scholarly journals Asymmetric Information and Islamic Financial Contracts

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdelhafid Benamraoui ◽  
Yousef Alwardat
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
Research Paper ◽  
Islamic Finance ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Financial Contracts ◽  
Net Profit ◽  
Conventional Banks

This research paper aims to examine the relevance of asymmetric information to the two main financial contracts used by Islamic banks or conventional banks with Islamic windows, mudaraba and musharaka. We use theoretical proofs to explain how asymmetric information affects mudaraba and musharaka contract in terms of bank cost and yield and how to account for the adverse selection and moral hazard costs when calculating bank net profit or loss. We also provide suggestions supported by key modern theories including signalling, comparative advantage and incentives to resolve asymmetric information problems in the Islamic financial contracts. The research paper shows that asymmetric information is relevant to both mudaraba and musharaka contracts and directly affects Islamic banks and conventional banks with Islamic windows cost and yield. The paper also reveals that signalling and incentives are effective tools to deal with asymmetric information in Islamic financial contracts. Finally, the paper shows that Islamic finance providers need to opt for more secure financing, particularly with small borrowers.

scholarly journals A MARKOV CHAIN MODEL FOR ISLAMIC MICRO-FINANCING

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 763-784
Author(s):  
Djaffar Lessy ◽  
Fouad Khoudjeti ◽  
Marc Diener ◽  
Francine Diener
Keyword(s):  
Markov Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Markov Chain Model ◽  
The Other ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Business Sector ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Strategic Default

            This paper introduces a Markov chain model for Islamic micro-financing, especially mudarabah  and murababah contract. Mudarabah and murabahah  are two Islamic micro-financing contracts that have enormous potential in creating a balance between the monetary and sharia sector because these two products are moving to manage the business sector which undoubtedly adds value to the economic movement directly.  On the other hand, these two contracts have the potential to cause problems in their implementation. The most common problem of the two contracts is asymmetric information, which consists of adverse selection and moral hazard. We propose the Markov chain model as a solution for the Islamic banks to reduce the risk because of adverse selection and moral hazard in mudarabah  and murabahah  contract. In our model, we also propose a mechanism to avoid strategic default in mudarabah contract. We observed two different probabilities of an applicant to become a beneficiary to find the solution to the problems. The results of this study, the bank can decrease the probability of an applicant to become a beneficiary to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard in mudarabah  and murabahah contract.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

scholarly journals The Analysis of the Turkish Islamic Banking System Between 2005 and 2014

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lívia Tálos ◽  
Gyöngyi Bánkuti ◽  
Jozsef Varga
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Rating System ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Islamic Finance ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Conventional Banks

Islamic banking is a banking system that is based on the principles of sharia or Islamic law. The principles of Islamic finance forbid interest - this is commonly known as riba - charity (zakat), forbid high risk (gharar), forbid some transactions like gambling, and are based on PLS (Profit-Loss Share). The most important concept is that both charging and receiving interest are strictly forbidden; money may not generate profits. Islamic banks have largely survived the global economic crisis intact and they offer a safer operation than conventional banks. CAMEL analysis is a supervisory rating system to classify a bank's overall condition according to Capital (C), Assets (A), Management (M), Earnings (E) and Liquidity (L). In the analysis a variety of indicators were calculated based on data from the annual reports. The results of the four banks were averaged separately, then classified (1 = good, 2 = adequate, 3 = satisfactory, 4 = acceptable, 5 = unacceptable) according to the desired criteria, the changes over the years and the relative values of the four banks.

scholarly journals MUDHARABAH SCHEME WITHIN THE ISLAMIC BANKING: PROFIT SHARING AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS IN IT

Kodifikasia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-262
Author(s):  
Supriatna Supriatna ◽  
Irpan Helmi ◽  
Nurrohman Nurrohman
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Methods ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Financial Loss ◽  
Net Profit ◽  
Financing And Investment ◽  
Conventional Banks ◽  
Sense Of Justice

Artikel ini membahas prinsip bagi hasil dalam skema mudharabah di perbankan syariah dan permasalahan yang terdapat di dalamnya dengan metode deskriptif-kualitatif melalui studi kepustakaan dan eksploratif literatur. Skema mudharabah biasanya diterapkan pada produk pembiayaan dan investas yang melibatkan dua pihak: shahib al-maal dan mudharib. Kedua belah pihak bekerjasama untuk mendapatkan keuntungan yang akan dibagikan sesuai dengan nisbah yang telah disepakati di awal akad. Apabila terjadi kerugian finansial, shahib al-maal akan menanggung semuanya, tetapi jika disebabkan oleh kelalaian pengelola modal maka kerugian tersebut harus ditanggung oleh mudharib. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dalam akad mudharabah mayoritas bank syariah menerapkan prinsip revenue-sharing yang secara tidak langsung direstui oleh Fatwa DSN 07/2000. Penerapan prinsip ini dapat memicu timbulnya rasa ketidakadilan karena bagi hasil dihitung berdasarkan laba kotor yang lebih menguntungkan pihak shahib al-maal dan kurang menguntungkan bagi mudharib. Kondisi ini membuat nasabah kurang termotivasi untuk memilih bank syariah ketimbang bank konvensional. Dilihat dari perspektif fiqh, bagi hasil dihitung berdasarkan keuntungan bersih sebagaimana diterapkan pada prinsip profit/loss-sharing, yang penerapannya juga direkomendasikan oleh OKI. Pada akhirnya, penyempurnaan pada Fatwa DSN 07/2000 perlu dilakukan untuk memberikan rasa keadilan bagi semua entitas mudharabah: shahib al-maal dan mudharib. [This article was created to discuss the principle of profit-sharing in the mudharabah scheme in Islamic banking and the problems contained therein using descriptive-qualitative methods through library study and literature exploratory. Mudharabah schemes are usually applied to financing and investment products that involve two parties: shahib al-maal and mudharib. Both parties collaborate to get profits which will be shared according to the nisbah agreed at the beginning of the contract. If there is a financial loss, shahib al-maal will bear everything, but if it is caused by the negligence of the capital-user then the loss must be borne by the mudharib. The results showed that in the mudharabah contract, the majority of Islamic banks apply the principle of revenue-sharing which is indirectly blessed by Fatwa DSN 07/2000. The implementation of this principle could trigger a sense of injustice because the profit-sharing is calculated based on gross profit which is more beneficial for the shahib al-maal and less profitable for the mudarib. This condition makes customers less motivated to choose Islamic banks rather than conventional banks. From the perspective of fiqh, profit-sharing is calculated based on net profit as it’s applied to the principle of profit/loss-sharing as well as recommended by the OIC. At the end, improvements to the Fatwa 07/2000, needs to be done to provide a sense of justice for all mudharabah entities: shahib al-maal and mudharib.]

Improving Trustworthiness in E-Market Using Attack Resilient Reputation Modeling

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 57-82
Author(s):  
Neeraj Kumar Sharma ◽  
Vibha Gaur ◽  
Punam Bedi
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Reputation Systems ◽  
Trust And Reputation ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms ◽  
Reputation Building ◽  
Building Parameters

Asymmetric information is a major problem in e-commerce transactions as it gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Reputation mechanisms provide a solution to this problem by discouraging fraudulent behavior and encouraging honest behavior of participants in the uncertain and un-trusted environment of e-market. This paper discusses trust and reputation relationships, and highlights the importance of key reputation building parameters to enhance trustworthiness of participants. Finally, it proposes reputation metrics that guard reputation systems from various attacks by malicious participants to improve the quality of e-market and presents a working prototype.

Agency, Information, and the Structure of Moral Problems in Business

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan W. Husted
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Many ethical problems in business can be characterized as having elements of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. This paper analyzes such problems using information economics and the principal-agent model. It defines the nature of moral problems in business and then applies principal-agent models involving adverse selection and moral hazard to these problems. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined in order to support the development of organizational virtue.

scholarly journals Tanggung Jawab Bank Syariah dalam Penerapan Prinsip Kehati-hatian dan Good Corporate Governance

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Renny Supriyatni
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Islamic Finance ◽  
Moral Hazards ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Conventional Banks

Abstract: The Responsibilities of Shariah Banking in the application of Prudential Principles and Good Corporate Governance. A Bank’s functions as an intermediary institution is interesting in relation to the importance of responsibilities to customers in applying the principles of Good Corporate Governance (GCG). The application of the principle of prudence and good corporate governance in shariah banking is useful in minimizing risks that may arise from moral hazards and avoid transactions in money laundering. The responsibility of shariah banks in the distribution of Islamic finance is basically just a little different from its application in commercial banks, caused by differences between systems that are applied by conventional banks with a shariah system which directly impact on the rules used and structures of shariah banks.Keywords: Shariah banks, principle of prudence, good governance, principles of shariahAbstrak: Tanggung Jawab Bank Syariah dalam Penerapan Prinsip Kehati-hatian dan Good Corporate Governance. Fungsi bank sebagai lembaga intermediasi menarik dalam kaitannya dengan pentingnya tanggung jawab bagi pihak nasabah dengan menerapkan prinsip Good Corporate Governance (GCG). Penerapan prinsip kehati-hatian dan Good Corporate Governance dalam Pembiayaan syariah berguna untuk meminimalisasi risiko yang mungkin timbul dari moral hazard dan menghindari transaksi yang bersifat money laundering. Tanggung jawab bank syariah dalam penyaluran pembiayaan syariah pada dasarnya hanya sedikit berbeda dengan penerapannya pada bank umum, dikarenakan adanya perbedaan antara sistem yang diterapkan oleh bank konvensional dengan sistem syariah yang secara langsung berdampak kepada aturan yang dipakai dan struktur dari bank syariah.Kata Kunci: bank syariah, prinsip kehati-hatian, tata kelola yang baik, prinsip syariahDOI: 10.15408/ajis.v12i1.985

scholarly journals Informal Finance and Asymmetric Information: A theory Review

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Small Business ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Financial Deepening ◽  
Informal Finance ◽  
Formal Finance ◽  
Theory Review ◽  
Objective Necessity

Based on theories of financial inhibition and Transaction Cost Theories, along with the combination of behavior economics, this paper tries to discuss and analyze the nature of informal finance. In china, it is hard to finance for Mid-small business, informal finance has advantage to deal with the capital gap of Mid-small size business as a supplementary means of formal finance which are hard to overcome the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard induced by asymmetric information. we discussed the foundation for existing of informal finance and objective necessity. Based on perspective of asymmetric information, we tried to answer why informal finance still thrived vibrantly on the process of financial deepening.

scholarly journals The Interest in Islamic Finance Contracts in Saudi Arabia as Viewed by Google Trends

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Wesal M. Aldarabseh
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Google Trends ◽  
Islamic Finance ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Financial Contracts ◽  
The Past

Several Islamic contracts have been used by Islamic banks to cover the financial needs of their customers. The contracts include Murabahah, Ijarah, Tawarruq, Mudarabah, Musharakah, Salam, and Istisna'. In the current study, the interest in Islamic financial contracts in the past 5 years (2014-2019) in Saudi Arabia as viewed by Google trends was examined. The interest in Murabahah showed increases with the years, whereas decreases in the interest of Tawarruq, Salam Mudarabah were observed in the last years. However, the interest in Ijarah and Istisna' was stable during the examined period. With respect to Musharakah, the interest decreased with years until 2017 then it showed slight increases in 2018 and 2019. Differences in the interest of financial contracts were also observed across different regions of Saudi Arabia. The interest in Ijarah, Tawarruq and Istisna’ was higher in Riyadh, whereas the interest in Murabahah and Musharakah was higher in Ha’il than other Saudi regions The present findings can be used by Islamic banks to shape their financing services according to observed interest trends and across different regions of Saudi Arabia.

scholarly journals ANALISIS PERKEMBANGAN SEKTOR KEUANGAN TERHADAP PERTUMBUHAN EKONOMI DI NEGARA ISLAM

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-37
Author(s):  
Izzun Khoirun Nissa
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Fixed Effect Model ◽  
Islamic Finance ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Effect Model ◽  
Islamic Countries ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Conventional Banks ◽  
Positive Effect

This study analyzes the development of the financial sector on economic growth in Islamic countries in twelve Islamic countries for the period of 2011-2018. This study aims to determine the effect of the sector from conventional and sharia banking or the whole on economic growth in Islamic countries and from the Islamic finance sector to economic growth in Islamic countries. This study applied panel data to estimate empirically involving 12 Islamic countries during the 2011-2018 period. This study reveals that the fixed Effect model is the best model to explain the effect of the independent variables as a whole and specifically the Islamic finance sector on the dependent variable. Overall, the results of this study indicate that the variables of interest rates, total assets of conventional banks, financing and total assets of Islamic banks have no effect on economic growth. Meanwhile, the deposit variable has a negative effect and the number of Islamic banks has a positive effect on economic growth. Furthermore, the test for the Islamic finance sector on economic growth, the financing variable and the number of sharia offices have a significant positive effect on economic growth. For the variable total assets of Islamic banks has no effect on economic growth.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document