scholarly journals Personality and Neural Correlates of Mentalizing Ability

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 599-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy A. Allen ◽  
Amanda R. Rueter ◽  
Samantha V. Abram ◽  
James S. Brown ◽  
Colin G. Deyoung ◽  
...  

Theory of mind, or mentalizing, defined as the ability to reason about another's mental states, is a crucial psychological function that is disrupted in some forms of psychopathology, but little is known about how individual differences in this ability relate to personality or brain function. One previous study linked mentalizing ability to individual differences in the personality trait Agreeableness. Agreeableness encompasses two major subdimensions: Compassion reflects tendencies toward empathy, prosocial behaviour, and interpersonal concern, whereas Politeness captures tendencies to suppress aggressive and exploitative impulses. We hypothesized that Compassion but not Politeness would be associated with better mentalizing ability. This hypothesis was confirmed in Study 1 ( N = 329) using a theory of mind task that required reasoning about the beliefs of fictional characters. Post hoc analyses indicated that the honesty facet of Agreeableness was negatively associated with mentalizing. In Study 2 ( N = 217), we examined whether individual differences in mentalizing and related traits were associated with patterns of resting–state functional connectivity in the brain. Performance on the theory of mind task was significantly associated with patterns of connectivity between the dorsal medial and core subsystems of the default network, consistent with evidence implicating these regions in mentalization. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology

Author(s):  
Ali Motavalli ◽  
◽  
Javad Mahmoudi ◽  
Alireza Majdi ◽  
Saeed Sadigh-Eteghad ◽  
...  

Although there are numerous views about the concept of consciousness, no consensus exists regarding the meaning. However, with the aid of the latest neuroscientific developments, the misleading obstacles related to consciousness have been removed. Over the last few decades, neuroscientific efforts in determining the function of the brain and merging these findings with philosophical theories, have brought a more comprehensive perception of the notion of consciousness. In addition to metaphysical/ontological views of consciousness e.g., higher-order theories, reflexive theories, and representationalist theories, there are some brain directed topics in this matter which include but not are limited to neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), brain loop connectivity, and lateralization. This narrative review sheds light on cultural and historical aspects of consciousness in old and middle ages and introduces some of the prominent philosophical discussions related to mind and body. Also, it illustrates the correlation of brain function with states of consciousness with a focus on the roles of function and connectivity.


2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Sabbagh ◽  
Margaret C. Moulson ◽  
Kate L. Harkness

Successful negotiation of human social interactions rests on having a theory of mind—an understanding of how others' behaviors can be understood in terms of internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions. A core theory-of-mind skill is the ability to decode others' mental states on the basis of observable information, such as facial expressions. Although several recent studies have focused on the neural correlates of reasoning about mental states, no research has addressed the question of what neural systems underlie mental state decoding. We used dense-array eventrelated potentials (ERP) to show that decoding mental states from pictures of eyes is associated with an N270–400 component over inferior frontal and anterior temporal regions of the right hemisphere. Source estimation procedures suggest that orbitofrontal and medial temporal regions may underlie this ERP effect. These findings suggest that different components of everyday theory-of-mind skills may rely on dissociable neural mechanisms.


Author(s):  
Jack M. Gorman

Some scientists now argue that humans are really not superior to other species, including our nearest genetic neighbors, chimpanzees and bonobos. Indeed, those animals seem capable of many things previously thought to be uniquely human, including a sense of the future, empathy, depression, and theory of mind. However, it is clear that humans alone produce speech, dominate the globe, and have several brain diseases like schizophrenia. There are three possible sources within the brain for these differences in brain function: in the structure of the brain, in genes coding for proteins in the brain, and in the level of expression of genes in the brain. There is evidence that all three are the case, giving us a place to look for the intersection of the human mind and brain: the expression of genes within neurons of the prefrontal cortex.


1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Karmiloff-Smith ◽  
Edward Klima ◽  
Ursula Bellugi ◽  
Julia Grant ◽  
Simon Baron-Cohen

Many species can respond to the behavior of their conspecifics. Human children, and perhaps some nonhuman primates, also have the capacity to respond to the mental states of their conspecifics, i.e., they have a “theory of mind.” On the basis of previous research on the theory-of-mind impairment in people with autism, together with animal models of intentionality, Brothers and Ring (1992) postulated a broad cognitive module whose function is to build representations of other individuals. We evaluate the details of this hypothesis through a series of experiments on language, face processing, and theory of mind carried out with subjects with Williams syndrome, a rare genetic neurodevelopmental disorder resulting in an uneven lin-guisticocognitive profile. The results are discussed in terms of how the comparison of different phenotypes (e.g., Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, autism, and hydrocephaly with associated myelomeningocele) can contribute both to understanding the neuropsychology of social cognition and to current thinking about the purported modularity of the brain.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanni Nanni ◽  
Joel Martínez-Soto ◽  
Leopoldo Gonzalez-Santos ◽  
Fernando A. Barrios

AbstractStudies based on a paradigm of free or natural viewing have revealed characteristics that allow us to know how the brain processes stimuli within a natural environment. This method has been little used to study brain function. With a connectivity approach, we examine the processing of emotions using an exploratory method to analyze functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data. This research describes our approach to modeling stress paradigms suitable for neuroimaging environments. We showed a short film (4.54 minutes) with high negative emotional valence and high arousal content to 24 healthy male subjects (36.42 years old; SD=12.14) during fMRI. Independent component analysis (ICA) was used to identify networks based on spatial statistical independence. Through this analysis we identified the sensorimotor system and its influence on the dorsal attention and default-mode networks, which in turn have reciprocal activity and modulate networks described as emotional.


Author(s):  
Sarah Feldt ◽  
Jane X. Wang ◽  
Vaughn L. Hetrick ◽  
Joshua D. Berke ◽  
Michal Żochowski

Understanding the neural correlates of brain function is an extremely challenging task, since any cognitive process is distributed over a complex and evolving network of neurons that comprise the brain. In order to quantify observed changes in neuronal dynamics during hippocampal memory formation, we present metrics designed to detect directional interactions and the formation of functional neuronal ensembles. We apply these metrics to both experimental and model-derived data in an attempt to link anatomical network changes with observed changes in neuronal dynamics during hippocampal memory formation processes. We show that the developed model provides a consistent explanation of the anatomical network modifications that underlie the activity changes observed in the experimental data.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (12) ◽  
pp. 2025-2046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Michel ◽  
Laurence Dricot ◽  
Renaud Lhommel ◽  
Cécile Grandin ◽  
Adrian Ivanoiu ◽  
...  

The temporal poles (TPs) are among the brain regions that are often considered as the brain network sustaining our ability to understand other people's mental states or “Theory of Mind” (ToM). However, so far the functional role of the left and right TPs in ToM is still debated, and it is even not clear yet whether these regions are necessary for ToM. In this study, we tested whether the left TP is necessary for ToM by assessing the mentalizing abilities of a patient (C.M.) diagnosed with semantic dementia. Converging evidence from detailed MRI and 18F-fluoro-2-deoxy-d-glucose PET examinations showed a massive atrophy of the left TP with the right TP being relatively unaffected. Furthermore, C.M.'s atrophy encompassed most regions of the left TP usually activated in neuroimaging studies investigating ToM. Given C.M.'s language impairments, we used a battery of entirely nonverbal ToM tasks. Across five tasks encompassing 100 trials, which probed the patient's ability to attribute various mental states (intentions, knowledge, and beliefs), C.M. showed a totally spared performance. This finding suggests that, despite its consistently observed activation in neuroimaging studies involving ToM tasks, the left TP is not necessary for ToM reasoning, at least in nonverbal conditions and as long as its right counterpart is preserved. Implications for understanding the social abilities of patients with semantic dementia are discussed.


2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 323-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Nettle ◽  
Bethany Liddle

We hypothesise on a number of grounds that the personality dimension of Agreeableness may be associated with inter‐individual differences in theory of mind (ToM) functioning. However, it is important to distinguish social‐perceptual from social‐cognitive ToM. Previous findings on ToM in psychopathic individuals, sex differences in ToM and the associations between ToM and social relationships, all suggest that social‐cognitive ToM is more likely than social‐perceptual ToM to relate to Agreeableness. In separate empirical studies, we find that Agreeableness is substantially correlated with social‐cognitive ToM performance, but uncorrelated with social‐perceptual ToM performance. We suggest that the propensity or motivation to attend to the mental states of others may be central to the personality dimension of Agreeableness. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 559-571
Author(s):  
Lily Tsoi ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe

Early in human development, children react negatively to receiving less than others, and only later do they show a similar aversion to receiving more. We tested whether theory of mind (ToM) can account for this developmental shift we see in middle childhood. We conducted a face-to-face fairness task that involved a ToM manipulation, measured individual differences in ToM, and collected parent-ratings of children’s empathy, a construct related to ToM. We find that greater ToM capacities lead to more rejections of unequal offers, regardless of the direction of inequality, demonstrating that children with greater ToM are more likely to engage in costly compliance with fairness norms. Moreover, drawing attention to mental states sufficiently elicits aversion to advantageous inequity in younger children. These findings contribute to our growing understanding that people’s concerns for fairness rely not just on their own thoughts and beliefs but on the thoughts, beliefs, and expectations of others.


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