Accelerated aging of the brain transcriptome by the common chemotherapeutic doxorubicin

2021 ◽  
pp. 111451
Author(s):  
Alyssa N. Cavalier ◽  
Zachary S. Clayton ◽  
David A. Hutton ◽  
Devin Wahl ◽  
Julie A. Reisz ◽  
...  
Author(s):  
William P. Wergin ◽  
Eric F. Erbe

The eye-brain complex allows those of us with normal vision to perceive and evaluate our surroundings in three-dimensions (3-D). The principle factor that makes this possible is parallax - the horizontal displacement of objects that results from the independent views that the left and right eyes detect and simultaneously transmit to the brain for superimposition. The common SEM micrograph is a 2-D representation of a 3-D specimen. Depriving the brain of the 3-D view can lead to erroneous conclusions about the relative sizes, positions and convergence of structures within a specimen. In addition, Walter has suggested that the stereo image contains information equivalent to a two-fold increase in magnification over that found in a 2-D image. Because of these factors, stereo pair analysis should be routinely employed when studying specimens.Imaging complementary faces of a fractured specimen is a second method by which the topography of a specimen can be more accurately evaluated.


Author(s):  
Ann-Sophie Barwich

How much does stimulus input shape perception? The common-sense view is that our perceptions are representations of objects and their features and that the stimulus structures the perceptual object. The problem for this view concerns perceptual biases as responsible for distortions and the subjectivity of perceptual experience. These biases are increasingly studied as constitutive factors of brain processes in recent neuroscience. In neural network models the brain is said to cope with the plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus regularities on the basis of previous experiences. Drawing on this development, this chapter analyses perceptions as processes. Looking at olfaction as a model system, it argues for the need to abandon a stimulus-centred perspective, where smells are thought of as stable percepts, computationally linked to external objects such as odorous molecules. Perception here is presented as a measure of changing signal ratios in an environment informed by expectancy effects from top-down processes.


Author(s):  
Walter Ott

Descartes’s treatment of perception in the Optics, though published before the Meditations, contains a distinct account of sensory experience. The end of the chapter suggests some reasons for this oddity, but that the two accounts are distinct is difficult to deny. Descartes in the present work topples the brain image from its throne. In its place, we have two mechanisms, one purely causal, the other inferential. Where the proper sensibles are concerned, the ordination of nature suffices to explain why a given sensation is triggered on the occasion of a given brain motion. The same is true with regard to the common sensibles. But on top of this purely causal story, Descartes re-introduces his doctrine of natural geometry.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiziano Flati ◽  
Silvia Gioiosa ◽  
Giovanni Chillemi ◽  
Andrea Mele ◽  
Alberto Oliverio ◽  
...  

AbstractStressful experiences are part of everyday life and animals have evolved physiological and behavioral responses aimed at coping with stress and maintaining homeostasis. However, repeated or intense stress can induce maladaptive reactions leading to behavioral disorders. Adaptations in the brain, mediated by changes in gene expression, have a crucial role in the stress response. Recent years have seen a tremendous increase in studies on the transcriptional effects of stress. The input raw data are freely available from public repositories and represent a wealth of information for further global and integrative retrospective analyses. We downloaded from the Sequence Read Archive 751 samples (SRA-experiments), from 18 independent BioProjects studying the effects of different stressors on the brain transcriptome in mice. We performed a massive bioinformatics re-analysis applying a single, standardized pipeline for computing differential gene expression. This data mining allowed the identification of novel candidate stress-related genes and specific signatures associated with different stress conditions. The large amount of computational results produced was systematized in the interactive “Stress Mice Portal”.


2021 ◽  
Vol 231 ◽  
pp. 189-197
Author(s):  
Jalmar Teeuw ◽  
Anil P.S. Ori ◽  
Rachel M. Brouwer ◽  
Sonja M.C. de Zwarte ◽  
Hugo G. Schnack ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
James Deery

AbstractFor some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.


Hypertension ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 894-903 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Tzourio ◽  
Stéphane Laurent ◽  
Stéphanie Debette
Keyword(s):  

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 703-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Hoyos Flight

2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (6s1) ◽  
pp. 368A-368A
Author(s):  
Julie A. Owen ◽  
Oscar Velasquez ◽  
Patricia S. Levin ◽  
Yan Wang ◽  
Harish Krishnan ◽  
...  

2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Landreth ◽  
John Bickle

We briefly describe ways in which neuroeconomics has made contributions to its contributing disciplines, especially neuroscience, and a specific way in which it could make future contributions to both. The contributions of a scientific research programme can be categorized in terms of (1) description and classification of phenomena, (2) the discovery of causal relationships among those phenomena, and (3) the development of tools to facilitate (1) and (2). We consider ways in which neuroeconomics has advanced neuroscience and economics along each line. Then, focusing on electrophysiological methods, we consider a puzzle within neuroeconomics whose solution we believe could facilitate contributions to both neuroscience and economics, in line with category (2). This puzzle concerns how the brain assigns reward values to otherwise incomparable stimuli. According to the common currency hypothesis, dopamine release is a component of a neural mechanism that solves comparability problems. We review two versions of the common currency hypothesis, one proposed by Read Montague and colleagues, the other by William Newsome and colleagues, and fit these hypotheses into considerations of rational choice.


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