scholarly journals Respect for Judicial Independence

Author(s):  
Frans van Dijk

AbstractThis Chapter examines whether judges feel that their independence is respected. Three categories of actors are distinguished: the court users, the political system and the internal decision makers of the judiciary. Judges feel in the mean most respected by the internal leadership, to a lesser extent by the court users and least by the political system. In some countries judges do not feel respected by the political system at all. In the opinion of the judges, respect by the different actors has different features. Perceived respect shown by litigants has to do with absence of bribery and other forms of corruption, and inappropriate pressure. Respect by government and parliament is about the implementation of judgments by government and the case load of the judiciary. Case load depends on the resources that politicians make available. Respect by court management concerns absence of pressure on judges to adjudicate cases timely, case load and promotion of judges based on merit. Caseload is a recurring determinant of perceived respect for independence. This suggests that independence is highly affected by resource allocation.

1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nelson W. Polsby

Most people who study politics are in general agreement, it seems to me, on at least two propositions. First, we agree that for a political system to be viable, for it to succeed in performing tasks of authoritative resource allocation, problem solving, conflict settlement, and so on, in behalf of a population of any substantial size, it must be institutionalized. That is to say, organizations must be created and sustained that are specialized to political activity.1 Otherwise, the political system is likely to be unstable, weak, and incapable of servicing the demands or protecting the interests of its constituent groups. Secondly, it is generally agreed that for a political system to be in some sense free and democratic, means must be found for institutionalizing representativeness with all the diversity that this implies, and for legitimizing yet at the same time containing political opposition within the system.2Our growing interest in both of these propositions, and in the problems to which they point, can begin to suggest the importance of studying one of the very few extant examples of a highly specialized political institution which over the long run has succeeded in representing a large number of diverse constituents, and in legitimizing, expressing, and containing political opposition within a complex political system—namely, the U.S. House of Representatives.The focus of my attention here will be first of all descriptive, drawing together disparate strands—some of which already exist in the literature3—in an attempt to show in what sense we may regard the House as an institutionalized organ of government. Not all the necessary work has been done on this rather difficult descriptive problem, as I shall indicate. Secondly, I shall offer a number of speculative observations about causes, consequences, and possible lessons to be draw from the institutionalization of the House.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nelson W. Polsby

Most people who study politics are in general agreement, it seems to me, on at least two propositions. First, we agree that for a political system to be viable, for it to succeed in performing tasks of authoritative resource allocation, problem solving, conflict settlement, and so on, in behalf of a population of any substantial size, it must be institutionalized. That is to say, organizations must be created and sustained that are specialized to political activity. Otherwise, the political system is likely to be unstable, weak, and incapable of servicing the demands or protecting the interests of its constituent groups. Secondly, it is generally agreed that for a political system to be in some sense free and democratic, means must be found for institutionalizing representativeness with all the diversity that this implies, and for legitimizing yet at the same time containing political opposition within the system.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 294
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara

Indonesian constitutional reform after the fall of Soeharto’s New Order brings favorable direction for the judiciary. Constitutional guarantee of judicial independence as regulated in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, has closed dark memories in the past. This article decides that the Judiciary is held by the Supreme Court and the judicial bodies below and a Constitutional Court. Such a strict direction of regulation plus the transformation of the political system in a democratic direction should bring about the implementation of the independent and autonomous judiciary. But in reality, even though in a democratic political system and constitutional arrangement affirms the guarantee of independence, but it doesn’t represent the actual situation. There are some problems that remain, such as (i) the absence of a permanent format regarding the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Judicial Commission, and (ii) still many efforts to weaken judiciary through different ways such criminalization of judge. Referring to the problem above, then there are gaps between what "is" and what "ought", among others. First, by changing political configuration that tends to be more democratic, the judiciary should be more autonomous. In this context, various problems arise such as (i) disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations between judicial power actors, (ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over their decisions, and (iii) judicial corruption. Second, by the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, there will be no legislation that that may reduce constitutional guarantee. However, there are many legislation or regulations that still not in line with a constitutional guarantee concerning judicial independence. This paper reviews and describes in-depth about how to implement constitutional guarantees of judicial independence after the political transition and conceptualize its order to strengthen rule of law in Indonesia


Author(s):  
Wissam Saleh Abdul-Hussein Jassim Al-Rub

The Iranian Constitution of 1979 and the amendment of 1989 considered the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution the most powerful institution in influence and presence in the political system. The guide, directly or indirectly, through the agencies operating under his administration, and here we say that the political vision of the wali al-Faqih governs its authority over all the perceptions of decision-makers in their formulation and implementation of strategic decisions that achieve the goals of the Iranian regime at home and abroad.


2021 ◽  
pp. 253-283
Author(s):  
Sveinung Arnesen ◽  
Anne Lise Fimreite ◽  
Jacob Aars

This chapter examines a citizens’ panel (a ‘mini-public’) that took place in the municipality of Bergen in 2018. We begin by discussing mini-publics as innovative measures to increase participation in political systems. In the literature, the internal quality of the panels – who is recruited and included on the panel and how opinion formation is organized – is emphasized. How mini-publics affect the political/representative political system – the external quality of the panels – has not been studied as thoroughly, and is therefore the analytical starting point for our chapter. In the empirical part of the chapter, we present the panel in Bergen, how it was recruited and organized, and the recommendations it made to decision-makers in the municipality. We also explore how citizens in Bergen assess these sorts of innovative democratic measures. The chapter ends with a discussion of the mini-public’s place in a representative democracy – are mini-publics supplements or alternatives?


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-38
Author(s):  
Akhtar Hussain ◽  
Sikandar Hussain Soomro ◽  
Zohra Khatoon

Electoral systems are set of rules and procedures which determine how voters cast their votes and how the votes are converted into representative seats. Beyond this, each electoral system has its own impact on how the political system functions. From this perspective, the author has tested the discontents of the Pakistani electoral system, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) taking the election data of 2002, 2008, 2013 and 2018. The research finding showed that the FPTP electoral system is ill devised to the Pakistan’s current needs and realities. In view of such discontents, there is a genuine concern of reforming the Pakistan electoral system. The question remains, however, which electoral system best suits the Pakistani situation from the bulk of alternatives? The current paper is an attempt to build a case for introducing reforms with a focus on how to translate the votes into seats in a more representative way. For this purpose the article in its first part deals with the problems the FPTP is having in translatingthe votes into seats. In the second part data from the last four general elections are analysed to show how some of the parties having more votes and less seats and vice versa. Building the argument on this analysis the recent concerns shown by the politicians and critics of the present system are supported to build a strong case for the decision makers to bring in such changes in the system where minimum of the votes are wasted so that a true representative democracy is established in Pakistan.


1970 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus von Beyme

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF WEST GERMANY MAY BE CHARACTERIZED as a ‘penetrated system’, a notion which has been developed by James Rosenau. After the restoration of German sovereignty in 1955 , Rosenau's definition seemed less applicable to Germany, since it was defined by the fact that ‘non-members of a national society’ . . . ‘participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, either in the allocation of its values or in the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals’. Wolfram Hanrieder tried to improve the applicability of the notion of ‘penetrated system’ to Germany by broadening the scope of the concept; he no longer restricted it to ‘direct and authoritative participation of non-members’. This concept fitted the German situation better than G. Modelski's model of ‘internal war’ which has been applied to Germany by some younger scholars since the process of the division of Germany was more or less a result of the action of the great powers and only rather late was it consciously endorsed by decision makers in both parts of Germany.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 1242-1257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Kornberg ◽  
Hal H. Winsborough

Systematic empirical research into the process of political leadership recruitment has made substantial progress since World War II with emphasis given to those who occupy formal positions of authority within the political system, specifically, legislators and party activists. Generally such studies have been concerned with delineating (a) who the leaders are, (b) how and why they are where they are, and (c) the variables affecting (a) and (b).The most ambitious recent studies, in the sense that they try to deal systematically with all three aspects of recruitment, are those by Samuel J. Eldersveld, Austin Ranney, and Henry Valen. Their research, and the examples cited of other scholarship, have yielded a substantial number of propositions. Three which lend themselves to testing with data we have gathered on the recruitment of candidates for the Canadian House of Commons, 1945–65, are:1) The status of individuals recruited by a party in part is a function of the party's competitive positions. (Key, Snowiss).2) The status of individuals recruited by a party varies with the party's position on an ideological continuum (Eldersveld, Ranney, Marvick and Nixon, Valen).3) Relative urbanism and the degree of industrialization of communities affect recruitment patterns (Rokkan and Valen, Valen, Snowiss). In the present instance there should be a positive relationship between urbanism and the mean status of candidates.In testing these propositions we will compare, whenever such comparisons appear appropriate, the data for Canadian parliamentary candidates with findings from some of the previously cited studies and also indicate how, in Canada, multi-partyism is related to the status of recruited candidates.


2020 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 14-20
Author(s):  
Nodira Sardarovna Rasulova ◽  

The article examines the role and place of interest groups in civil society, their functions, specificity of activities, similarities and differences from political parties. Based on an analysis of the opinions of prominent scientists and political scientists, the main task of interest groups is shown - mediation between the state, seeking to protect common interests, and civil society, expressing private goals and interests. The possibilities of various groups of interests to influence the authorities, as well as to bring to the attention of political decision-makers, the needs and demands of the population, have been determined. Specific proposals and recommendations have been formulated aimed at increasing the political and legal activity of citizens.


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