The Influence of Information Power Upon the Great Game in Cyberspace: U.S. Wins Over Russian Meddling in the 2018 Elections

The 2018 U.S. pivot in information and cyberspace degraded Russian operations in the 2018 election. Following pervasive Russian information power operations during the U.S. 2016 elections, the United States progressed from a policy of preparations and defense in information and cyberspace to a policy of forward engagement. U.S recognition of renewed great power competition coupled with Russia’s inability to compete diplomatically, militarily (conventionally), or economically, inspires Russia to continues to concentrate on information power operations. This great game in cyberspace was virtually uncontested by the U.S. prior to 2017. Widespread awareness of Russian aggression in 2016 served as a catalyst which highlighted the enormity of Russian campaigns and the crippling constraints on U.S. information power. This catalyst pivoted the U.S. from a passive policy of preparations and defense in information and cyberspace to a policy of forward engagement that successfully attenuated Russian efforts in 2018. By examining information power from theory development and Russian practice to recent reports and primary sources we find that the U.S. demonstrated the capability and willingness to defend forward successfully during the 2018 elections. Going forward, the U.S. must continue and expand efforts to contest cyberspace and counter disinformation to secure our democracy and the U.S. 2020 presidential election.

Assessing Impacts of 5th Generation (5G) Cellular Telecommunications on Internet of Things (IoT) Deployments

The Internet of Things (IoT) is emerging as a primary enabler of the transformation to digital business services in today’s economy. At the same time, 5th Generation (5G) cellular transport technology is emerging as a viable means to support IoT data requirements. Although 5G is still in its infancy, DoD leaders need to understand the impacts that 5G will have on IoT projects as there are several challenges involved with integrating 5G into IoT. In order to achieve the maximum benefits of high bandwidth, low latency and superior performance, an entirely new grid of cell sites and access units must be installed. A second challenge is with malware and intrusion attacks. 5G is an IP-based network technology that will expose 5G connected devices to common IP-based malware and intrusion risks such as denial-of-service (DOS and DDOS) and intrusion attacks. A third challenge is with standardized security and encryption of data from end-devices. The larger challenge with standardization involves interoperability. In order for 5G to work seamlessly across carriers with device agnostic hardware and compatible software, a holistic approach should be considered. Hardware compatibility will determine interoperability between sensors, platforms and gateways. In addition, software compatibility will be governed by 5G standards as well as industry partnerships. 5G standards are currently still being developed. Organizations, including the DoD Chief Information Officer and Government Accountability Office should specifically address implications of 5G cellular technology for IoT-related studies and use cases in the DoD.

Three Emerging Innovative Technologies Required for Cyber Operations to Execute Commander’s Intent at Machine Speed

Decision advantage for the DoD and Combined Cyber Operations results from the secure, seamless, and rapid maneuver of data and information. In the DoD’s 2018 Artificial Intelligence Strategy, the DoD recognized that it must, “put in place key building blocks and platforms to scale and democratize access to AI. This includes creating a common foundation of shared data, reusable tools, frameworks and standards, and cloud and edge services.” More than ever, integrated, adaptive cyber operations provide the means of maneuver for data to enable DoD’s decision advantage-based goals. To support this vision, the integrated implementation three innovative cyber technologies must be rapidly realized across DoD Networks in order to execute cyber operations according to Commander’s Intent—at machine speed. Getting Information to the “edge” is what makes DoD competitive and provides advantage. The word “edge” in this context reflects the distributed individual platforms, sensors, and people who comprise the scale and scope of today’s globally networked DoD operations. That edge is creating the demand to access data and consume information as never before, and a greater need for more innovation to support DoD cyber operations on the DoD Information Network (DODIN). At the heart of the need for innovation is an increased demand for data and information, as well as the size and scale of networks and networking exploding without a proportionate growth in the IT resources to support today’s cyber operational demand. If the network continues to grow exponentially and must function as the medium of maneuver for the data that provides DoD decision advantage to the edge, then the DoD must deploy revolutionary innovations to reinvent the network as an integrated platform for cyber operations—across the enterprise and to the edge and implemented natively as hybrid multicloud-ready. Three innovative, next-generation networking technologies, integrated tightly together, offer the opportunity for DoD to provide revolutionary cyber operations capabilities across the DODIN and produce improved, data-enabled mission results. The scalable and seamless integration of: (1) advanced identity management, (2) software-defined networking, and (3) hybrid multicloud capabilities provides a Commander’s Intent-driven Cyber Platform implemented in a zero trust architecture that operates at machine speed and ensures decision advantage for the DoD.

Human-Machine Teaming and Its Legal and Ethical Implications

Humans rely on machines in accomplishing missions while machines need humans to make them more intelligent and more powerful. Neither side can go without the other, especially in complex environments when autonomous mode is initiated. Things are becoming more complicated when law and ethical principles should be applied in these complex environments. One of the solutions is human-machine teaming, as it takes advantage of both the best humans can offer and the best that machines can provide. This article intends to explore ways of implementing law and ethical principles in artificial intelligence (AI) systems using human-machine teaming. It examines the existing approaches, reveals their limitations, and calls for the establishment of accountability and the use of a checks-and-balances framework in AI systems. It also discusses the legal and ethical implications of this solution.

Prioritizing Strategic Cyberspace Lethality

The primary concern of United States national security policy, as detailed in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, has shifted from asymmetrical counter-insurgency operations to countering inter-state strategic competition by rogue regimes and revisionist powers. This doctrinal shift has prompted an increased emphasis on military lethality, particularly in strategic-level cyberspace operations intended to counter open challenges to the global security environment and United States preeminence. Drawing from the theory of constraints in industrial engineering and Bayesian search theory in operations research, this paper identifies the key organizational constraints that hinder the lethality of the Department of Defense’s strategic-level cyberspace operations units in light of a continued struggle for available cyberspace personnel. Current force structure paradigms and command and control policies are identified as the key limiting factors of military lethality in cyberspace. This paper argues for ruthlessly prioritizing the elimination and improvement of these constraints in order to align Department of Defense policies with efforts to project strategic power in and through cyberspace.

Cyber Metaphors and Cyber Goals: Lessons from “Flatland”

Reasoning about complex and abstract ideas is greatly influenced by the choice of metaphors through which they are represented. In this paper we consider the framing effect in military doctrine of considering cyberspace as a domain of action, parallel to the traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space. By means of the well-known Victorian science-fiction novella Flatland, we offer a critique of this dominant cyber metaphor. In Flatland, the problems of lower-dimensional beings comprehending additional dimensions are explored at some length. Inspired by Flatland, our suggested alternate metaphor for cyber is an additional (fourth) dimension. We then propose three common characteristics between the world of Spaceland as experienced by Flatland natives and that of Cyberland as experienced by humans, and finally explore some possible new insights suggested by the Flatland dimensional metaphor.

Command and Control for Cyberspace Operations - A Call for Research

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) declared cyberspace as an operational domain in 2011. The DoD subsequently formed US Cyber Command and the Cyber Mission Force to conduct operations to achieve national and military objectives in and through cyberspace. Since that time, the DoD has implemented and evolved through multiple command and control (C2) structures for cyberspace operations, derived from traditional military C2 doctrine, to achieve unity of effort across both the global cyberspace domain and with military operations in the physical domains (land, sea, air, and space). The DoD continues to struggle to adapt its C2 methods from the physical domains to the cyber domain. Applying traditional military C2 constructs to the cyberspace domain leads to several problems due to the uniqueness of cyberspace from the other domains. Cyberspace presents a very different operational environment than the physical domains, where time and space are compressed. In this paper, we describe the factors that make cyberspace different from the other operational domains and the challenges those differences impose on existing C2 constructs. We propose a campaign of experimentation, consisting of a series cyberspace C2 experiments, to address these challenges by conducting research into the taxonomy of C2 nodes, decisions, information, and relationships, which can be used to simulate and refine DoD cyberspace operations C2 constructs.

Introduction to Command and Control of Cyberspace Operations

In this issue we look at the means and doctrine for command and control of cyberspace operations today and in the future.