New Institutional Economics and Economic Development

2021 ◽  
pp. 27-40
Author(s):  
Manolis Manioudis ◽  
Giorgos Meramveliotakis
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Political Discourse ◽  
Power Relations ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Institutional Framework

In recent years, the concept of “institutions” has become central in scientific and political discourse. This reflects an increasing awareness of the role of institutions in the functioning of economies and in economic development more generally. Many of the catchphrases articulated within new institutional economics such as “institutions,” “organisations,” “transaction costs,” “property rights,” and “contracts” have become very common in orthodox economics discourse. This development is intellectually stimulating and interesting because it raises some fundamental issues with regard to the role and functioning of institutions. These concepts are seated on Smith's idea of the “harmony of interests.” However, Smith sees power as dominant in the formation of institutional framework. This chapter aims to provide a Smithian critique based on the notion of power, arguing that the formation of institutions and institutional framework cannot be considered apart from the intrinsic power relations which are vested in society.

Pouring Water out of the Tub, Do not Forget the Baby! (On the Correlation of Antimonopoly Policy and Economic Development)

2003 ◽  
pp. 111-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Mutual Exclusion ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Constructive Criticism ◽  
Bundle Of Rights ◽  
Analytical Tools

Key arguments on mutual exclusion of antimonopoly policy and economic development are criticized in the article. Analytical tools of the New Institutional Economics are used to identify the background of antimonopoly policy: property rights as a bundle of rights, externalities, transaction costs, comparative analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Perspective directions of constructive criticism and development of antimonopoly policy have been indicated.

Re-Thinking the Role of Institutions in Neoliberalism From New Institutional Economics Perspective

2020 ◽  
pp. 25-40
Author(s):  
Ilke Civelekoglu ◽  
Basak Ozoral
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Fertile Ground

In an attempt to discuss neoliberalism with a reference to new institutional economics, this chapter problematizes the role of formal institutions in the neoliberal age by focusing on a specific type of formal institution, namely property rights in developing countries. New institutional economics (NIE) argues that secure property rights are important as they guarantee investments and thus, promote economic growth. This chapter discusses why the protection of property rights is weak and ineffective in certain developing countries despite their endorsement of neoliberalism by shedding light on the link between the institutional structure of the state and neoliberalism in the developing world. With the political economy perspective, the chapter aims to build a bridge between NIE and political economy, and thereby providing fertile ground for the advancement of NIE.

scholarly journals Frontiers and economic institutions in Brazil: an approach focused on the new institutional economics

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
André Cutrim Carvalho
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Collective Behavior ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Surrounding Environment ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
Economic Relationship ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The present article seeks to discuss the meaning (s) of frontiers in Brazil and the role of institutions in the process of economic development through the new institutional economics. Any pattern of collective behavior characterizes an institution, and as such determines the “rules of the game”. The frontier represents a socio-economic relationship of production because the structure of society in building a frontier is dominated (in)directly by capital. In Brazil, the movement to occupy land on the frontier does not usually occur through contingent smallholders, but rather through a mixture of different social segments, such as: migrants, “landless” males, farmers and entrepreneurs, all seeking land to occupy, to produce and to speculate. The main conclusion is that a developed institutional system may help to promote economic development by structuring the surrounding environment and stimulating the process of cooperation, innovation and learning in the frontier regions of Brazil.

scholarly journals On fuzzy frontiers and fragmented foundations: some reflections on the original and new institutional economics

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Human Motivation ◽  
Golden Triangle ◽  
Key Points ◽  
Dynamic Analyses ◽  
Douglass North

AbstractThese reflections are prompted by the papers by Ménard (2014) and Ménard and Shirley (2014). Their essays centre on the path-breaking contributions to the ‘new institutional economics’ (NIE) by Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson. In response, while recognising their substantial achievements, it is pointed out that these three thinkers had contrasting views on key points. Furthermore, Ménard's and Shirley's three ‘golden triangle’ NIE concepts – transaction costs, property rights and contracts – are themselves disputed. Once all this is acknowledged, differences of view appear within the NIE, raising interesting questions concerning its identity and boundaries, including its differences with the original institutionalism. There are sizeable overlaps between the two traditions. It is argued here that the NIE can learn from the original institutionalism, particularly when elaborating more dynamic analyses, and developing more nuanced, psychologically-grounded and empirically viable theories of human motivation.

scholarly journals Illuminating the formal–informal dichotomy in land development on the basis of transaction cost theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan Darabi ◽  
Danon Jalali
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Land Development ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Transaction Cost Theory ◽  
Financial Return ◽  
Partial Ownership ◽  
Informal Development

Transaction cost theory is largely used to investigate the formal domain of land and housing. In the informal domain, however, this perspective has been employed largely as a supplement in addressing the other fundamental notion in new institutional economics—property rights—despite the possibility that informality in land development can emerge regardless of the informality or formality of such rights. To cover this gap, this study developed a theoretical framework based on transaction cost theory to explain the formal–informal dichotomy in land development. The proposed framework maintains that land development depends on engaging in transactions that involve total or partial ownership of a combination of capital and land through lease and/or sale contracts, which enable landowners to earn from the new rental prices produced by the increase in land prices. Landowners are afforded two avenues from which to reduce transaction costs, namely, formal and informal institutional frameworks, each defining and enforcing restrictive rules on agents’ actions. These avenues, however, are simultaneously a source of new transaction costs that can affect the expected financial return of land development. Landowners therefore tend to choose the institutional framework that entails lower transaction costs but enables higher gains. Thus, the higher transaction costs associated with a formal institutional framework are the primary deterrents to the selection of this structure. In turn, informal land development continues to expand, regardless of the existence of formal prohibitive measures. We investigated the formal–informal dichotomy in the rural land development process in Tehran Province, Iran. The results indicated that transaction costs cause inefficiency in formal institutions, thereby driving the perpetuation of informal development.

scholarly journals “How is these kids meant to make it out the ghetto now?” Community cohesion and communities of laughter in British multicultural comedy

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Ilott
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Heritage ◽  
Political Discourse ◽  
Power Relations ◽  
Young Men ◽  
Gang Members ◽  
Community Based ◽  
Community Cohesion ◽  
British Muslims ◽  
Shared Laughter

This article uses readings of Mark Mylod’s Ali G Indahouse, Joe Cornish’s Attack the Block, and Chris Morris’s Four Lions to argue against a political trend for laying the blame for the purported failure of British multiculturalism at the hands of individual communities. Through my readings of these comic films, I suggest that popular constructions of “community” based on assumptions about cultural and religious homogeneity are rightly challenged, and new communities are created through shared laughter. Comedy’s structural engagement with taboo means that stereotypes which have gained currency through media and political discourse that seeks to demonize particular groups of young men (Muslims and gang members, for example) are foregrounded. By being brought to the forefront and exposed, these stereotypes can be engaged with and challenged through ridicule and demonstrations of incongruity. Furthermore, I suggest that power relations are made explicit through joking structures that work to include or exclude, meaning that the comedies can draw and redraw communities of laughter in a manner that effectively challenges notions of communities as discrete, homogeneous, and closely connected to cultural heritage. The article works against constructions of British Muslims as the problem community par excellence by using multicultural discourse to contextualize the representation of British Muslims and demonstrate how the discourse has repressed the role of political, social, and economic structures in a focus on “self-segregating” communities.

Governing the Environment: the Intitutional Economics Approach

2009 ◽  
pp. 61-86
Author(s):  
Arild Vatn
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Specific Area ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Neoclassical Economics ◽  
Institutional Perspective ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Plural Rationalities ◽  
Jel Classifications

- Analyzing environmental governance implies foremost to analyze institutional structures and their implications. In doing so, the present paper utilizes insights primarily from the tradition of classical institutional economics. The paper is divided in three. In the first part I describe the main features of the classical position and compare it briefly with that of neoclassical economics and the tradition of new institutional economics. In the second part I clarify what is considered the main aspects of governance as seen from an institutional perspective. In part three I move to the more specific area of environmental governance. The concept of resource regimes is defined. Moreover I analyze how different regimes influence which environmental problems appear and how they can be treated. I discuss how institutions influence the formation and articulation of knowledge and values, how they form and protect interests, how they influence the level of transaction costs and hence the possibilities for coordination, and finally how they form the motivations underlying human choices in concrete contexts. Given that all these variables are shown to be endogenous to the institutional system, the use of comparative analysis in the assessment of various governance options is emphasized.Keywords: classical institutional economics, interdependence, resource regimes, value articulation, interest protection, transaction costs, plural rationalities.JEL classifications: B52; Q50; D02; D70.

scholarly journals Gender and Transaction Costs in Use of Zero Grazing Net for Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis Control in Stall Feeding Systems in Kenya

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Jared Isaboke Mose
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Survey Design ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Tsetse Fly ◽  
Cross Sectional Survey ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Zero Grazing

Trypanosomiasis is a widespread constraint in livestock production, mixed farming and human health in Africa. Several technologies have been developed to ameliorate the effects of the disease but delivery of these technologies to farmers has been undertaken on trial and error basis without a proper strategy leading to more failure than success and wastage of scarce resources. The purpose of this paper was to carry out an analysis of transaction costs incurred in accessing and using insecticide treated net in tsetse and trypanosomiasis control among smallholder cattle farms in Busia County, Kenya. The study utilized cross–sectional survey design and was guided by the New Institutional Economics approach and utilized stratified and simple random sampling technique to get 211 respondents for the study. Data was collected by use of structured questionnaires and analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Conjoint analysis results for zero grazing net showed that cost was the most important factor influencing farmers’ decision, accounting for 38.52% of the total while durability and availability each accounted for 25% and retreatability accounted for 10% of the decisions. Further t-test results showed that there were significant differences between men and women with respect to attribute scores (at 99 d.f. and alpha = 0.05%) suggesting that men and women face different transaction costs in accessing T&T control technologies. Therefore there is need for gender sensitive strategies in T&T technology design and dissemination. Tsetse fly and Trypanosomiasis control by use of low cost technologies such as insecticide treated zero grazing net should be promoted by government and other development partners. The net should be affordable, available at supply outlets close to farmers, long lasting and re-treatable for famers to take it up.

Institutions

2019 ◽  
pp. 30-41
Author(s):  
Stefan Voigt
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Research Area ◽  
Economic Transformation ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Transformation Property ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Political Transformation ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Transformation Processes

This chapter offers a look at transformation processes from the perspective of the new institutional economics (NIE). It briefly describes the main pillars of this research area, including its assumptions, the definition of institutions, and their interplay. It is shown that the NIE can contribute to explaining the outcome of transformation processes by pointing at the different institutions relied upon during transition. In the section surveying the large literature on institutions and transition, special focus is laid on the role of constitutions for political transformation, property rights for economic transformation, and internal or informal institutions as institutions largely exempt from deliberate transformation which can, hence, constitute an important constraint in transformation processes. The chapter concludes by pointing out some research gaps.

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