The Reagan Administration and the Regulation of Labor

1989 ◽  
pp. 197-206
Author(s):  
Marilyn Power
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Sargent

This chapter examines the large net-of-interest deficits in the U.S. federal budget that have marked the administration of Ronald Reagan. It explains the fiscal and monetary actions observed during the Reagan administration as reflecting the optimal decisions of government policymakers. The discussion is based on an equation whose validity is granted by all competing theories of macroeconomics: the intertemporal government budget constraint. The chapter first considers the government budget balance and the optimal tax smoothing model of Robert Barro before analyzing monetary and fiscal policy during the Reagan years: a string of large annual net-of-interest government deficits accompanied by a monetary policy stance that has been tight, especially before February 1985, and even more so before August 1982. Indicators of tight monetary policy are high real interest rates on government debt and pretax yields that exceed the rate of economic growth.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 60-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan McCormick

The Reagan administration came to power in 1981 seeking to downplay Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights in U.S. policy toward Latin America. Yet, by 1985 the administration had come to justify its policies towards Central America in the very same terms. This article examines the dramatic shift that occurred in policymaking toward Central America during Ronald Reagan's first term. Synthesizing existing accounts while drawing on new and recently declassified material, the article looks beyond rhetoric to the political, intellectual, and bureaucratic dynamics that conditioned the emergence of a Reaganite human rights policy. The article shows that events in El Salvador suggested to administration officials—and to Reagan himself—that support for free elections could serve as a means of shoring up legitimacy for embattled allies abroad, while defending the administration against vociferous human rights criticism at home. In the case of Nicaragua, democracy promotion helped to eschew hard decisions between foreign policy objectives. The history of the Reagan Doctrine's contentious roots provides a complex lens through which to evaluate subsequent U.S. attempts to foster democracy overseas.


2013 ◽  
Vol 60 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 273-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Korb ◽  
Alexander Rothman

1983 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
C J Smith

The Community Méntal Health Centers (CMHC) legislation in the early 1960s was the first real attempt at a national mental health policy in the United States of America. Federal funding was made available for the establishment of 1500 centers across the country. The goal was to provide access to quality mental health care for all US citizens by 1980. As a result of prolonged criticisms, the legislation was repealed by the incoming Reagan Administration in the early 1980s, In this paper, the twenty-year lifespan of this ‘innovation’ in mental health policy is reviewed and an evaluation of some of its most pervasive criticisms are presented.


2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 768-771
Author(s):  
Mark J. Stern

Michael Katz began work on social welfare during the late 1970s with a project entitled “The Casualties of Industrialization.” That project led to a series of essays, Poverty and Policy in American History (Katz 1983), and a few years later to In the Shadow of the Poorhouse (Katz 1986). His reading in twentieth-century literature for Shadow—and the ideological and policy nostrums of the Reagan administration—allowed Katz to pivot to two books that frame contemporary welfare debates in their historical context—The Undeserving Poor in 1989 and The Price of Citizenship in 2001, as well as a set of essays Improving Poor People (Katz 1995) that he published between the two.


1981 ◽  
Vol 14 (02) ◽  
pp. 262-263
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Mann

By now most of you are aware of the severe cuts in federal funding for the social and behavioral sciences and for the humanities proposed by the Reagan Administration.At the National Science Foundation, while support for the natural sciences is slated to increase, the proposed budget for the social and economic sciences calls for a 65 percent reduction.At the National Institute of Mental Health (ADAMHA), the Administration proposes toeliminateall social research, which is expected to include research on the family, socialization of children, effects of separation and divorce, evaluation of prevention efforts with children, effects of mass media on behavior of children. In addition, the definition probably will include social policy research, research on race and ethnic relations, studies of community structure and change and studies of social institutions.


1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis

A rational strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons is a contradiction in terms. The enormity of the destruction, either executed or threatened, severs the nexus of proportionality between means and ends which used to characterize the threat and use of force. This does not mean, however, that all nuclear strategies are equally irrational. The nuclear policy of the Reagan administration—which is essentially the same as that of the Carter administration and which has its roots in developments initiated by even earlier administrations—is particularly ill-formed. As I will demonstrate, the basic reason for this is that the strategy rests on a profound underestimation of the impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy and attempts to understand the current situation with intellectual tools appropriate only in the pre-nuclear era.American strategy for the past several years—the “countervailing strategy”—has been based on the assumption that what is crucial is the ability of American and allied military forces to deny the Soviets military advantage from any aggression they might contemplate. The U.S. must be prepared to meet and block any level of Soviet force. The strategy is then one of counterforce—blocking and seeking to destroy Soviet military power. The goal is deterrence. Although it is concerned with how the U.S. would fight many different kinds of wars, both nuclear and non-nuclear, it is not correct to claim that the strategy seeks to engage in wars rather than deter them.


1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Volman

Studies of U.S. government relations with Africa have generally focused on the role of the executive branch, specifically by examining and analyzing the views and activities of administration officials and the members of executive branch bureaucracies. This is only natural, given the predominant role that the executive branch has historically played in the development and implementation of U.S. policy toward the continent. However, the U.S. Congress has always played an important role in determining U.S. policy toward Africa due to its constitutional authority over the appropriation and authorization of funding for all foreign operations conducted by the executive branch. Furthermore, Congress enacted legislation on several occasions during the Cold War period that directly affected U.S. policy. For example, Congress approved the Clark Amendment prohibiting U.S. intervention in Angola (although it later voted to repeal the amendment) and also passed the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which imposed sanctions on South Africa over the veto of the Reagan administration.


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