public pension systems which rely on investment returns to sustain their long-term solvency and offset budgetary contributions. This paper uses a simulation method to examine the long-term effect of a low-return environment on the unfunded liabilities and contribution costs of US public pension systems while considering the moderating effects of asset allocation strategies, amortization approaches, and contribution policies.

Impact of CEO pensions on value relevance of R&D expenditures

Since CEO pension is unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, it induces CEOs to have long-term incentives towards minimizing their firms’ default risk. Motivated by the unique characteristics of CEO pension, this study investigates the impact of CEO pension on the value relevance of R&D expenditures. Using Tobin’s Q ratio to measure firm value, the empirical results show that CEO pension intensifies the relation between R&D expenditures and Tobin’s Q ratio. The results remain robust in two-stage least square and propensity score matching regression analysis to address the endogeneity issues in the relation between CEO pension and the value relevance of R&D expenditures. In addition, the regression results with ROA and F-score as the alternative dependent variables also confirm that CEO pension intensifies the relation between R&D expenditures and firm value.

City Revenue Structure and Unfunded Pension Liabilities

A growing body of research shows that economic, demographic, and institutional factors affect public pension funding. Most of these findings are based on the analysis of complete retirement systems, which are often funded by multiple plan sponsors. This article offers one of the first empirical analyses of the determinants of pension funding at the level of a city government that acts as a plan sponsor, often for more than one plan. Models predicting unfunded liabilities for a large national sample of cities over 2003–2012 suggest that city fiscal autonomy and reliance property taxes are additional pieces of the pension underfunding puzzle.

Contribution volatility and public pension reform

In the wake of the economic downturn of 2008–2009, researchers and policymakers have focused considerable attention on the extent of unfunded liabilities in US public sector pension plans and the implications for the long term fiscal sustainability of state and local governments. In response to the growth in liabilities, many states have introduced legislation that cuts back on defined benefit (DB) plan commitments, in some cases even shifting the pension system from a DB to a defined contribution or hybrid plan. This paper explores the factors that have led states to engage in pension reform, focusing particular attention on one factor that has only recently gained attention in the research literature: contribution volatility. While unfunded liabilities have significant long-term solvency implications, in the short term fluctuations in the amount of required contributions pose substantial difficulties for the ability of plan sponsors to balance budgets and engage in strategic planning. We begin by quantifying the volatility in the required contributions US states were expected to make between 2001 and 2013 and comparing the volatility of pension spending to other relevant tax and spending measures. Next, we describe the various types of pension reforms that states have implemented and examine the fiscal pressures facing those states that have engaged in reform. States with greater fluctuations in their required payments have been more likely to reduce benefits and increase employee contributions; they have also been more likely to institute these reforms sooner.

The funding status of retiree health plans in the public sector

While no longer common in the private sector, most public sector employers offer retiree health insurance (RHI) as a retirement benefit to their employees. While these plans are thought to be an important tool for employers to attract, retain, motivate, and ultimately retire workers, they represent a large and growing cost. This paper reviews what is currently known about RHI in the public sector, while highlighting many important unanswered questions. The analysis is informed by data produced in accordance with the 2004 Government Accounting Standards Board Rule 45 (GASB 45). We consider the extent of the unfunded liabilities states face and explore what factors may explain the variation in liabilities across states. The importance and sustainability of RHI plans in the public sector ultimately depend on how workers view and value this post-retirement benefit, yet little is known about how RHI directly impacts the public sector labor market. We conclude with a discussion of the future of RHI plans in the public sector.

Policy options for state pension systems and their impact on plan liabilities

We calculate the present value of state pension liabilities under existing policies and separately under policy changes that would affect pension payouts. If promised payments are viewed as default free, then it is appropriate to use discount rates given by the Treasury yield curve. If plans are frozen at June 2009 levels, then the present value of liabilities would be $4.4 trillion. Under the typical actuarial method of recognizing future service and wage increases, this figure rises to $5.2 trillion. Compared to $1.8 trillion in pension fund assets, the baseline level of unfunded liabilities is therefore around $3 trillion. A 1 percentage point reduction in cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) would lower total liabilities by 9–11%; implementing actuarially fair early retirement would reduce them by 2–5%; and increasing the retirement age by 1 year would reduce them by 2–4%. Dramatic policy changes, such as the elimination of COLAs or the implementation of Social Security retirement age parameters, would leave liabilities around $1.5 trillion more than plan assets. This suggests that taxpayers will bear the lion's share of the costs associated with the legacy liabilities of state DB pension plans.

Retiree Health Plans for Public School Teachers after GASB 43 and 45

Most public elementary and high school teachers are covered by health insurance provided by their employer while they are employed. In most cases, these health plans are managed at the state level. At retirement, teachers with sufficient years of service are allowed to remain in the health plan. Retiree health plans for teachers vary widely across the country, with some states paying the full premium for the retired teacher while other states require that the retiree pay 100 percent of the premium. Recent changes in the accounting rules now mandate that public sector employers report the accrued liabilities associated with these plans. This article documents the unfunded liabilities of teacher retiree health plans in the various states, examines the reasons for differences in these liabilities, and considers how these plans might evolve in the future.