scholarly journals Constitutivity in Flavour Perception

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Błażej Skrzypulec

AbstractWithin contemporary philosophy of perception, it is commonly claimed that flavour experiences are paradigmatic examples of multimodal perceptual experiences. In fact, virtually any sensory system, including vision and audition, is believed to influence how we experience flavours. However, there is a strong intuition, often expressed in these works, that not all of these sensory systems make an equal contribution to the phenomenology of flavour experiences. More specifically, it seems that the activities of some sensory systems are constitutive for flavour perception while others merely influence how we experience flavours. This paper aims to answer the question regarding the constitutive factors of flavour perception in a twofold way. First, a theoretical framework is developed, relying on debates regarding constitutivity in analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science, which defines the stronger and weaker senses in which the activities of sensory systems may be constitutive for flavour perception. Second, relying on empirical results in flavour science, the constitutive status of activities related to distinct sensory systems in the context of flavour perception is investigated.

Author(s):  
Ronald Hoinski ◽  
Ronald Polansky

David Hoinski and Ronald Polansky’s “The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism” shows how the general tendencies of contemporary philosophy of science disclose a return to the Aristotelian emphasis on both the formation of dispositions to know and the role of the mind in theoretical science. Focusing on a comparison of Michael Polanyi and Aristotle, Hoinski and Polansky investigate to what degree Aristotelian thought retains its purchase on reality in the face of the changes wrought by modern science. Polanyi’s approach relies on several Aristotelian assumptions, including the naturalness of the human desire to know, the institutional and personal basis for the accumulation of knowledge, and the endorsement of realism against objectivism. Hoinski and Polansky emphasize the promise of Polanyi’s neo-Aristotelian framework, which argues that science is won through reflection on reality.


Author(s):  
Alexander Reutlinger ◽  
Juha Saatsi

What is a scientific explanation? This has been a central question in philosophy of science at least since Hempel and Oppenheim’s pivotal attempt at an answer in 1948 (also known as the covering-law model of explanation; Hempel 1965: chapter 10). It is no surprise that this question has retained its place at the heart of contemporary philosophy of science, given that it is one of the sciences’ key aims to provide ...


Explanations are very important to us in many contexts: in science, mathematics, philosophy, and also in everyday and juridical contexts. But what is an explanation? In the philosophical study of explanation, there is long-standing, influential tradition that links explanation intimately to causation: we often explain by providing accurate information about the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. Such causal accounts have been the received view of the nature of explanation, particularly in philosophy of science, since the 1980s. However, philosophers have recently begun to break with this causal tradition by shifting their focus to kinds of explanation that do not turn on causal information. The increasing recognition of the importance of such non-causal explanations in the sciences and elsewhere raises pressing questions for philosophers of explanation. What is the nature of non-causal explanations—and which theory best captures it? How do non-causal explanations relate to causal ones? How are non-causal explanations in the sciences related to those in mathematics and metaphysics? This volume of new essays explores answers to these and other questions at the heart of contemporary philosophy of explanation. The essays address these questions from a variety of perspectives, including general accounts of non-causal and causal explanations, as well as a wide range of detailed case studies of non-causal explanations from the sciences, mathematics and metaphysics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 207 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-319
Author(s):  
Heiner Römer

AbstractTo perform adaptive behaviours, animals have to establish a representation of the physical “outside” world. How these representations are created by sensory systems is a central issue in sensory physiology. This review addresses the history of experimental approaches toward ideas about sensory coding, using the relatively simple auditory system of acoustic insects. I will discuss the empirical evidence in support of Barlow’s “efficient coding hypothesis”, which argues that the coding properties of neurons undergo specific adaptations that allow insects to detect biologically important acoustic stimuli. This hypothesis opposes the view that the sensory systems of receivers are biased as a result of their phylogeny, which finally determine whether a sound stimulus elicits a behavioural response. Acoustic signals are often transmitted over considerable distances in complex physical environments with high noise levels, resulting in degradation of the temporal pattern of stimuli, unpredictable attenuation, reduced signal-to-noise levels, and degradation of cues used for sound localisation. Thus, a more naturalistic view of sensory coding must be taken, since the signals as broadcast by signallers are rarely equivalent to the effective stimuli encoded by the sensory system of receivers. The consequences of the environmental conditions for sensory coding are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 871-881
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Brooks

Transcendental arguments are not popular in contemporary philosophy of science. They are typically seen as antinaturalistic and incapable of providing explanatory force in accounting for natural phenomena. However, when viewed as providing (certain types of) intelligibility to complicated concepts used in scientific reasoning, a concrete and productive role is recoverable for transcendental reasoning in philosophy of science. In this article I argue that the resources, and possibly the need, for such a role are available within a thoroughly naturalistic framework garnered from the work of Hasok Chang and William Wimsatt.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahid Rahman ◽  
Muhammad Iqbal

AbstractOne of the epistemological results emerging from this initial study is that the different forms of co-relational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās, represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provides new epistemological insights into legal reasoning in general but also furnishes a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning which can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied in contemporary philosophy of science. However, in the present paper we will only discuss the case of so-called co-relational inferences of the occasioning factor and only in the context of Islamic jurisprudence.


The main objective of this chapter is to present the empirical results of an experimental study carried out with 9th grade students for teaching electrical circuits. The experimental research took place during April and May 2013. In the study, the authors compared two instructional approaches (4C/ID versus conventional). Thus, the results obtained by two groups (experimental and control) on the variables ‘performance', ‘perceived mental effort', and ‘instructional efficiency' were compared. The results revealed that, globally, the experimental group obtained better performances, with less perceived mental effort (i.e., better instructional efficiency). These results were discussed in 4C/ID-model theoretical framework.


Author(s):  
William Fish

Everyone would agree that contemporary philosophical thinking and theorizing about perception should both be aware of, and consistent with, the findings of visual science. Yet despite this consensus, there is little discussion—and even less agreement—about how this should work in practice. This chapter proposes that we can gain useful insights by bringing some tools from the philosophy of science to bear on this question. Focusing on the disagreement between Burge and McDowell as to whether or not disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception is ‘directly at odds with scientific knowledge’ (Burge 2005, 29), the chapter suggests that interesting insights can be gained by seeing this debate through a Kuhnian lens—as a clash of paradigms (or, more strictly, Lakatosian research programmes)—and then investigate the methodological consequences that flow from this. It contends that looking at this debate through this lens not only sheds light on why it can seem so intractable, but also provides us with reassurance that this might be a good thing.


Author(s):  
Andrea Woody ◽  
Clark Glymour

In the late middle ages, chemistry was the science and technology closest to philosophy, the material realization of the method of analysis and synthesis. No longer. Contemporary philosophy is concerned with many sciences—physics, psychology, biology, linguistics, economics—but chemistry is not among them. Why not? Every discipline has particular problems with some philosophical coloring. Those in quantum theory are famous; those in psychology seem endless; those in biology and economics seem more sparse and esoteric. If, for whatever reason, one’s concern is the conceptual or theoretical problems of a particular science, there is no substitute for that science, and chemistry is just one among others. Certain sciences naturally touch on substantive areas of traditional philosophical concern: quantum theory on metaphysics, for example, psychology on the philosophy of mind, and economics and statistics on theories of rationality. In these cases, there is a special interest in particular sciences because they may reform prior philosophical theories or recast philosophical issues or, conversely, because philosophy may inform these subjects in fundamental ways. That is not true, in any obvious way, of chemistry. So what good, then, what special value, does chemistry offer contemporary philosophy of science? Typically philosophical problems, even problems in philosophy of science, are not confined to a particular science. For general problems—problems about representation, inference, discovery, explanation, realism, intertheoretic and interdisciplinary relations, and so on—what is needed are scientific illustrations that go to the heart of the matter without requiring specialized technical knowledge of the reader. The science needed for most philosophy is familiar, not esoteric, right in the middle of things, mature and diverse enough to illustrate a variety of fundamental issues. Almost uniquely, chemistry fits the description. In philosophy of science, too often an effort gains in weight and seriousness merely because it requires mastery of an intricate and arcane subject, regardless of the philosophical interest of what it says. Yet, surely, there is something contrived, even phony, in illustrating a philosophical point with a discussion of the top quark if the point could be shown as well with a discussion of the ideal gas law.


Sensors ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Gerhardy ◽  
Katharina Gordt ◽  
Carl-Philipp Jansen ◽  
Michael Schwenk

Background: Decreasing performance of the sensory systems’ for balance control, including the visual, somatosensory and vestibular system, is associated with increased fall risk in older adults. A smartphone-based version of the Timed Up-and-Go (mTUG) may allow screening sensory balance impairments through mTUG subphases. The association between mTUG subphases and sensory system performance is examined. Methods: Functional mobility of forty-one community-dwelling older adults (>55 years) was measured using a validated mTUG. Duration of mTUG and its subphases ‘sit-to-walk’, ‘walking’, ‘turning’, ‘turn-to-sit’ and ‘sit-down’ were extracted. Sensory systems’ performance was quantified by validated posturography during standing (30 s) under different conditions. Visual, somatosensory and vestibular control ratios (CR) were calculated from posturography and correlated with mTUG subphases. Results: Vestibular CR correlated with mTUG total time (r = 0.54; p < 0.01), subphases ‘walking’ (r = 0.56; p < 0.01), and ‘turning’ (r = 0.43; p = 0.01). Somatosensory CR correlated with mTUG total time (r = 0.52; p = 0.01), subphases ‘walking’ (r = 0.52; p < 0.01) and ‘turning’ (r = 0.44; p < 0.01). Conclusions: Supporting the proposed approach, results indicate an association between specific mTUG subphases and sensory system performance. mTUG subphases ‘walking’ and ‘turning’ may allow screening for sensory system deterioration. This is a first step towards an objective, detailed and expeditious balance control assessment, however needing validation in a larger study.


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