Does Consciousness Disappear in Dreamless Sleep?

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (12) ◽  
pp. 871-882 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Windt ◽  
Tore Nielsen ◽  
Evan Thompson
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Fisk

Abstract In two of Rachmaninov's last works, the Rhapsody on a Theme of Paganini of 1934 and the first of the Symphonic Dances of 1940, a stylistic contrast between an opulently scored lyrical theme and the more angular, dissonant music that surrounds that theme throws into relief the extent that Rachmaninov's musical language had changed and developed since his first great successes thirty years earlier with the Second Piano Concerto and the Second Symphony. The words that motivate a similar stylistic contrast in the song Son (Sleep), composed in 1917, near the end of his most compositionally productive years, suggest an interpretive reading of such a stylistic contrast: the earlier, lusher style is associated here with dreams, and hence with memories; while the later, sparer, more tonally ambiguous style accompanies an evocation of something more impersonal, in the case of the song the stillness of a dreamless sleep. Some of the developing aspects of Rachmaninov's style revealed in these later examples are already evident even in the more traditional-sounding pieces of the last decade (1907––17) of his Russian period, which is shown in an analysis of the piano Prelude in G## Minor of 1910. Even this seemingly traditional Prelude, but more and more in his later music, Rachmaninov emerges as an indisputably twentieth-century composer.



BMJ ◽  
1902 ◽  
Vol 2 (2177) ◽  
pp. 918-918 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Hall
Keyword(s):  


2013 ◽  
pp. 1127-1143
Author(s):  
Giulio Tononi ◽  
Chiara Cirelli

Sleep is a state of reduced responsiveness to environmental stimuli, usually associated with immobility and stereotyped postures. It is universal and tightly regulated, suggesting that it is likely to serve some essential function. However, that function remains unclear. In this chapter we examine how sleep is traditionally subdivided into different stages that alternate in the course of the night, discuss the brain areas that determine whether we are asleep or awake, and summarize the negative consequences of sleep deprivation. We then discuss how brain activity changes between sleep and wakefulness and consider how this leads to the characteristic modifications of consciousness experienced during dreaming and dreamless sleep. Finally, we turn to the paramount but still mysterious question of sleep function.



2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Thompson

One of the major debates in classical Indian philosophy concerned whether consciousness is present or absent in dreamless sleep. The philosophical schools of Advaita Vedānta and Yoga maintained that consciousness is present in dreamless sleep, whereas the Nyāya school maintained that it is absent. Consideration of this debate, especially the reasoning used by Advaita Vedānta to rebut the Nyāya view, calls into question the standard neuroscientific way of operationally defining consciousness as “that which disappears in dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up or dream.” The Indian debate also offers new resources for contemporary philosophy of mind. At the same time, findings from cognitive neuroscience have important implications for Indian debates about cognition during sleep, as well as for Indian and Western philosophical discussions of the self and its relationship to the body. Finally, considerations about sleep drawn from the Indianmaterials suggest that we need a more refined taxonomy of sleep states than that which sleep science currently employs, and that contemplative methods of mind training are relevant for advancing the neurophenomenology of sleep and consciousness.



2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-61
Author(s):  
Nikolaus Lehner

AbstractMuch has been written about dreaming, but deep, dreamless sleep still seems to receive little attention within cultural studies and social science. This article analyses Georges Perec's A Man Who Sleeps and Ottessa Moshfegh's My Year of Rest and Relaxation in terms of the phantasm of metamorphosis enabled by sleep. These two novels show that the polarity of waking and dreaming can be relativized and shifted to the polarity between waking-dreaming/sleeping: This shift becomes particularly productive when it comes to the question of losing and finding ones identity, but also when we try to shed light on the relationship between (ideological or biographical) subjectification and self-overcoming. At the centre of this article is the notion of the sovereignty of sleep, which could allow both day life and dream life to be lifted out of joint.



Author(s):  
Adriana Alcaraz-Sanchez

AbstractThis paper presents a pilot study that explores instances of objectless awareness during sleep: conscious experiences had during sleep that prima facie lack an object of awareness. This state of objectless awareness during sleep has been widely described by Indian contemplative traditions and has been characterised as a state of consciousness-as-such; while in it, there is nothing to be aware of, one is merely conscious (cf. Evans-Wentz, 1960; Fremantle, 2001; Ponlop, 2006). While this phenomenon has received different names in the literature, such as ‘witnessing-sleep’ and ‘clear light sleep’ among others, the specific phenomenological profile of this state has not yet been rigorously studied. This paper aims at presenting a preliminary investigation of objectless consciousness during sleep using a novel tool in qualitative research that can guide future research. Five participants experiencing objectless consciousness during sleep were interviewed following the Micro-phenomenological Interview technique (MPI; Petitmengin, 2005, 2006). All participants reported an experience they had during sleep in which there was no scenery and no dream. This period labelled as ‘No Scenery/Void’ was either preceded by the dissolution of a lucid dream or by other forms of conscious mentation. The analysis of the results advances four experiential dimensions during this state of void, namely (1) Perception of absence, (2) Self-perception, (3) Perception of emotions, and (4) Perception of awareness. While the results are primarily explorative, they refer to themes found in the literature to describe objectless sleep and point at potential avenues of research. The results from this study are taken as indications to guide future operationalisations of this phenomenon.



Philosophy ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-211
Author(s):  
N. M. L. Nathan

You have a body, but you are a soul or self. Without your body, you could still exist. Your body could be and perhaps is outlasted by the immaterial substance which is your soul or self. Thus the substance dualist. Most substance dualists are Cartesians. The self, they suppose, is essentially conscious: it cannot exist unless it thinks or wills or has experiences. In this paper I sketch out a different form of substance dualism. I suggest that it is not consciousness but another immaterial feature which is essential to the self, a feature in one way analogous to a non-dispositional taste. Each self has moreover a different feature of this general kind. If this is right then simple and straightforward answers are available to some questions which prove troublesome to the Cartesian, consciousness-requiring type of substance dualist. I mean the questions, How can the self exist in dreamless sleep?, What distinguishes two simultaneously existing selves, and What makes a self the same self as a self which exists at some other time?



Author(s):  
Anil K. Seth ◽  
Adam B. Barrett ◽  
Lionel Barnett

An outstanding challenge in neuroscience is to develop theoretically grounded and practically applicable quantitative measures that are sensitive to conscious level. Such measures should be high for vivid alert conscious wakefulness, and low for unconscious states such as dreamless sleep, coma and general anaesthesia. Here, we describe recent progress in the development of measures of dynamical complexity, in particular causal density and integrated information . These and similar measures capture in different ways the extent to which a system's dynamics are simultaneously differentiated and integrated. Because conscious scenes are distinguished by the same dynamical features, these measures are therefore good candidates for reflecting conscious level. After reviewing the theoretical background, we present new simulation results demonstrating similarities and differences between the measures, and we discuss remaining challenges in the practical application of the measures to empirically obtained data.



Human Studies ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-202
Author(s):  
Corey Anton
Keyword(s):  


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