Public sector marketing, political science and the science of public administration: the evolution of a transdisciplinary dialogue

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramón Bouzas-Lorenzo
2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-218
Author(s):  
John C. Pierce

Max Neiman provides a concise, well-written, and compre- hensive critical analysis of "the conservative attack on the public sector, especially its explanation for and evaluation of the size and growth of the public sector in the United States" (p. viii). In doing so, however, he only partially fulfills what is promised in the subtitle, namely, explaining why big govern- ment works. Rather than explicitly assess the reasons for goal achievement in a variety of policy areas, as the title implied to me, Neiman focuses on why we have big government and on the various critiques of that size. To be sure, the book is appropriate for upper division and graduate courses in political science, public policy, or public administration.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 88-105
Author(s):  
Firman Firman

Abstract: This study is about the meritocracy system of bureaucracy and the neutrality of civil state apparatus (ASN) in the face of elections to the elections. In various regions there is always a problem of bureaucratic professionalism issues. Despite the various regulations to regulate ASN to be neutral and independent so that the democratic process in this case direct election of the head of the region can run well. However, this issue is always repeated with different schemes for the lust of power and bureaucrat positions that can be facilitated or lifted / accelerated to occupy positions in the bureaucracy. Various rules and regulations were hit or forced only because they became part of the susceptibility when the pilkada was implemented. A regulation about ASN 2014 is expected to filter spoil system problems or promote a bureaucrat in certain positions only because of proximity or for being a successful team during the electionsKeywords: meritocracy system , bureaucracy, election                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Abstrak: Kajian ini tentang system meritokrasi birorkasi dan netralitas aparatur sipil negara (ASN) dalam menghadapi pilkada sampai dengan pilkada usai. Diberbagai daerah selalu muncul persoalan permasalahan profesionalisme  birorkasi. Walaupun sudah lahir berbagai regulasi untuk mengatur agar ASN bisa bersikap netral dan independen agar proses demokrasi dalam hal ini pemilihan langsung kepala daerah bisa berjalan dengan baik. Namun, persoalan ini selalu berulang dengan skema yang berbeda untuk syahwat kekuasaan dan jabatan birokrat yang bisa dimudahkan atau diangkat/dipercepat untuk menduduki posisi dalam birokrasi. Berbagai aturan dan regulasi ditabrak atau dipaksakan hanya karena menjadi bagian suskesi saat pilkada dilaksanakan. Muncul regulasi tentang ASN 2014 diharapkan bisa menfilter persoalan spoil system atau mempromosikan seorang birokrat dalam posisi tertentu hanya gara-gara kedekatan atau karena menjadi tim sukses saat pilkada  Kata kunci: Sistem Merit, Birokrasi, Pemilu  Albrow, M. (1989). Birokrasi, diterjemahkan oleh Rusli Karim dan Totok Daryanto, PT. Tiara Wacana. Jakarta.Alon-Barkat, S., & Gilad, S. (2016). Political control or legitimacy deficit? Bureaucracies' symbolic responses to bottom-up public pressures. Policy & Politics, 44(1), 41-58.Assessment of hierarchical tendencies in an Indian bureaucracy. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 20(5), 380-391Cascio, W. F. (2006). The economic impact of employee behaviors on organizational performance. California Management Review, 48(4), 41-59.Kaufman, H. (1956). Emerging conflicts in the doctrines of public administration. American Political Science Review, 50(4), 1057-1073.Laski, H. J. (2014). Parliamentary Government in England (works of Harold J. Laski): A Commentary (Vol. 9). Routledge.Martini, R. (2010). Politisasi birokrasi di Indonesia. POLITIKA Jurnal Ilmu Politik MIP, 1(1), 67-74.Nadel, M. V., & Rourke, F. E. (1975). Bureaucracies. Handbook of Political Science, 5, 373-440.Rourke, F. E. (1984). Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy. Boston: Little, Brown. RourkeBureaucracy. Politics, and Public Policy1984.Rourke, F. E. (1992). Responsiveness and neutral competence in American bureaucracy. Public Administration Review, 539-546.Setiyono, B. (2012). Birokrasi Dalam Perspektif “Politik & Administrasi” (Vol. 1). NUANSA.Soebhan, S. R. (2000). Model Reformasi Birokrasi Indonesia. Jakarta: PPW LIPI.Sudirman ://makassar.tribunnews.com/2016/08/26/daftar-nama-nama-pejabat-soppeng-yang-baru-dilantik diakses pada tanggal 2/10/2017Thoha, M., & Organisasi, P. (1993). konsep dasar dan Aplikasinya. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers.Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative theory. Transaction publishers.Woo, K. H. (2015). Recruitment Practices in the Malaysian Public Sector: Innovations or Political Responses?. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 229-246.Janesick, J., Pinter, J., Potter, R., Elliot, T., Andrews, J., Tower, J., ... & Bishop, J. (2009, August). Fundamental performance differences between CMOS and CCD imagers: part III. In Proc. SPIE (Vol. 7439, p. 743907).


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1919-1923
Author(s):  
Tatijana Ashtalkoska-Baloska ◽  
Aleksandra Srbinovska-Doncevsk

A number of abuses of power and position, daily committed for acquisition of unlawful profit, beyond of permitted and envisaged legal jobs, starting from the lowest level, to the so-called, daily corruption, which most often is related to existential needs and it acts harmless, not even grow into another form, to one that uses such profits as the main motive for generating huge illegal gains for a longer period of time, by exploiting and abusing high social position, corruption in public sector, but today already in private sector too, are part of corruption in the broadest sense, embracing all its forms, those who do not enter in zone of punishment and those who means committing of serious crime. It has many forms, but due to focusing on a particular problem, as a better way to contribute a solution, this paper will focus on the analysis of corruption in the public administration in the Republic of Macedonia, and finding measures for its prevention and reduction, which we hope will give a modest contribution to its real legal protection, not only in declarative efforts in some new strategy for its prevention and suppression.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 26-31
Author(s):  
EMIL MARKVART ◽  
◽  
DMITRY V. MASLOV ◽  
TATYANA B. LAVROVA ◽  
◽  
...  

The existing approaches to quality assessment, based on ranking and rating, perform a control function but do not give government bodies at various levels, local governments, and public sector organizations the necessary tools to improve their performance. The article is devoted to one of the modern models of quality management in the field of public administration – the European model for improving the activities of public sector organizations through the self-assessment – the Common Assessment Framework (CAF model) and the possibilities of its implementation in Russia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Lars Fuglsang ◽  
Anne Vorre Hansen ◽  
Ines Mergel ◽  
Maria Taivalsaari Røhnebæk

The public administration literature and adjacent fields have devoted increasing attention to living labs as environments and structures enabling the co-creation of public sector innovation. However, living labs remain a somewhat elusive concept and phenomenon, and there is a lack of understanding of its versatile nature. To gain a deeper understanding of the multiple dimensions of living labs, this article provides a review assessing how the environments, methods and outcomes of living labs are addressed in the extant research literature. The findings are drawn together in a model synthesizing how living labs link to public sector innovation, followed by an outline of knowledge gaps and future research avenues.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232199642
Author(s):  
Ringa Raudla ◽  
James W. Douglas ◽  
Zachary Mohr

Civil servants vary in the degree to which they hold technocratic attitudes. We explore whether bureaucrats’ exposure to politics and politicians is associated with the depoliticization dimension of the technocratic mentality. We use survey data of high-level executives in 19 European countries to explore factors that are associated with executives’ perceptions that removing issues and activities from the realms of politics leads to more farsighted policies. We find that respondents’ level of exposure to politics and politicians is indeed negatively associated with technocratic mentality. Bureaucrats have studied political science or public administration, work closer to politicians (in terms of type of organization), interact with them more frequently, and have more positive perceptions of these interactions tend to have lower levels of technocratic attitudes. Points for practitioners Beliefs affect behaviors and behaviors affect outcomes. Technocratic attitudes may limit the ability of civil servants to work effectively with politicians. We show that educational degrees that promote democratic values and exposure to politicians (particularly positive interactions) are associated with lower levels of technocratic attitudes. Given that a proper balance between political and technical knowledge can enhance organizational performance (Krause et al., 2006), these findings should be taken into account when staffing and structuring public organizations.


1973 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 661-664 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Vaison

Normally in political studies the term public policy is construed to encompass the societally binding directives issued by a society's legitimate government. We usually consider government, and only government, as being able to “authoritatively allocate values.” This common conception pervades the literature on government policy-making, so much so that it is hardly questioned by students and practitioners of political science. As this note attempts to demonstrate, some re-thinking seems to be in order. For purposes of analysis in the social sciences, this conceptualization of public policy tends to obscure important realities of modern corporate society and to restrict unnecessarily the study of policy-making. Public policy is held to be public simply and solely because it originates from a duly legitimated government, which in turn is held to have the authority (within specified limits) of formulating and implementing such policy. Public policy is public then, our usual thinking goes, because it is made by a body defined somewhat arbitrarily as “public”: a government or some branch of government. All other policy-making is seen as private; it is not public (and hence to lie essentially beyond the scope of the disciplines of poliitcal science and public administration) because it is duly arrived at by non-governmental bodies. Thus policy analysts lead us to believe that public policy is made only when a government body acts to consider some subject of concern, and that other organizations are not relevant to the study of public policy.


1952 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 660-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roscoe C. Martin

By tradition public administration is regarded as a division of political science. Woodrow Wilson set the stage for this concept in his original essay identifying public administration as a subject worthy of special study, and spokesmen for both political science and public administration have accepted it since. Thus Leonard White, in his 1930 article on the subject in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, recognizes public administration as “a branch of the field of political science.” Luther Gulick follows suit, observing in 1937 that “Public administration is thus a division of political science ….” So generally has this word got around that it has come to the notice of the sociologists, as is indicated in a 1950 report of the Russell Sage Foundation which refers to “political science, including public administration….” “Pure” political scientists and political scientists with a public administration slant therefore are not alone in accepting this doctrine, which obviously enjoys a wide and authoritative currency.But if public administration is reckoned generally to be a child of political science, it is in some respects a strange and unnatural child; for there is a feeling among political scientists, substantial still if mayhap not so widespread as formerly, that academicians who profess public administration spend their time fooling with trifles. It was a sad day when the first professor of political science learned what a manhole cover is! On their part, those who work in public administration are likely to find themselves vaguely resentful of the lack of cordiality in the house of their youth.


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