Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and the Tools of the New Institutional Economics: Water Rights and Water Markets

2010 ◽  
pp. 272-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary D. Libecap
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Water Rights ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Water Markets

scholarly journals On fuzzy frontiers and fragmented foundations: some reflections on the original and new institutional economics

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Human Motivation ◽  
Golden Triangle ◽  
Key Points ◽  
Dynamic Analyses ◽  
Douglass North

AbstractThese reflections are prompted by the papers by Ménard (2014) and Ménard and Shirley (2014). Their essays centre on the path-breaking contributions to the ‘new institutional economics’ (NIE) by Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson. In response, while recognising their substantial achievements, it is pointed out that these three thinkers had contrasting views on key points. Furthermore, Ménard's and Shirley's three ‘golden triangle’ NIE concepts – transaction costs, property rights and contracts – are themselves disputed. Once all this is acknowledged, differences of view appear within the NIE, raising interesting questions concerning its identity and boundaries, including its differences with the original institutionalism. There are sizeable overlaps between the two traditions. It is argued here that the NIE can learn from the original institutionalism, particularly when elaborating more dynamic analyses, and developing more nuanced, psychologically-grounded and empirically viable theories of human motivation.

New Institutional Economics and Economic Development

2021 ◽  
pp. 27-40
Author(s):  
Manolis Manioudis ◽  
Giorgos Meramveliotakis
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Political Discourse ◽  
Power Relations ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Institutional Framework

In recent years, the concept of “institutions” has become central in scientific and political discourse. This reflects an increasing awareness of the role of institutions in the functioning of economies and in economic development more generally. Many of the catchphrases articulated within new institutional economics such as “institutions,” “organisations,” “transaction costs,” “property rights,” and “contracts” have become very common in orthodox economics discourse. This development is intellectually stimulating and interesting because it raises some fundamental issues with regard to the role and functioning of institutions. These concepts are seated on Smith's idea of the “harmony of interests.” However, Smith sees power as dominant in the formation of institutional framework. This chapter aims to provide a Smithian critique based on the notion of power, arguing that the formation of institutions and institutional framework cannot be considered apart from the intrinsic power relations which are vested in society.

Pouring Water out of the Tub, Do not Forget the Baby! (On the Correlation of Antimonopoly Policy and Economic Development)

2003 ◽  
pp. 111-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Mutual Exclusion ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Constructive Criticism ◽  
Bundle Of Rights ◽  
Analytical Tools

Key arguments on mutual exclusion of antimonopoly policy and economic development are criticized in the article. Analytical tools of the New Institutional Economics are used to identify the background of antimonopoly policy: property rights as a bundle of rights, externalities, transaction costs, comparative analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Perspective directions of constructive criticism and development of antimonopoly policy have been indicated.

Governing the Environment: the Intitutional Economics Approach

2009 ◽  
pp. 61-86
Author(s):  
Arild Vatn
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Specific Area ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Neoclassical Economics ◽  
Institutional Perspective ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Plural Rationalities ◽  
Jel Classifications

- Analyzing environmental governance implies foremost to analyze institutional structures and their implications. In doing so, the present paper utilizes insights primarily from the tradition of classical institutional economics. The paper is divided in three. In the first part I describe the main features of the classical position and compare it briefly with that of neoclassical economics and the tradition of new institutional economics. In the second part I clarify what is considered the main aspects of governance as seen from an institutional perspective. In part three I move to the more specific area of environmental governance. The concept of resource regimes is defined. Moreover I analyze how different regimes influence which environmental problems appear and how they can be treated. I discuss how institutions influence the formation and articulation of knowledge and values, how they form and protect interests, how they influence the level of transaction costs and hence the possibilities for coordination, and finally how they form the motivations underlying human choices in concrete contexts. Given that all these variables are shown to be endogenous to the institutional system, the use of comparative analysis in the assessment of various governance options is emphasized.Keywords: classical institutional economics, interdependence, resource regimes, value articulation, interest protection, transaction costs, plural rationalities.JEL classifications: B52; Q50; D02; D70.

scholarly journals Gender and Transaction Costs in Use of Zero Grazing Net for Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis Control in Stall Feeding Systems in Kenya

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Jared Isaboke Mose
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Survey Design ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Tsetse Fly ◽  
Cross Sectional Survey ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Zero Grazing

Trypanosomiasis is a widespread constraint in livestock production, mixed farming and human health in Africa. Several technologies have been developed to ameliorate the effects of the disease but delivery of these technologies to farmers has been undertaken on trial and error basis without a proper strategy leading to more failure than success and wastage of scarce resources. The purpose of this paper was to carry out an analysis of transaction costs incurred in accessing and using insecticide treated net in tsetse and trypanosomiasis control among smallholder cattle farms in Busia County, Kenya. The study utilized cross–sectional survey design and was guided by the New Institutional Economics approach and utilized stratified and simple random sampling technique to get 211 respondents for the study. Data was collected by use of structured questionnaires and analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Conjoint analysis results for zero grazing net showed that cost was the most important factor influencing farmers’ decision, accounting for 38.52% of the total while durability and availability each accounted for 25% and retreatability accounted for 10% of the decisions. Further t-test results showed that there were significant differences between men and women with respect to attribute scores (at 99 d.f. and alpha = 0.05%) suggesting that men and women face different transaction costs in accessing T&T control technologies. Therefore there is need for gender sensitive strategies in T&T technology design and dissemination. Tsetse fly and Trypanosomiasis control by use of low cost technologies such as insecticide treated zero grazing net should be promoted by government and other development partners. The net should be affordable, available at supply outlets close to farmers, long lasting and re-treatable for famers to take it up.

Re-Thinking the Role of Institutions in Neoliberalism From New Institutional Economics Perspective

2020 ◽  
pp. 25-40
Author(s):  
Ilke Civelekoglu ◽  
Basak Ozoral
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Fertile Ground

In an attempt to discuss neoliberalism with a reference to new institutional economics, this chapter problematizes the role of formal institutions in the neoliberal age by focusing on a specific type of formal institution, namely property rights in developing countries. New institutional economics (NIE) argues that secure property rights are important as they guarantee investments and thus, promote economic growth. This chapter discusses why the protection of property rights is weak and ineffective in certain developing countries despite their endorsement of neoliberalism by shedding light on the link between the institutional structure of the state and neoliberalism in the developing world. With the political economy perspective, the chapter aims to build a bridge between NIE and political economy, and thereby providing fertile ground for the advancement of NIE.

scholarly journals Barriers to exit encountered by small farms in light of the theory of new institutional economics

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (No. 6) ◽  
pp. 277-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satola Lukasz ◽  
Wojewodzic Tomasz ◽  
Sroka Wojciech
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Financial Resources ◽  
Small Farms ◽  
Production Resources

For at least 25 years, processes involving structural changes have been growing more and more intense in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with these processes including a decline in the number of small farms. The main aim of this paper is to present the mechanisms involved in, as well as barriers to and costs preventing the exit of farms from agriculture, including those that make it difficult to transfer production resources which are being released to other companies. This research takes the form of an overview and is based on the output of new institutional economics, and on transaction cost and rent-seeking theories in particular. The most frequent difficulties encountered in the process of exit from farming include low profitability of production and the shortage of capital among potential buyers, while the lack of sellers’ financial resources and the necessity of incurring expenses related to preparing and finalising the sale of resources held by them (the actual transaction costs related to closing down farms) are frequently overlooked. The most important barriers preventing the complete liquidation of farms are the inherent transaction costs categorised as expenses, as well as the emotional costs and costs of alternatives, which are difficult to evaluate and estimate. The following notions are particularly helpful in explaining barriers to exit from farming: the concept of transaction costs and rent-seeking theory, which are both a part of the stream of thought of new institutional economics.

scholarly journals Let’s Break the Law: Transaction Costs and Advance Rent Deposits in Ghana’s Housing Market

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-354
Author(s):  
Kofi Oteng Kufuor
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Housing Market ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Financial Burden ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
The Law

A feature of the Ghana private rental accommodation market is that landlords usually demand advance rent of, in some instances, up to 5 years before signing a tenancy agreement. This is in violation of the 1963 Rent Act and recent initiatives are in the direction of curing this problem in the interest of protecting prospective tenants. However while advance rent is a financial burden this is offset by transaction costs in the housing market. Hence, in this paper and influenced by New Institutional Economics, I argue that it is possible for tenants and landlords to continue to bargain outside the shadow of the law to secure mutually beneficial tenancy agreements.

Governance in der Waldwirtschaft | Governance in forest economy

2003 ◽  
Vol 154 (2) ◽  
pp. 42-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Hostettler
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Basic Concept ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Governance Structures

The Swiss forest economy has been trying for many years to improve logistics in the chain of the added value of wood. This work addresses necessary reforms to the system within the context of new institutional economics. The basic concept is explained, transaction costs of markets and hierarchies are presented systematically and the forms of governance structures outlined. The example of Swiss forest economy shows that fruitful points of departure can be developed aimed at reforming the vertical and horizontal relations between enterprises, as well as internal questions of governance. A pre-condition to achieve more efficient governance in forest economy is the reduction of restrictive institutions, whether formal or informal.

scholarly journals Gender and Transaction Costs in Crush-Pen Spraying for Trypanosomiasis Control in Kenya

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 144
Author(s):  
Jared Isaboke Mose
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Survey Design ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
Simple Random Sampling ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Tsetse Fly ◽  
Group Affiliation ◽  
Cross Sectional Survey ◽  
Cross Sectional

Trypanosomiasis a widespread constraint in livestock production, mixed farming and human health in Africa has necessitated development of several technologies to ameliorate the effects of the disease. However delivery of these technologies to farmers has been undertaken on trial and error basis without a proper strategy leading to more failure than success and wastage of scarce resources. The purpose of this paper was to carry out an analysis of transaction costs associated with the use of communal crushpen in tsetse fly and trypanosomiasis control among smallholder cattle farms in Busia County, Kenya. The study utilized cross-sectional survey design and was guided by the New Institutional Economics approach. Stratified and simple random sampling technique was adopted to get 211 respondents. Data was collected by use of structured questionnaires and analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Conjoint results showed that price was the most important factor influencing the farmers’ decision for crushpen use, accounting for 55.58%; distance accounted for 20.7% while trust accounted for 14.6% and group affiliation 8.7%. It is recommended that crush pens should be close to farms, managed by trustworthy people preferably belonging to farmers’ groups and charges levied for spraying the cows should be within the reach of farmers. The necessity of developing affordable Tsetse fly and Trypanosomiasis control methods in the war against Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis is supported by this study.

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