The signaling game model under asymmetric fairness-concern information

The paper researched the screening model in enterprise competitive intelligence activity based on game theory. It studied the service provider’s decision in competitive intelligence(CI) project and proved it could be satisfied with Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It also revealed the heterogeneity between the service providers through a signaling game model in which signal set was the combine of CI quality standard term. The result shows that a quality standard about CI should be designed in contract which provides a signal for service provider to self-certify its own true type and is in favor of screening for enterprise.

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Game model of enterprises and government based on the tax preference policy for energy conservation and emission reduction

Filomat ◽

10.2298/fil1615963z ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 30 (15) ◽

pp. 3963-3974 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Guoxing Zhang ◽

Zhenhua Zhang ◽

Yongjing Cui ◽

Chun Yuan

Keyword(s):

Energy Conservation ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Optimal Number ◽

Signaling Game ◽

Game Model ◽

Tax Preference ◽

Single Period ◽

Separating Equilibrium

In recent years, greater efforts in tax preference policy for energy conservation and emission reduction (ECER) have been implemented in our country. Based on the tax preference of enterprise income for comprehensive utilization of resources, the constraints to achieve completely successful equilibrium are studied in the single period and multiple periods. In the single period, the key to achieve separating equilibrium is analyzed carefully by constructing a signaling game model of enterprises and government on tax preference of enterprise income. In the multiple periods, with the stochastic evolutionary game model based on the stochastic differential equation (SDE) theory, the constraints of keeping the separating equilibrium stable and continuing in a long term will be further investigated. It gives the optimal number of tax preference of enterprise income, camouflage cost and expected cost of risk under the state of separating equilibrium. The optimal result of completely successful equilibrium is obtained in single period by the analysis of numerical example for enterprises and government signaling game model. The simulation experiment is successfully finished to test the effectiveness of the stochastic evolutionary game model by using mathematical software MATLAB.

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Towards a Predictive Analysis of UAV-Based Flying Base Station Decisions

International Journal of Business Data Communications and Networking ◽

10.4018/ijbdcn.2020070102 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 16 (2) ◽

pp. 20-52 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Hamid Garmani ◽

Driss Ait Omar ◽

Mohamed El Amrani ◽

Mohamed Baslam ◽

Mostafa Jourhmane

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ◽

Base Station ◽

Base Stations ◽

Practical Significance ◽

Game Model ◽

Activity Scheduling ◽

Area Of Interest ◽

Aerial Vehicles ◽

Fairness Concern

The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a communication platform is of great practical significance in the wireless communications field. This paper studies the activity scheduling of unmanned aerial vehicles acting as aerial base stations in an area of interest for a specific period. Specifically, competition among multiple UAVs is explored, and a game model for the competition is developed. The Nash equilibrium of the game model is then analyzed. Based on the analysis, an algorithm for Nash equilibrium computation is proposed. Then, a game model with fairness concern is established, and its equilibrium price is also analyzed. In addition, numerical examples are conducted to determine the factors that affect the strategies (price, quality of service, and beaconing duration) of the UAV and to show how the expected profits of UAVs change with that fairness concern point. The authors believe that this research paper will shed light on the application of UAV as a flying base station.

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A theoretical signaling game model for intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks

2010 14th International Telecommunications Network Strategy and Planning Symposium (NETWORKS) ◽

10.1109/netwks.2010.5624961 ◽

2010 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Mohsen Estiri ◽

Ahmad Khademzadeh

Keyword(s):

Wireless Sensor Networks ◽

Sensor Networks ◽

Intrusion Detection ◽

Wireless Sensor ◽

Signaling Game ◽

Game Model

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Signaling Game Model of Safety Management on Construction

International Asia Conference on Industrial Engineering and Management Innovation (IEMI2012) Proceedings ◽

10.1007/978-3-642-38445-5_93 ◽

2013 ◽

pp. 893-900

Author(s):

Hong Ren ◽

Fei Xu

Keyword(s):

Safety Management ◽

Signaling Game ◽

Game Model

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A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health ◽

10.3390/ijerph16111978 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 16 (11) ◽

pp. 1978 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Qiuxiang Li ◽

Mengnan Shi ◽

Yimin Huang

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Price Adjustment ◽

Stable Region ◽

Game Model ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Return Rates ◽

Dynamic Price ◽

Price Game ◽

Fairness Concern ◽

Parameter Values

In this paper, we developed a dynamic price game model for a low-carbon, closed-loop supply chain system in which (1) the manufacturer had fairness concern and carbon emission reduction (CER) behaviors, and market share and profit maximization were their objectives, and (2) the retailer showed fairness concern behaviors in market competition and provided service input to reduce return rates. The retailer recycled old products from customers, and the manufacturer remanufactured the recycled old products. The effects of different parameter values on the stability and utility of the dynamic price game model were determined through analysis and numerical simulation. Results found that an increasing customer loyalty to the direct marketing channel decreased the stable region of the manufacturer’s price adjustment and increase that of the retailer. The stable region of the system shrank with an increase of CER and the retailer’s service level, which expanded with return rates. The dynamic system entered into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of price adjustment speed. In the chaotic state, the average utilities of the manufacturer and retailer all declined, while that of the retailer declined even more. Changes to parameter values had a great impact on the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer. By selecting appropriate control parameters, the dynamic system can return to a stable state from chaos again. The research of this paper is of great significance to participants’ price decision-making and supply chain operation management.

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Research on Quality Control of Electronics Products Based on Signal Game Model in the Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

Advanced Materials Research ◽

10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.230-232.600 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 230-232 ◽

pp. 600-604

Author(s):

Xin Ma

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Decision Making ◽

Quality Control ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Asymmetric Information ◽

Production System ◽

Signaling Game ◽

Game Model ◽

Strong Competition

Various participants in the supply chain must combine their own quality control and the relevant coordination decision-making with other enterprises to ensure they have strong competition position in the supply chain. Transactions among the manufacturers and retailers with the existence of asymmetric information in the electronic production system, as a result, the game will existent among them. In this paper, application of signal game theory to quality control of retailers are studied and the signaling game model of equilibrium to satisfy the three conditions are also be analysis.

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