Two approaches to theory acceptance in ethics

1996 ◽  
pp. 81-102
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser

This chapter articulates Adam Smith’s philosophy of science. The first section emphasizes the significance of Smith’s social conception of science—science takes place, not always comfortably, within a larger society and is itself a social enterprise in which our emotions play a crucial role. Even so, in Smith’s view science ultimately is a reason-giving enterprise, akin to how he understands the role of the impartial spectator. The second and third sections explain Smith’s attitude to theorizing and its relationship, if any, to Humean skepticism. Smith distinguishes between theory acceptance and the possibility of criticism; while he accepts fallibilism, he also embraces scientific revolutions and even instances of psychological incommensurability. His philosophy is not an embrace of Humean skepticism, but a modest realism. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of Smith’s analysis of scientific systems as machines.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
William Rawleigh

The currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – theories and methods. However, the ontology underlying the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy includes questions/topics as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia.  I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ad infintum. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0001]: Accept the following definition of question: Question ≡ a topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0002]: Accept the ontology of epistemic elements with theories, methods, and questions as distinct epistemic elements. Reject the previously accepted ontology of epistemic elements. [Sciento-2018-0003]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2018-0002] is accepted, accept that the epistemic stance that can be taken by an epistemic agent towards a question is question acceptance (the opposite is unacceptance), defined as follows:  Question Acceptance ≡ a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0004]: Provided that modifications [Sciento-2018-0002] and [Sciento-2018-0003] are accepted, accept the following question as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry:  Mechanism of Question Acceptance: How do questions become accepted as legitimate? What is the mechanism of question acceptance?  Indicators of Question Acceptance: What are the historical indicators of theory acceptance? How can observational scientonomists establish that such-and-such a question was accepted as a legitimate topic of inquiry by a certain epistemic agent at a certain time?


2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingo Brigandt

The ‘death of evidence’ issue in Canada raises the spectre of politicized science, and thus the question of what role social values may have in science and how this meshes with objectivity and evidence. I first criticize philosophical accounts that have to separate different steps of research to restrict the influence of social and other non-epistemic values. A prominent account that social values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive risk. It maintains that the more severe the social consequences of erroneously accepting a theory would be, the more evidence is needed before the theory may be accepted. However, an implication of this position is that increasing evidence makes the impact of social values converge to zero; and I argue for a stronger role for social values. On this position, social values (together with epistemic values and other empirical considerations) may determine a theory's conditions of adequacy, which among other things can include considerations about what makes a scientific account unbiased and complete. I illustrate this based on recent theories of human evolution and the social behaviour of non-human primates, where some of the social values implicated are feminist values. While many philosophical accounts (both arguments from inductive risk and from underdetermination) conceptualize the relevance of social values in terms of making inferences from evidence, I argue for the need for a broader philosophical framework, which is also motivated by issues pertaining to scientific explanation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 893-900
Author(s):  
Daniel K. Maduku

Using an integrated conceptual model that incorporated the theories of unified theory acceptance and use of technology, social cognition, and institution-based trust, in the context of mobile banking (m-banking) use, I investigated the moderating effect of use experience on the relationships among the factors of acceptance (performance expectancy, effort expectancy, self-efficacy, and structural assurance) and behavioral intention to use m-banking. Data for empirical testing of the model were obtained through a survey of 401 retail-banking customers in South Africa. Although the proposed model was supported by the data, the moderating effects of use experience on the factors of behavioral intention were nonsignificant, except in the relationship between structural assurance and behavioral intention. The implications of these findings for efforts aimed at accelerating the acceptance of m-banking services are discussed.


2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Elsamahi

This paper explores the conceptual dimension in theory acceptance, throws light on the notion of coherence between theories, and emphasizes the role of coherence between theories in theory acceptance. It is important, however, to recognize that the empirical-conceptual distinction, like most other distinctions in philosophy, is only pragmatic because purely empirical or conceptual notions in science are rare. That is, the term ‘conceptual’ is actually used in the sense of ‘mostly conceptual’, and the term ‘empirical’ signifies what is predominantly empirical. Yet it is useful in many contexts to speak of conceptual and empirical merits of theories separately. Among the commonly discussed conceptual merits of a theory are internal consistency, simplicity, comprehensiveness, and coherence with existing theories. Empirical merits include accommodating known evidence and passing experimental tests. The focus of this paper is coherence between theories.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tri Ciptaningsih

This article discuss about the impact of e-tax invoice as the new tax aplication launched by the Directorate General of Taxation . In this article, we will explain about several rules that related to the main topic and Theory Acceptance Model (TAM). Explanation includes several factors which indicated influencing taxpayer behavior in e-tax invoice usage. Those factors are perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, perceived of Fairness and trust, Norms, attitude, and behavioral intention. Key Words: e-tax invoice, theory acceptance model (TAM), and Tax compliance.


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