The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry
about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of
procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour,
necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers.
Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either
insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach
explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of
democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the
nature of the epistemic justification of democracy and the best theoretical
framework for harmonizing political and epistemic values. I also inquire
whether the proposed division of epistemic labour and the inclusion of
experts can indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without
jeopardizing political justification. More specifically, I argue in favour
of three theses. First, not only democratic procedures but also the outcomes
of democracy, as a social system, need to be epistemically virtuous. Second,
democracy?s epistemic virtues are more than just a tool for achieving
political goals. Third, an appropriate division of epistemic labour has to
overcome the limitations of both individual and collective intelligence.
How non-epistemic values can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification
