Advantages and Challenges Using Psychological Tests in the Assessment of Suicide Bombers and Lone Actors

This report discusses the advantages and challenges in using direct psychological personality profile and psychodynamic assessments (corresponding to Otto Kernberg’s model of personally organization) of suicide bombers and lone actors. Two studies that administered various psychological instruments (i.e., self-report inventories, semi-structured interviews, and projective tests) were used to assess these subjects in a prison setting, before or after their trial. Main findings showed that suicide bombers displayed low levels of ego strength with dependent and/or avoidant personality styles, while most of the lone actors presented evidence of psychiatric histories. Also, the main methodological advantages and challenges of the assessment procedures and instruments utilized are discussed. Self-report inventories were found to be less valid. In contrast, semi-structured interviews assisted in identifying a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of both personality dynamics and the discerning of traumatic experiences in participants’ background related primarily to their family history. Projective tests had limited and restricted responses i.e., lacked the necessary complexity. This pattern likely reflected those participants with either limited mental resources, maladaptive personality styles, or hostile responses toward their assessors. Future directions are discussed in a psycho-cultural theoretical perspective regarding the development risk/threat assessment instruments to discern potential perpetrators who are victims of trauma in families living under specific cultural contexts. We assume that these victims’ manifest dissociation defences, present tendencies to activate mobilization, and immobilization energetic systems. These systems evoke complex behaviour patterns triggering suicidal tendencies coupled with rage tendencies aiming to end the lives of others, in this context, perceived political enemies.

The Use of Terrorism Risk Assessment Tools in Australia to Manage Residual Risk

There is growing concern in Australia about the residual risk of acts of terrorism or violent extremism posed by offenders after their release to the community from jail. A number of legislative measures have been passed that attempt to address this particular risk. Terrorism risk assessment tools are central to the effective operation of these new laws. Although existing tools demonstrate potential in assisting decision makers in identifying and managing persons that pose a risk of extremist violence there remain several challenges. These tools provide a useful guide to information gathering and analysis, however the assessment process is time consuming and resource intensive. Further, existing tools are currently given limited weight by the courts which impairs the effectiveness of legal measures designed to address residual risk.

Jihadist Travelers and Terrorism Risk Assessment in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, police use IR46 as a Terrorism Risk Assessment Instrument for identifying radicalized individuals and the risk or threat they pose. Originally, its focus was on ideological radicalization as a precursor to terrorist violence. Here, it reflected mainstream thinking in terrorism studies, which held that terrorists overall are ‘normal’ in terms of mental health and socio-economic backgrounds. New empirical research called this ‘normality paradigm’ into doubt, and IR46 has changed accordingly. One example of this research was a 2015 study in Dutch police files describing behavioural problems and disorders in jihadist travelers to the Middle East. This chapter presents new findings from a follow-up study from 2019. The studies, and similar research elsewhere, have indicated that jihadist travelers on average have a history of adverse socio-economic conditions, high criminality, and more mental health problems than their peers. Individual backgrounds may have contributed to their susceptibility to extremist messages. These backgrounds can be quite diverse though, which does not allow for an accurate prediction of those who actually commit a terrorist crime. Nevertheless, insight in these backgrounds provides new angles for identifying and managing risk in individuals of concern.

Violent Extremism: The Practical Assessment and Management of Risk

This chapter examines the task of preventing harmful behaviour motivated by a violent extremist ideology. It begins with a brief review of the history of practice in the field of risk assessment and management in order to highlight the latest learning and recommendations, which the violent extremism field would do well to follow. Risk and threat assessment and management practice is then compared and contrasted in order to highlight differences that account at least in part for the wide variety of guidance and expectations currently available. The final part of the chapter focuses on practical issues in the prevention of violent extremism through its assessment, formulation, and subsequent management. Specific key issues are addressed: (i) the application of the structured professional judgement approach in practice, from triage through to extended or live risk management; (ii) the challenge of establishing a violent extremist intent in a person who is the focus of concern, in order that the most appropriate guidance and management strategies are put against his or her harm potential; and (iii) the task of embedding and evaluating harm prevention into counter-terrorism practice. The chapter ends with concluding remarks and practice recommendations.

Early Prevention of Extremism Through Multi-Agency Use of the Model for Assessment for Concerns About Extremism (MACE)

The model for assessment for concerns about extremism (MACE) is a process-model developed for a multi-agency collaboration where relevant authorities assess concerns about extremism in a Danish context. This assessment is made with the sole purpose of early prevention. The concerns can range from mild to very serious concerns where there is need for some kind of preventive measure or intervention. This chapter introduces the development of the model as well as a description of the phases of the model and the assessment tools that support that process. Finally, a range of learning points and recommendations are listed to sum up the chapter.

From Empirical Beginnings to Emerging Theory

This chapter charts the author’s own learning pathway as a senior forensic psychologist working with those convicted of terrorist offences in the UK, from the Maze prison in Northern Ireland as a senior member of HM Inspectorate of Prisons during the period of the Good Friday Peace Agreement in 1998, through to casework in England & Wales with those convicted of terrorist offences between 2008 and 2011. These experiences created an ongoing research interest into the etiology of terrorist offending from a psychological perspective. Empirical work with convicted terrorist offenders over three years within a small team of psychologists informed a methodology for the assessment and management of the risk of terrorist re-offending for the British correctional system in 2012, and interventions to assist in their disengagement and/or desistance. This learning in turn informed the Prevent strand of the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy for countering violent extremism in the community.2 More recently, as an academic this work has developed into a theorized typology of terrorists as more evidence has come to light about the contributions of criminality and individual psychopathology to terrorist violence. This chapter seeks to map this journey from empirical beginnings to emerging theory.

RADAR-iTE 2.0: An Instrument of the German State Protection – Structure, Development and Current Stage of Evaluation

RADAR-iTE is an actuarial risk assessment instrument developed specifically for the German Police in the field of state protection. The purpose of the instrument is the prioritization of individuals of the Islamist spectrum known by the police in terms of their risk to commit politically motivated serious violence in Germany. The specific requirements of an instrument developed for the police and the adapted research process are outlined. This is followed by the description of the evaluation and revision of the instrument after one year of application by the German police. The result of this process, the current version 2.0 of RADAR-iTE is introduced and an insight into the implementation process of the instrument is also provided. Finally, the limitations of RADAR-iTE are discussed

A Diagnostic and Statistical Model-5 Experimental Personality Disorder-Based Terrorism Risk/Threat Assessment Instrument

This chapter aims to provide a review of the literature on the role of personality traits and disorders among terrorist offenders, as well as extant terrorism risk and threat assessment (TR/TA) instruments. We assert that there is an overwhelming need for an instrument that is largely based on DSM-5 personality disorder dimensions and related traits. Specifically, an assessment tool is proposed based largely on the Personality Inventory for DSM-5 (PID-5), in combination with domains borrowed from the Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP), as well as accounting for ideology and prior criminality. Using open sources, we discuss the prevalence of the included traits in both Omar Mateen and Dylann Roof and argue that their unstable personalities could have led investigators to downplay the risk they posed given that they break the mold of the terrorist as having a stable personality who methodically seeks to avoid detection.