Between the Fronts: Conflict and Crisis Management on the Eastern and Southern Flanks of the EU

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-78
Author(s):  
Stefan Fröhlich
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
The Eu

The European Union’s Policy towards its Eastern Neighbours: The Crisis in Ukraine

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsiana Shaban
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Policy Development ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
European Neighbourhood Policy ◽  
Significant Progress ◽  
Challenges And Opportunities ◽  
External Governance ◽  
Institutional Challenges ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

The European Union’s neighbourhood is complex and still far from being stable. In Ukraine, significant progress has occurred in many areas of transition; however, much work remains to be done, especially in the field of regional development and governance where many legacies of the Soviet model remain. At the crossroads between East and West, Ukraine presents an interesting case of policy development as an expression of European Union (EU) external governance. This paper asks the question: why was the relationship between the EU and Ukraine fairly unsuccessful at promoting stability in the region and in Ukraine? What was missing in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in Ukraine that rendered the EU unable to prevent a conflict on the ground? By identifying security, territorial, and institutional challenges and opportunities the EU has faced in Ukraine, this paper underlines the most important factors accounting for the performance of its external governance and crisis management in Ukraine.   Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v12i2.1310

scholarly journals THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE CASE OF THE EULEX MISSION IN KOSOVO

2021 ◽  
pp. 199-218
Author(s):  
Bilbil Kastrati ◽  
Samo Uhan
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Management Mechanism ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Expectations Gap ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Common Security

Abstract. The article considers whether the EU’s CSDP missions are a suitable crisis management mechanism for post-conflict situations, along with the EU’s relevance in crisis management at all. For this purpose, the EU’s biggest CSDP civilian mission EULEX was chosen as a research case study. The research results reveal that EULEX has not implemented its mandate, not met the expectations of security consumers, not made any difference on the ground, and cannot be seen as an example the EU should rely on in its future missions. Further, EULEX shows that CSDP missions suffer from many shortfalls and the EU CFSP from a capability–expectations gap. The article concludes that the EULEX mission does not show the EU’s relevance in the crisis management of post-conflict situations.

Democracy, Legitimacy, and Accountability in Euro Crisis Management

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-151
Author(s):  
Menelaos Markakis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Implementation ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Euro Crisis ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Social Legitimacy ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
Economic Developments ◽  
Horizontal And Vertical Distribution ◽  
The Eu

This chapter looks at democracy, legitimacy, and accountability in Euro crisis management. It looks at the main critiques of the EU’s response to the crisis. It will be shown that scholars in this area castigate the EMU governance framework for its shortcomings in terms of input, output, and social legitimacy. The chapter makes the case for increased democratic controls and intense inter-institutional dialogue in the functioning of the EMU. It demonstrates how the crisis-induced developments have impacted on the horizontal and vertical distribution of power in the EU and the Member States. First, more powers were conferred on the Commission, Council, and Eurogroup in the measures enacted to combat the crisis. Though the European Parliament was heavily involved in norm production and had a pretty good strike rate in getting its amendments included in the final legislation, its role in policy implementation remains minimal. Second, the EU legislature put much of its reforming faith in a new recruit to strengthen democratic control in the EMU—the national parliaments. The crisis-induced legal and economic developments have circumscribed their budgetary sovereignty in many ways, but the newly enacted rules also serve to empower them vis-à-vis the executive. Third, the de facto division between borrower and lender states might have a bearing on the intra-institutional balance of power in the EU, and the emerging patterns of geographical fragmentation threaten the unity of the EU-28. The chapter set outs concrete proposals on how to enhance transparency and accountability in the EMU.

Integrating through Crises

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-163
Author(s):  
George Pagoulatos
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Capital ◽  
Reform Agenda ◽  
National Autonomy ◽  
The Face ◽  
Joint Reaction ◽  
The Eu

EMU was a brainchild of contrasting parental personalities. Integrationist European ambition joined disparate national pursuits to create an imperfect EMU architecture, though one amenable to correction through crises. When the debt crisis hit the periphery, recessionary national adjustment was supported by insufficient Eurozone-level reforms. The EU opted for incremental crisis management and paid a price in terms of fragmentation. The Eurozone debt crisis bequeathed a contradictory legacy of both raising the visibility of the reform agenda and raising the bar of political difficulty in bringing it about, having divided Europe between (heartless) ‘creditor’ and (reckless) ‘borrower’ countries. By raising the stakes of EU failure, the Covid-19 crisis operated as a reform accelerator. The joint reaction demonstrated that the EU maintained its survival instinct, drawing on the political capital invested in its preservation. The Eurozone’s reform conundrum remains the glaring gap between what is widely admitted as necessary and what is realized as politically feasible. Consecutive reform attempts have been frustrated by country coalitions that resist movement towards further risk sharing (through the fiscal, financial or monetary channel) or deny any further transfer of national autonomy. There are ways out of the EMU straitjacket. One is formally deferring the rules. Another is saying things without doing them. A third strategy is doing things without saying them. The momentous leap of ‘Next Generation EU’ notwithstanding, EMU remains incomplete, even though confidence in its ability to survive has been greatly boosted by its resilience in the face of the two severe, consecutive crises.

ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 178-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Asseburg ◽  
Ronja Kempin
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
European Security ◽  
Global Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
The Eu

In 2003, the EU declared its civilian and military crisis management instruments ready for deployment. Since then, EU member states have demonstrated their capability to act as a global security player. They have deployed civil missions and military operations to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, the Eastern neighbourhood, the Near and Middle East, and even to Asia. Th ese engagements have encompassed a variety of approaches and tools to crisis management and stabilisation, ranging from the training of security forces and the support for the rule of law, to the provision of a military or civilian presence, to safeguard elections or to monitor border arrangements and ceasefire agreements, to the fight against piracy or other forms of organised crime. Altogether, by the end of 2009, the EU had conducted 23 missions and operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU has made considerable progress on its way to becoming a global security actor. However, case studies show that many ESDP engagements face substantial shortcomings – chief among them the lack of long-term, strategic planning for future deployments, a binding and institutionalised “lessons learned” process as well as a consistent follow-up by member states and EU institutions involved.

Emergency Keynesianism 2.0: The political economy of fiscal policy in Europe during the Corona Crisis

2020 ◽  
pp. 16-26
Author(s):  
Cornel Ban
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
The Self ◽  
Fiscal Crisis ◽  
The Political ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Spending Cuts ◽  
Deep Recession ◽  
The Eu

Fiscal policy is the sum of decisions on taxation and spending that one takes in an economy, particularly in times of crisis. As such, it is of existential importance in the life of a society. Known for its recent waves of spending cuts and tax increases (austerity) during recessions (Blyth, 2013), 2020 Europe has had a more expansionary fiscal policy than ever before. How do we make sense of this shift? To answer this question, let us draw on select insights from three political economy literatures on fiscal crisis management. The first is the literature on learning. For its proponents, changes in fiscal policy are powered by evidence-based, yet politically mediated cognitive updating in the corridors of power. Plainly put, policymakers are keen students of what changes in their environment. This literature has showed that a great deal of learning took place in the EU since 2010 in particular (Schmidt, 2020; Kahkhaji and Radaelli, 2017; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2019). Its main implication for fiscal policy under corona is that between 2010 and 2015 the EU leaders learned about the limits of austerity and the virtues of more spending and tax cuts in a recession. Consequently, one would expect that when a deep recession arrives again (and it did in the spring of 2020), they would not be tempted to do a rerun of the self-defeating policies of the 2010-2012 period. As Keynes put it, “when the facts change, I change my mind.”

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