Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and Comparative Advantage in Trade Relationships: An Interactive Game

2007 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 601-608
Author(s):  
Eric P. Chiang

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdelhafid Benamraoui ◽  
Yousef Alwardat

This research paper aims to examine the relevance of asymmetric information to the two main financial contracts used by Islamic banks or conventional banks with Islamic windows, mudaraba and musharaka. We use theoretical proofs to explain how asymmetric information affects mudaraba and musharaka contract in terms of bank cost and yield and how to account for the adverse selection and moral hazard costs when calculating bank net profit or loss. We also provide suggestions supported by key modern theories including signalling, comparative advantage and incentives to resolve asymmetric information problems in the Islamic financial contracts. The research paper shows that asymmetric information is relevant to both mudaraba and musharaka contracts and directly affects Islamic banks and conventional banks with Islamic windows cost and yield. The paper also reveals that signalling and incentives are effective tools to deal with asymmetric information in Islamic financial contracts. Finally, the paper shows that Islamic finance providers need to opt for more secure financing, particularly with small borrowers.



2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itay P Fainmesser

Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers have the option to “cheat” their buyers, and buyers decide whether to repurchase from different sellers. We model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and study repeated games in such networks. Endowing sellers with incomplete knowledge of the network, we derive conditions that determine whether a network is consistent with cooperation between every buyer and seller that are connected. Three network features reduce the minimal discount factor sufficient for cooperation: moderate and balanced competition, sparseness, and segregation. Incentive constraints are binding and rule out efficient networks. (JEL C73, D82, D85, Z13)





ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).



In this paper, primarily the export specialisation pattern of Vietnam has been examined from the perspective of domestic value added exports. In addition, an effort has been made to identify presence of exaggeration in gross exports measures of industries level competitiveness. Empirical findings suggest that the export specialisation of Vietnam has reversed, and there is presence of exaggeration in the estimates of comparative advantage of ‘human capital and technology intensive’ industries that has also caused in ballooning up their shares in gross exports. Such pattern has arisen because intra-industry trade has become increasingly significant in Vietnam. Received 11th March 2019; Revised 17th October 2019, Accepted 20th October 2019



2015 ◽  
pp. 25-41
Author(s):  
Anh Tu Thuy ◽  
Ngoc Le Minh

This paper makes use of two trade indicators, Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) and Regional Orientation (RO), to evaluate the economic impacts of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (The) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on Vietnamese commodities at the Harmonized System (HS) 2-digit level. Several sectors in which Vietnam has revealed a comparative advantage, has benefited from the AFTA, and would continue to enjoy trade creation from the RCEP, are: Cereals (10), Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement (25), Rubber (40), Knitted or crocheted fabric (60), etc. More importantly, the result provides a list of commodities in which Vietnam has a comparative advantage and only experiences trade creation when participating in the RCEP. These are: Milling products, malt, starches, inulin, wheat gluten (11), Vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable products not elsewhere specified (14), Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal (44), etc. Findings also show commodities in which Vietnam has a comparative advantage; but are not well positioned in the RCEP market yet, e.g. Cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations and products (19) and Manmade staple fibres (55). If sufficient investment decisions and marketing strategies are applied to these commodities, they will well penetrate the RCEP market and bring trade creation and welfare improvement to Vietnam. Public and private investment should consider the above-mentioned commodities as targets to leapfrog the benefits of RCEP.









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