scholarly journals Science and policy in extremis: the UK’s initial response to COVID-19

Author(s):  
Jonathan Birch

AbstractDrawing on the SAGE minutes and other documents, I consider the wider lessons for norms of scientific advising that can be learned from the UK’s initial response to coronavirus in the period January–March 2020, when an initial strategy that planned to avoid total suppression of transmission was abruptly replaced by an aggressive suppression strategy. I introduce a distinction between “normatively light advice”, in which no specific policy option is recommended, and “normatively heavy advice” that does make an explicit recommendation. I argue that, although scientific advisers should avoid normatively heavy advice in normal times in order to facilitate democratic accountability, this norm can be permissibly overridden in situations of grave emergency. SAGE’s major mistake in early 2020 was not that of endorsing a particular strategy, nor that of being insufficiently precautionary, but that of relying too heavily on a specific set of “reasonable worst-case” planning assumptions. I formulate some proposals that assign a more circumscribed role to “worst-case” thinking in emergency planning. In an epilogue, I consider what the implications of my proposals would have been for the UK’s response to the “second wave” of late 2020.

Author(s):  
Frederick H. White

One of Russia’s greatest twentieth-century poets, Aleksander Aleksandrovich Blok (1880–1921) was a representative of the ‘second wave’ of Russian Symbolists. Two books of poetry, Verses on a Beautiful Lady (1904) and Inadvertent Joy (1907), and his lyric drama, The Showbooth, staged in 1906, made him famous. Paradoxically, Blok began to openly mock his former Symbolist ideals after 1905, even as he was considered by many to be the leader of Russian Symbolism. In particular, Blok was concerned with the widening gulf between the common people and the intelligentsia. As his disillusionment deepened, his poetry was haunted by a sense of imminent catastrophe. Therefore, his initial response to the revolution of 1917 was positive, seeing in it an apocalyptic moment that would bring renewal and regeneration after a period of chaos and destruction. This idea was realized in his poem The Twelve (1918) which celebrates the October Revolution and placed Christ at the head of a gang of Red Army soldiers. Blok, however, soon realized that the Bolsheviks would not embody the revolutionary ideals that he wished to support, causing him to become disenchanted and deeply depressed. Blok only lived for another three and a half years, dying in August 1921.


Author(s):  
Kevin Quigley

Organization theorist Lee Clarke (2005) argues when policy makers plan for disasters, they too often think in terms of past experiences and “probabilities.” Rather, policy makers, when planning to protect the infrastructure, should open their minds to worst-case scenarios; catastrophes that are possible but highly unlikely. Underpinned by a precautionary principle, such an approach to the infrastructure would be more likely to produce “out of the box” thinking and in so doing, reduce the impact of disasters that occur more frequently than people think. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the utility of Clarke’s worst-case planning by examining Y2K preparations at two US government agencies, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The data concerning Y2K come mostly from official US government sources, interviews, and media analysis. The chapter concludes that the thoroughness of worst-case planning can bring much needed light to the subtlety of critical complex and interdependent systems. But such an approach can also be narrow in its own way, revealing some of the limitations of such a precautionary approach. It potentially rejects reasonable efforts to moderate risk management responses and ignores the opportunity costs of such exhaustive planning.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Gregory D. Bothun

The initial estimate of the flow rate of now liberated crude oil following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil platform turned out to be a factor of 50 times lower than the physical reality. This initial estimate, provided by the corporate owner of the oil platform, British Petroleum (BP), was a leak rate of 1,000 barrels per day (bpd). This number was not based on any scientific approach and was never put into context, for the media or the public, of whether this was a big or small number (i.e., how many bpd is equivalent to filling a bathtub for 24 h) and was simply accepted as the physical reality. As a consequence, the initial response to the disaster would plan for a scope that was much smaller than what ultimately unfolded. Furthermore, since 1,000 bpd turns out to be a small number, the initial strategy was based on the belief that the leak could be patched and therefore a fix was manageable. Here we show that (a) simple physical reasoning at the time of the occurrence would have lead to initial estimates that were close to the final estimate (determined 2 months after the initial incident) of about 50,000 bpd; (b) there was an unnecessarily slow time evolution to involve the scientific community to gather relevant data that would vastly improve the estimate and; (c) this slow evolution in unmasking the physical reality of the situation prevented a more robust governmental response to the problem. Even though the government, through National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), revised the leak rate to 5,000 bpd one week after the disaster, another month would elapse before it was officially recognized that the leak rate was essentially 10 times higher.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 345-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kari Stokke ◽  
Jon Rødal

ABSTRACT The Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO) is responsible for oil spill response, planning, and preparedness on behalf of the companies that are operating on the Norwegian continental shelf The responsibility includes initial response offshore, as well as coastal protection and shoreline cleanup. NOFO is developing a plan for regional oil spill preparedness to be implemented in 2001. The plan is based on risk assessment and covers planned oil production activities in the Norwegian offshore sector. Previously, NOFO's oil spill response plan was based on authority requirements and recognized standards. NOFO is now proposing a risk-based approach, aiming to identify the need for oil spill response in different areas of the Norwegian sector. The new approach is based on estimated probability of oil spill situations, dimensioning oil spill scenarios, and oil drift modeling to define arrival time to shore, coastal areas at risk, and amount of oil that may possibly reach the shore. The risk-based approach is an alternative to traditional “worst case” considerations and allows implementation of more cost-effective measures.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahad M. Al-Ward

One of the main challenges to treatment of lung cancer with radiation therapy is the tumor motion due to respiration. Previously, a novel approach was developed to generate treatment plans which compensate for respiratory motion and its variations. The worst case method is based on combining two intensity maps from two 4D plans optimized on the two worst cases of motion variations. The worst case planning method was previously tested on simulated motion variations. The goal of this project was to further test the worst case approach on realistic patient motion variations and treatment planning data. Two approaches to combining worst case plans were investigated: the first method takes the average of the two intensity maps, and the second method takes the maximum intensity of the two intensity maps. The robustness of worst case plans was compared with ITV plans and nominal 4D plans on three different motion variation scenarios. Study 1 and 2 investigated the robustness of the worst case methods on amplitude variations and patient motion variations on simulated image data. Study 3 investigated the robustness of the worst case methods on patient motion variations using real patient image data. The average intensity worst case method was only robust to Study 3 motion variations. The maximum intensity worst case method, the margin based, and the nominal approaches were not robust to any of the motion variations. Further evaluation over a wide range of tumour sizes, motion amplitudes and variability is required to determine the clinical applicability of the worst case planning method.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahad M. Al-Ward

One of the main challenges to treatment of lung cancer with radiation therapy is the tumor motion due to respiration. Previously, a novel approach was developed to generate treatment plans which compensate for respiratory motion and its variations. The worst case method is based on combining two intensity maps from two 4D plans optimized on the two worst cases of motion variations. The worst case planning method was previously tested on simulated motion variations. The goal of this project was to further test the worst case approach on realistic patient motion variations and treatment planning data. Two approaches to combining worst case plans were investigated: the first method takes the average of the two intensity maps, and the second method takes the maximum intensity of the two intensity maps. The robustness of worst case plans was compared with ITV plans and nominal 4D plans on three different motion variation scenarios. Study 1 and 2 investigated the robustness of the worst case methods on amplitude variations and patient motion variations on simulated image data. Study 3 investigated the robustness of the worst case methods on patient motion variations using real patient image data. The average intensity worst case method was only robust to Study 3 motion variations. The maximum intensity worst case method, the margin based, and the nominal approaches were not robust to any of the motion variations. Further evaluation over a wide range of tumour sizes, motion amplitudes and variability is required to determine the clinical applicability of the worst case planning method.


Author(s):  
Rachel A. Fabian ◽  
Yvonne Najah Addassi

ABSTRACT 1141476 Major oil spills in California have historically instigated legislation aimed at improving preparedness and response. Most recently, public concern over management of high-profile pipeline spills precipitated the 2017 passage of Assembly Bill (AB) 1197, which mandated a certification program for spill management teams (SMTs). AB 1197 directs contingency plan holders to identify a certified SMT capable of managing their reasonable worst-case spill (RWCS) volumes, and tasks the Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) with adopting regulations establishing criteria for certification, including personnel on-scene times, training, and response objectives. We aimed to develop regulations detailing requirements that are achievable, but effectively advance preparedness, drawing upon accepted standards while incorporating mechanisms for flexibility. As we developed the regulations, we conducted informal scoping meetings with industry to fine-tune these mechanisms. We created three tiers for certification delineated by RWCS volume. To account for phased resource mobilization, we established separate requirements for initial response and cascading SMT personnel. We applied team-based training requirements to initial responders and used pared-down National Incident Management System qualifications for cascading personnel, allowing equivalent courses and/or experience to substitute for required training courses. We composed a short objectives checklist, aiming to capture essential tasks to be completed within the first 24 hours. The final regulatory package strikes balances between flexibility and prescription, and between achievability and advancing statewide preparedness.


2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1185-1209 ◽  
Author(s):  
VIRGINIA BERRIDGE

A key current concern is how scientific knowledge may inform policy in relation to major environmental and health concerns. There are distinct schools of analysis about this relationship between science and policy. They stress rational relationships; denial and delay; or the role of networks. History is important in modifying such perspectives: smoking policy in the 1950s and 1960s is the case study here. The initial response in the 1950s to the link between smoking and lung cancer was in part conditioned by the role of the tobacco industry and the financial importance of tobacco: the British tobacco industry had closer relationships with government than the American one, and did not rely on public relations. Public health interests worked with the industry. But politicians were concerned also about the fluidity of the epidemiological evidence; the dangers of stirring up further pressure over air pollution; the financial and ideological implications of health education and its location; and the electoral dangers of intervening in a popular mass habit. In the 1960s the British and American medical reports stimulated the growth of a public health ‘policy community’. The initial political considerations began to weaken and these years marked the beginning of a new style of public health.


Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Ferrante

Background: The novel coronavirus disease is an ongoing pandemic that started in China in December 2019. This paper is aimed at estimating the first two infections waves in Italy in relation to adopted health policies.Design and methods: We moved deaths of the Italian COVID-19 registry from recorded to infection date by the weighted moving average. We considered two infection fatality ratios related to the effective or saturated health system, we estimated the likely incidence curve from the resulting deaths and evaluated the curve shape before and after the national health policies.Results. From the 24th of February 2020 to the 7th of February 2021, we estimated 6,664,655 (4,639,221-9,325,138) cases distributed on two waves. Suitable daily infection fatality rates were 2.53% within the first wave and 1.15% within the second one. The first wave (February-July 2020) had its peak on the 14th of March 2020 (26,575). The second wave (August 2020-February 2021) was fatter with the peak on the 12th of November (60,425) and a hump in December before decreasing to 26,288 at the end. Adopted health policies were followed by changes in the curve rate.Conclusion: Tracing infection contacts and quarantining asymptomatic people reduced virus lethality in the second wave.  Restriction on population mobility is effective within a suppression strategy, distance learning reduces contacts among families. Removal of restrictions should be implemented by sequential steps for avoiding a quick rising of incident cases. A reasonable public health daily goal to control both virus spread and lethality could be to find at least 87 cases for each death.


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