scholarly journals Flip a coin or vote? An experiment on the implementation and efficiency of social choice mechanisms

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Hoffmann ◽  
Sander Renes
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Decision Rule ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Decision Quality ◽  
Revealed Preferences ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Efficient Mechanisms

AbstractCorporate boards, experts panels, parliaments, cabinets, and even nations all take important decisions as a group. Selecting an efficient decision rule to aggregate individual opinions is paramount to the decision quality of these groups. In our experiment we measure revealed preferences over and efficiency of several important decision rules. Our results show that: (1) the efficiency of the theoretically optimal rule is not as robust as simple majority voting, and efficiency rankings in the lab can differ from theory; (2) participation constraints often hinder implementation of more efficient mechanisms; (3) these constraints are relaxed if the less efficient mechanism is risky; (4) participation preferences appear to be driven by realized rather than theoretic payoffs of the decision rules. These findings highlight the difficulty of relying on theory alone to predict what mechanism is better and acceptable to the participants in practice.

Social Choice Theory and Legislative Institutions

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Spatial Models ◽  
Preference Aggregation ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Forthcoming Article ◽  
Aggregation Functions ◽  
Legislative Institutions

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Please check back later for the full article.Narrowly understood, social choice theory is a specialized branch of applied logic and mathematics that analyzes abstract objects called preference aggregation functions, social welfare functions, and social choice functions. But more broadly, social choice theory identifies, analyzes, and evaluates rules that may be used to make collective decisions. So understood, social choice is a subfield of the social sciences that examines what may be called “voting rules” of various sorts. While social choice theory typically assumes a finite set of alternatives over which voter preferences are unrestricted, the spatial model of social choice assumes that policy alternatives can be represented by points in a space of one or more dimensions, and that voters have preferences that are plausibly shaped by this spatial structure.Social choice theory has considerable relevance for the study of legislative (as well as electoral) institutions. The concepts and tools of social choice theory make possible formal descriptions of legislative institutions such as bicameralism, parliamentary voting procedures, effects of decision rules (e.g., supramajority vs. simple majority rule and executive veto rules), sincere vs. strategic voting by legislators, agenda control, and other parliamentary maneuvers. Spatial models of social choice further enrich this analysis and raise additional questions regarding policy stability and change. Spatial models are used increasingly to guide empirical research on legislative institutions and processes.

scholarly journals Norway rats reciprocate help according to the quality of help they received

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 20140959 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vassilissa Dolivo ◽  
Michael Taborsky
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rule ◽  
Rattus Norvegicus ◽  
Homo Sapiens ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Decision Criterion ◽  
Perceived Quality ◽  
Perceived Benefit ◽  
Predominant Factor ◽  
Norway Rats

Direct reciprocity, according to the decision rule ‘help someone who has helped you before’, reflects cooperation based on the principle of postponed benefits. A predominant factor influencing Homo sapiens ' motivation to reciprocate is an individ­ual's perceived benefit resulting from the value of received help. But hitherto it has been unclear whether other species also base their decision to cooperate on the quality of received help. Previous experiments have demonstrated that Norway rats, Rattus norvegicus , cooperate using direct reciprocity decision rules in a variant of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, where they preferentially help cooperators instead of defectors. But, as the quality of obtained benefits has not been varied, it is yet unclear whether rats use the value of received help as decision criterion to pay help back. Here, we tested whether rats distinguish between different cooperators depending purely on the quality of their help. Our data show that a rat's propensity to reciprocate help is, indeed, adjusted to the perceived quality of the partner's previous help. When cooperating with two conspecific partners expending the same effort, rats apparently rely on obtained benefit to adjust their level of returned help.

Decision rules, social norms and the expression of disagreement: the case of qualified-majority voting in the Council of the European Union

2010 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphanie Novak
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Decision Rule ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
The Way

When a group has to make a decision, one can assume that the members’ incentives to state their position vary according to the different decision rules. Decision-making in the Council of the European Union offers an opportunity to study how a decision rule influences the way members of a group state their position. Indeed, in several areas, decisions must be made by qualified-majority voting. But the combination of this rule and of social norms specific to the Council discourages the minority from expressing itself at different stages of decision-making. Decisions seem to be made without opposition at two main stages of the decision-making process: during the plenary sessions, representatives do not vote; according to the official Council records, a high proportion of measures are adopted without opposition.

The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and Voting Strategies on Externalities

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 929-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric M. Uslaner ◽  
J. Ronnie Davis
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rule ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Optimal Result ◽  
Simple Majority Rule ◽  
Optimal Learning ◽  
Vote Trading ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

In an article, “The Paradox of Vote Trading,” (APSR 67 [December, 1973]) William H. Riker and Steven J. Brams have argued that systematic logrolling among all members of a legislature produces a paradox: While each trade is individually rational, the effects of externalities offset the potential gains from exchanging votes and each voter finds himself worse off than he would have been by voting sincerely. We extend the results of Riker and Brams to a unanimity decision rule and find that a paradox of vote trading holds for that decision rule as well as for simple majority rule. Under a unanimity rule, however, trades which would be collectively rational (i.e., which would produce a Pareto optimal result) are not individually rational; the non-trader is the beneficiary under such a decision rule. Finally, we pose the question Riker and Brams suggested: Is the paradox of vote trading inescapable? Except under very restrictive conditions, we find that it is. However, given certain assumptions about the distributions of individual utilities, we present proofs of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the Pareto optimality of vote trading and argue that in actual legislative situations, when vote trading is Pareto optimal, learning behavior should serve to extricate the members from the paradox of vote trading.

The Evolutionary Dynamics of Decision Rule Selection

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Laver ◽  
Ernest Sergenti
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rule ◽  
Positive Feedback ◽  
Party System ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Track Record ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Survival Of The Fittest

This chapter extends the survival-of-the-fittest evolutionary environment to consider the possibility that new political parties, when they first come into existence, do not pick decision rules at random but instead choose rules that have a track record of past success. This is done by adding replicator-mutator dynamics to the model, according to which the probability that each rule is selected by a new party is an evolving but noisy function of that rule's past performance. Estimating characteristic outputs when this type of positive feedback enters the dynamic model creates new methodological challenges. The simulation results show that it is very rare for one decision rule to drive out all others over the long run. While the diversity of decision rules used by party leaders is drastically reduced with such positive feedback in the party system, and while some particular decision rule is typically prominent over a certain period of time, party systems in which party leaders use different decision rules are sustained over substantial periods.

Endogenous Parties, Interaction of Different Decision Rules

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Laver ◽  
Ernest Sergenti
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rule ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Competitive Environment ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Robert Axelrod

This chapter attempts to develop more realistic and interesting models in which the set of competing parties is a completely endogenous output of the process of party competition. It also seeks to model party competition when different party leaders use different decision rules in the same setting by building on an approach pioneered in a different context by Robert Axelrod. This involves long-running computer “tournaments” that allow investigation of the performance and “robustness” of decision rules in an environment where any politician using any rule may encounter an opponent using either the same decision rule or some quite different rule. The chapter is most interested in how a decision rule performs against anything the competitive environment might throw against it, including agents using decision rules that are difficult to anticipate and/or comprehend.

scholarly journals Rats show direct reciprocity when interacting with multiple partners

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nina Kettler ◽  
Manon K. Schweinfurth ◽  
Michael Taborsky
Keyword(s):  
Time Delay ◽  
Decision Rule ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Cognitive Demands ◽  
Multiple Partners ◽  
Norway Rats

AbstractDirect reciprocity, where individuals apply the decision rule ‘help someone who has helped you’, is believed to be rare in non-human animals due to its high cognitive demands. Especially if previous encounters with several partners need to be correctly remembered, animals might either stop reciprocating favours previously received from an individual, or switch to the simpler generalized reciprocity mechanism. Here we tested the decision rules Norway rats apply when interacting with multiple partners before being able to return received help. In a sequential prisoner’s dilemma situation, focal subjects encountered four different partners that were either helpful or not, on four consecutive days. On the fifth day, the focal subject was paired with one of the previous four partners and given the opportunity to provide it with food. The focal rats returned received help by closely matching the quantity of help their partner had previously provided, independently of the time delay between received and given help, and independently of the ultimate interaction preceding the test. This shows that direct reciprocity is not limited to dyadic situations in Norway rats, suggesting that cognitive demands involved in applying the required decision rules can be met by non-human animals even when they interact with multiple partners differing in helping propensity.

scholarly journals Research on QoS Classification of Network Encrypted Traffic Behavior Based on Machine Learning

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 1376
Author(s):  
Yung-Fa Huang ◽  
Chuan-Bi Lin ◽  
Chien-Min Chung ◽  
Ching-Mu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Deep Packet Inspection ◽  
Traffic Classification ◽  
K 13 ◽  
Packet Inspection ◽  
Majority Voting Method ◽  
Encrypted Traffic ◽  
Traffic Behavior

In recent years, privacy awareness is concerned due to many Internet services have chosen to use encrypted agreements. In order to improve the quality of service (QoS), the network encrypted traffic behaviors are classified based on machine learning discussed in this paper. However, the traditional traffic classification methods, such as IP/ASN (Autonomous System Number) analysis, Port-based and deep packet inspection, etc., can classify traffic behavior, but cannot effectively handle encrypted traffic. Thus, this paper proposed a hybrid traffic classification (HTC) method based on machine learning and combined with IP/ASN analysis with deep packet inspection. Moreover, the majority voting method was also used to quickly classify different QoS traffic accurately. Experimental results show that the proposed HTC method can effectively classify different encrypted traffic. The classification accuracy can be further improved by 10% with majority voting as K = 13. Especially when the networking data are using the same protocol, the proposed HTC can effectively classify the traffic data with different behaviors with the differentiated services code point (DSCP) mark.

Decision rules, escalation of commitment and sensitivity to framing in group decision-making

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (7) ◽  
pp. 1649-1668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petru Lucian Curseu ◽  
Sandra G. L. Schruijer ◽  
Oana Catalina Fodor
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Rule ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Escalation Of Commitment ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Collaborative Decision

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test the influence of collaborative and consultative decision rules on groups’ sensitivity to framing effect (FE) and escalation of commitment (EOC). Design/methodology/approach – In an experimental study (using a sample of 233 professionals with project management experience), the authors test the effects of collaborative and consultative decision rules on groups’ sensitivity to EOC and FE. The authors use four group decision-making tasks to evaluate decision consistency across gain/loss framed decision situations and six decision tasks to evaluate EOC for money as well as time as resources previously invested in the initial decisions. Findings – The results show that the collaborative decision rule increases sensitivity to EOC when financial resources are involved and decreases sensitivity to EOC when time is of essence. Moreover, the authors show that the collaborative decision rule decreases sensitivity to FE in group decision making. Research limitations/implications – The results have important implications for group rationality as an emergent group level competence by extending the insights concerning the impact of decision rules on emergent group level cognitive competencies. Due to the experimental nature of the design, the authors can probe the causal relations between the investigated variables, yet the authors cannot generalize the results to other settings. Practical implications – Managers can use the insights of this study in order to optimize the functioning of decision-making groups and to reduce their sensitivity to FEs and EOC. Originality/value – The study extends the research on group rationality and it is one of the few experimental attempts used to understand the role of decision rules on emergent group level rationality.

The Impact of Conflict- Generating Techniques on Student Reactions and Decision Quality

1995 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 39-45
Author(s):  
Granger Macy ◽  
Joan C. Neal
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Business Students ◽  
Decision Quality ◽  
Structured Decision Making ◽  
Constructive Conflict ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Student Reactions ◽  
Graduate Business Students ◽  
The Impact

This study examined the effectiveness of conflict-generating decision-making techniques in the college classroom. Utiliz ing constructive conflict in classroom exercises may affect decision-making quality and student reactions. This study of undergraduate and graduate business students found significant difference in both the quality of the decisions and in student reactions to the techniques. The findings and discussion indicate the potential for appropriate use of structured decision-making techniques in the classroom.

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