scholarly journals The Adaptation of New Countries to Existing (Old) Institutional Frameworks

Author(s):  
Erkki Berndtson

AbstractPolitical science as an independent academic discipline emerged in Europe after the Second World War. Moreover, up until the 1990s, it was mainly a preserve of Western Europe. The discipline began to develop in Central and Eastern Europe only after the 1989/91 political upheavals. When political science was institutionalised as a discipline in Western Europe, it was helped by international organisations such as the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). It would seem, however, that European cross-national organisations do not currently promote and facilitate European political science successfully, as only a few Central and Eastern European institutions participate fully in international cooperation. The current field of European political science is organisationally fragmented, which makes it difficult to enable new countries to adapt to existing institutional frameworks, and to create an institutionalised pan-European political science discipline. Resolving this problem is vital if European political science is to develop more fully.

2019 ◽  
pp. 271-284
Author(s):  
Ken Hirschkop

The conclusion examines the situation after the Second World War. It shows how the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy ended and how the social democratic settlement in Western Europe gave birth to the new linguistic turns known as structuralism. The author explores the former by examining the career of Richard Rorty and the latter by looking at how Roland Barthes combines ideas from Saussure with a project for a radical analysis of French everyday life in the Mythologies. The book concludes with a review of how the various linguistic turns overinvested in the idea of language.


Author(s):  
Martin Conway

This chapter focuses on the consumption of democracy. What happened in the roughly twenty-five-year period from the end of the Second World War to the late 1960s is perhaps best regarded as a process of gradual acculturation. At different speeds and by different paths, a large majority of Western Europeans came to feel at home in democracy, and began to practise democracy for themselves. However, the new democracies were more equal in their formal structures than in their social reality. The reassertion of boundaries of race, gender, sexuality, and age, after the more fluid and often chaotic experiences of the war years, was reinforced by the evolving but persistent inequalities of social class. Western Europe emphatically remained a class society after 1945. The rapid economic growth that occurred during the post-war years generated new forms of affluence, but these were distributed in ways that reinforced pre-existing class divisions. In particular, the post-war years witnessed a resurgence in the fortunes of the middle class. Whether assessed in terms of its material prosperity, its influence within and over government, or its wider social and cultural ascendancy, the middle class was the dominant social class of the post-war era.


1996 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Schildt

Little more than a decade after having lost the Second World War, the society of the western part of Germany, the Federal Republic, had changed fundamentally in the eye of the observer. The economic expert Henry C. Wallich was not the only one to speak of the ‘German miracle’. Not only had the previously achieved industrial standards long been regained and surpassed, but also a boom had set in – as in all of Western Europe – which came to an end only in the 1970s. Simultaneously, both economy and society had been modernised in the process of reconstruction. The transition to a new stage of modernity, ‘society in affluence’, was discussed animatedly. The emergence of new leisure lifestyles in particular was considered a mark of present times. However, in current reviews it is often forgotten that the West German society of the 1950s was to a far greater extent determined by continuity with the interwar period and by the consequences of the war and post-war years than a first glance at the spectacular novelties suggests.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-81
Author(s):  
Chieh Huang

AbstractThe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the Word Trade Organization (WTO), have been the main forum of international trade since the end of the Second World War. The regime is unquestionably based on free-market rules and principles. Yet in the last two decades, formerly planned economies — including Eastern European countries, former Soviet countries and China — have attempted to join the GATT/WTO. To encourage their transition under the influence of free-market principles, and to be a truly global trade organization, the GATT/WTO has accepted applicants with a reforming planned economy. This article studies the evolution of the GATT/WTO's approaches to integrate non-market economies and shows that the approach to integrate non-market economies during the WTO era is significantly different than during the GATT. While special mechanisms were provided in GATT accession protocols to bridge different market structures, WTO accessions require non-market economies to convert their own market structures. This article holds that this intolerance of different market structures in the WTO reflects the collapse of embedded liberalism and the rise of coercive trade diplomacy. Multilateral trade diplomacy has therefore become a means of imposing a domestic restructuring of economic structures rather than providing a negotiation forum for trade liberalization.


2004 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 194-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herrick Chapman

Comparative studies of social policy usually portray the French welfare state as lagging behind most of its counterparts in Western Europe during the first decades of the twentieth century. The sheer complexity of the French system, moreover, with its baroque mixture of separate private, government and quasi-public funds, made it exceptional as well. Yet tardiness and complexity by no means prevented the French from expanding social insurance at an especially rapid clip in the decades following the Second World War. By 1980 France spent more on social security as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product than any country in Europe except Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. Today the French are among Europe's most stalwart defenders of publicly funded pensions and health insurance. Given its unimpressive beginnings, how did the French welfare state become such a heavyweight?


1975 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Lampe

This paper should begin with a brief defense of its title. “Variety” and “unsuccessful” are doubtful if not dirty words to most economists and many economic historians. The “success stories” of rapid development in Western Europe, Russia and Japan have been the most frequent subject of this Journal's articles on non-American topics. And the discovery of uniformity in the past, rather than variety, is admittedly essential to the development economist's search for predictability in the future that has informed so much of the economic history written since the Second World War.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-140
Author(s):  
Alin Goron

The Communist ideology called for the denial of Christianity as a form of "mysticism" filled with "superstitions", but particularly as one of the factors that impeded social, economic and cultural progress. Scientific socialism, however, was meant to awaken class consciousness, setting Romanian society on a path towards true modernity. Thus a real battle ensued on the ideological front between two entities, the secular and ecclesiastical authorities, arising from the divide between traditional religious beliefs and atheist Marxism. The actions of the authorities against religious propaganda included both practical measures, which involved activities that filled the free time of the villagers, but also coercive measures consisting in political pressure or arrests. In spite of the communist regime's efforts to impose its own cultural agenda, the effects were long overdue, with rather modest results. Romania's forced development was faced with some inherent problems of the process of modernization and industrialization. The forced imposition of a foreign ideology to a conservative Eastern European area relying on obsolete mindsets, a society where 80% of the population lived in rural areas as of the end of the Second World War, required a longer period of time than the regime had originally planned.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-109
Author(s):  
Ramojus Kraujelis

The fate of Lithuania and Romania as well as future of the whole Central and Eastern European region was determined in the years of the Second World War. The common origin of their tragic and painful history was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – the secret deal between Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, which divided Central and Eastern Europe between two totalitarian regimes. In June 1940 the three Baltic States and a part of Romania were directly occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union. The main objective of this paper is to identify, analyze and compare the attitudes of the United States and Great Britain with respect to the annexation of the Baltic States and the Romania territory and discussed the post-war future reserved to them. During the early years of the Second Word War (1940-1942) few interesting international discussions about possible post-war arrangement plans existed. The analysis of the Western attitude would enable us to give answers to certain questions: What could have been done by the Western states for the benefit of Central and Eastern European region; what have they, in fact, done and what did they avoid doing? The year 1943 witnessed the consolidation of the Western attitude with regard to Soviet Union’s western borders, which resulted in the fundamental fact that Moscow did not intend to retract its interests in the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, North Bucovina and Bessarabia while the West did not intend to fight for these territories. Considering the fact that at the Teheran conference (1943) the Western states agreed upon turning the Baltic states into a Soviet interest sphere, the United States and Britain entered the Yalta conference (1945) with no illusions as to the fate of Central and Eastern Europe in general.


Author(s):  
Dean Vuletic

Immediately following the Second World War, Eastern European communist parties employed censorship against Western popular culture, such as film and popular music, which they regarded as politically inappropriate. From the late 1950s, most parties increasingly sought to satisfy their citizens’ desires for consumption and entertainment, and they promoted the development of local cultural alternatives. The parties were not uniform in their policies, as a comparison between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia demonstrates. However, they did seek to appropriate popular culture to advance their political interests, and they similarly faced resistance from some domestic artists who criticized the government. The reluctance of the parties to allow as much freedom of consumption and expression as existed in the West, together with their inability to provide cultural goods that could keep up with Western fashions, points to popular culture as a factor that contributed to the demise of communism in Eastern Europe


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-281
Author(s):  
Vjeran Pavlaković

Yugoslav scholarship about the Spanish Civil War, specifically the Yugoslav volunteers who fought in the International Brigades, was almost exclusively tied to the partisan struggle during the Second World War and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Many countries in the Soviet bloc published books about their heroes who fought fascism before Western Europe reacted and raised monuments to Spanish Civil War veterans. However, many lost their lives during Stalinist purges of the late 1940s and early 1950s since they were potentially compromised cadres who returned to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other countries only after the Red Army's occupation. Yugoslav volunteers, however, generally had a more prominent status in the country (and historiography) since the Yugoslav resistance movement liberated the country with only minimal support from the Soviet Union.


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